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Publius as Prophet?

Danny Atkinson, Oklahoma State University

The Federalist Papers have been described as the Framers' "message to mankind." They have been lauded by Presidents, scholars, and world leaders. Jefferson described them as "the best commentary on the principles which was ever written." The eighty-five essays (comprising about 75,000 words) were published initially in New York but later in other states beginning in late October of 1787 and were completed in the Spring of 1788 (although their publication was not completed until that Fall). The idea for the series of essays came from Hamilton after publication of a severe criticism of the Framers in the New York newspapers by the anonymous Cato. Decided what was needed was a series of essay explaining and justifying the proposed Constitution, he recruited John Jay and James Madison to be a part of the project. Due to illness Jay ended up only authoring five of the essays. Hamilton authored 55 with Madison authoring 25.

While the essays have been nearly universally lauded for their insight, this paper attempts to determine how accurate they were in predicting how the Presidency would function. There were eleven essays devoted to the Executive Branch, all authored by Hamilton. Those essays (Numbered 67 through 77) were chosen for this study.

FEDERALIST NO. 67: Recess Appointments

Federalist 67 is about recess appointments. If that seems like an esoteric subject, it was the subject of a rather important U.S. Supreme Court case as recently as the Obama Presidency.

Before discussing that case, what does Publius have to say concerning recess appointments?

The Constitution stipulates that Presidents will have the authority to appoint certain officers. Article II, Section 2 stipulates that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. But it continues, stipulating that the Congress may by Law vest the appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone.

Since the Brownlow Commission ended its report in 1937 with "The President needs help," the executive branch has grown considerably and with it a great number of presidential appointments. Indeed, the Committee's recommendations formed the basis of the Reorganization Act of 1939 and the creation of the Executive Office of the President. One of Political Scientist and Presidential expert Fred Greenstein's traits of the modern presidency is that the presidential office has become an extensive bureaucracy designed to enable presidents to undertake a legislative program and to regularly engage in direct policymaking (with the need for congressional approval).

One would think that with the vast expansion of the Executive branch, the number of recess appointments would also increase. They have. As several presidential scholars have pointed out, "Recent presidents have made surprisingly frequent use of recess appointments. However, since that conclusion the U.S. Supreme Court has legitimized a process whereby the opposition political Party, if controlling the Senate, has devised a plan for thwarting such appointments. It is done by having a Senator enter the empty chamber every three days, bang the gavel, and then continue this process till the Senate returns. This process was challenged by the Obama administration, but the

challenge was unsuccessful with the Supreme Court. The Court gave its approval to the strategy. The Court, in accepting the three-day “bang-the gavel” strategy, argued that this was too short a time to evaluate nominees.

WHAT WOULD PUBLIUS SAY?

Of course, Publius states nothing relating to the facts of Canning decision. However, there is a connection between the Supreme Court’s decision in *Canning* and *Federalist* No. 67.

In *Federalist* 67 Publius debunks a bizarre and misguided interpretation of what we today refer to as a recess appointment. A few of the characterizations made of Cato’s argument are “supercilious,” “exaggerated,” “counterfeit,” and “fallacy.” To what are these referring? They are referring to the Anti-Federalist argument that the language we today refer to as the recess appointment clause, would allow the President to fill (by appointment) vacancies in the U.S. Senate. Yet, as Publius points out, that power belongs to state Governors, AS SPECIFIED IN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT (Article I, Section 3)!

Here is how Publius made the point concerning how Cato described what the proposed Constitution specified concerning vacancies in the U.S. Senate: “. . . the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a power which by the instrument reported is expressly allotted to the executives of the individual states.” Cato was obviously incorrect. Although Publius thinks the error is intentional.

This is obvious by what he writes later in the essay. He refers to the “error” as a “misrepresentation,” which is “unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real merits of the Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people.”

FEDERALIST NO. 68: Electing the President

This essay is devoted exclusively to the electoral college. Unlike the preceding essay, in this one Hamilton takes more of an “informative” approach seeking to spell out how the method of electing the President (the electoral college) will work. As such, is a good primer on that subject, except for the rather significant changes that were made with the Twelfth Amendment (ratified in 1804).

Hamilton opens the essay on a very positive note. “The mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.” He goes further and states if “it be not perfect, it is at least excellent.”

One point about the operation of the electoral college, however, stands out in a rather surprising way. It has to do with how the electors will be chosen. Under the Constitution of 1787 the manner of choosing electors is not specified. It is no surprise, therefore, to learn that various methods of doing this have been used throughout U.S. history. For example, early in the nation’s history it was not unusual to assign the choosing of electors to be done by the state legislature. Indeed, in Section II the Constitution assigns each state legislature the authority to determine how the electors shall be chosen. Yet, during the early portion of the Constitution’s history, four states allowed voters to choose the electors. By the end of the Civil War, however, each state legislature had given the power of choosing the electors to the voters.

Another issue, independent of who chose the electors was how the electoral votes would be allocated. In the period following the Civil War the preferred method was the General Ticket System. Under this system whichever presidential ticket got the most popular votes in a state was

awarded all of the state's electoral votes. However, since the 1960s two states have allocated their state's electoral votes using the District Plan. Under this Plan, the popular votes for the presidential tickets are broken down by congressional districts with one electoral vote awarded for each congressional district. Two additional electoral votes are allocated based on the statewide popular vote. An alternative method known as the Proportional Plan was put to a vote in Colorado in 2016. Had it passed it would have allowed the state's electoral vote to be proportioned to each candidate based on the percentage of popular votes received. It didn't pass.

While the Constitution is silent concerning how the electoral votes are determined, *Federalist* No. 68 isn't. Publius does something in this essay that is not that uncommon in the 85 essays. Publius will sometimes give a hint as to how he would like for "things" that are not clearly delineated in the Constitution to work. This he does concerning the selecting of electors in No. 68. He "hints" that states will allow the people to select the electors. As already mentioned, this may explain why originally four states did so. Here are some examples of these "hints".

In the second paragraph he writes, "It was desirable that a sense of the people would operate in the choice of [the President]." In the next paragraph he refers to the electors as being "selected by their fellow citizens. . . ." In paragraph five he refers to an "act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of [the electors]." In paragraph six he writes, "Another and no less important desideratum was that the executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves." And in paragraph seven he seems to throw all caution to the wind and assert, "All these advantages will be happily combined in the plan devised by the convention, which is, THAT THE PEOPLE OF EACH STATE SHALL CHOOSE A NUMBER OF PERSONS AS ELECTORS . . . who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President (emphasis added). In short, while specifying that voters will chose the electors was not specified in the Constitution, Publius treats the subject as settled—the people should be allowed to choose them!

As indicated, .

FEDERALIST NO. 69: Commander-in-Chief

Federalist No. 69 is not devoted to a single constitutional provision pertaining to the Executive Branch. It touches on every provision pertaining to the Executive Branch. In this essay Publius compares each provision with what the New York constitution stipulates concerning its governor, and also compares the U.S. presidency with the King of England. That is the "good news" concerning the essay. The "bad news" is that because of this, Publius does not go into depth concerning any one constitutional provision.

Publius does highlight, in paragraph three, that the Framers did not put a limit on the number of terms a president could serve. That, of course, was modified by the Twenty-second Amendment which limits a president to two elected terms. That Amendment was a result of Republicans, then in control of Congress, of proposing a two-term limit following the fourth term for Franklin Roosevelt. In *Federalist* No. 72 Publius devotes an entire essay to the rationale for not relying on term limits. That essay will be discussed later.

Concerning the Constitution's assigning of the President to be Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, but points out that "this would amount to *nothing more than* supreme command of the [military]...as first general. Given the tremendous power the Commander-in-Chief title as lent to past Presidents, it would seem that Publius viewed the role (with the "nothing more" comment) as being much less powerful than Presidents historically have viewed it. Even today,

when debating a subject, if a person adds, “I mean nothing more than” they tend to be downplaying their point rather than enhancing it.

Finally, later in the essay Publius emphasizes that while the King of England may declare war, the President cannot. Under the U.S. Constitution only Congress may constitutionally take our nation from a state of peace to a state of war.

FEDERALIST NO. 70: Singular v. Plural

The notion of having a plural executive was rather hotly debated at the Constitutional Convention. This explains why Publius devoted an entire essay to why the Framers rejected this proposal. Publius introduces this topic by asserting that the Framers saw the need for a “vigorous” executive. Apparently, Publius would agree with the adage “divide and conquer” arguing that a plural executive would be much easier, for example, for Congress to dominate the Executive Branch composed of a plural executive. Concerning this, he introduces a logical syllogism. It goes like this:

A plural executive is a feeble executive.

A feeble executive results in a feeble government.

A feeble government is another name for bad execution.

A government ill executed is a bad government.

Having made his “feeble” argument concerning a plural Executive, the question for Publius then becomes, how vigorous should the office of President be? To address this question Publius asks another question: What are the “ingredients” of energy in the Executive? He answers that they are: (1) unity; (2) duration; (3) adequate provision for its support; and (4) competent powers. He follows by asserting what “ingredients” constitute “safety” in a republic. They are (1) a due dependence on the people and (2) a due responsibility.

The rest of *Federalist* No. 70 is devoted to a discussion of “unity”. By this Publius meant a single executive instead of a plural executive. In announcing this Publius credits the Framers with wisdom of knowing that “energy” is a necessary quality in the executive and is most likely to be found in one individual. Not only is “unity” in the executive conducive to energy, it is also conducive to “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” A plural executive, which was proposed at the Constitutional Convention, would have destroyed these traits.

Publius notes that a plural executive destroyed the Roman government. Likewise with governments having a single executive with strong councils assisting them (namely, New York and New Jersey). Both, Publius argues, destroy unity in the government. Both result in dissensions in the government. Both teach this lesson in government: do not be enamored with plurality in the executive. The public may split, aligning themselves with the quarreling executives. Also, while disagreements are somewhat natural in the legislative branch, they counteract the most important traits of the executive: vigor and expedition.

Yet, perhaps the strongest argument for opposing a plural executive (either type) is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. Near the end of the 1960s a scholar of the U.S. Presidency wrote an article about the “swelling of the Presidency”? Publius’ point seems well taken considering the enormous amount of time the hearings in Congress took investigating two of the most significant scandals of the modern era: Watergate and Iran-Contra.

Anyone familiar with these two major scandals knows that most of the investigation into them was in sorting out all the “finger-pointing” concerning who did what and how involved each of the actors were. Without the logic supplied by Publius at the beginning of this essay it would have been all but impossible to assign responsibility for what was clearly scandalous, if not illegal,

behavior. As it was, Watergate lead to the resignation of a President. Iran-contra lead to prison sentences.

FEDERALIST NO. 71: Term of Office

In this essay Publius discusses the second trait needed for an energetic executive: duration (or a sufficiently lengthy term of office). According to Publius a proper length of time to serve provides a firmness and results in an interest in the job. He argues that it is a fact of human nature that people are more interested in and more willing to risk more for things securely held.

These views are summarized in what might be considered the best quote from the essay.

The republican principle demands that the deliberate sense of the Community should govern the conduct of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation that the people commonly intend the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always reason right about the *means* of promoting it. They know from experience that they sometimes err; and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset as they continually are by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it.

Publius compares the policies that might emerge from the House of Representatives which might be popular, especially at first, with the voters. After all, House members have two year terms (and would therefore be more susceptible to such policies). As such the House could be thought of as a “hot” institution: give the people what they want when they want it. Hence, the importance in providing the President has with a longer term of office. As Publius puts it this is a greater guarantee that he will provide a more “cool and deliberate” sense of the community. For he has to calculate how the people will react to his leadership up to possibly four years after he has acted.

Showing one of his greatest traits, Publius then turns the tables and asks if maybe a four-year term is too short, so why not go ahead and make it even shorter to at least guard against an overly ambitious President? He responds by arguing that a four year term is long enough for a president to be deliberative in his actions without worrying about constant re-election, but not so long as to infract on individual liberty.

It has already been pointed out that James Madison was the Father of the Constitution. One study has determined that of those issues on which Madison took a “strong” position, his position was successful (in becoming a part of the Constitution) 77 percent of the time. One of the reasons Madison had such a large role on the writing of the Constitution was the fact that he authored the so-called “Randolph Plan.” This Plan was introduced on day three of the Convention by Edmund Randolph of Virginia. Although Mr. Randolph *introduced* this Plan it was *authored* by Madison! It became the agenda for the Conventions proceedings for the rest of the summer.

Why was Virginia Plan so successful? Primarily because of the political savvy and wisdom of Madison in writing it. Yet, another reason for the Plan's success resulted from Madison's wisdom or political savvy in proposing the Virginia Plan.

Madison at times left details unspecified in that Plan. For example, initially Resolution 7 read: "Resolved that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of _____ Years" Notice what Madison does here. Instead of specifying the term, he left it blank for the delegates to decide. This reduced the number of times he might have been wrong, and also demonstrated that it was something Madison was willing to rely on the suggestions of other delegates.

As it turned out, the Presidential term of office was a rather controversial subject at the Convention.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A Plethora of Suggestions

This is clearly demonstrated by examining the debate surrounding what number would be inserted in the blank concerning the number of years a President's term of office would be. The first time a number was introduced to replace the blank was on June 1. It was then when James Wilson, Madison's protégé moved that the blank be replaced by the words, "three years." Wilson also noted that he assumed that the President would also be eligible for reelection. Wilson's motion was supported by some delegates, but Mr. Pinckney moved to replace it with a single (i.e. not eligible for reelection) seven-year term which was supported by Mr. Mason. However, Mr. Bedford "was strongly opposed to so long a term. He favored a three year term with an ineligibility after serving nine years."

The motion for a seven year term passed. The debate over a shorter term with re-eligibility versus a longer single term was revisited several times during July. However, on July 17 Gouverneur Morris appeared to end the debate over a single term. Here is how he argued for re-eligibility:

"The ineligibility [provision] tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment. It was like saying to him, make hay while the sun shines."

In spite of this, one delegate, seemingly moved by the term for federal judges, proposed an executive term of "good behavior". In the end, the delegates reject "good behavior" for the Executive. And then, on July 24, the motions for the President's term became a kind of "bidding" war.

During this debate Davie (North Carolina) suggested an eight-year term for the President. Luther Martin (Maryland) moved that the term be eleven years! Gerry (Massachusetts) proposed 15 years! King (Massachusetts) perhaps influenced by his name, was for 20 years(!), arguing that this was "the medium life of princes."

It was the so-called Committee of Eleven on September 4 which proposed the four-year term for the President. It should be kept in mind that many early states were hostile to executive power due to their experiences as colonies. Many state Governors had one year terms. Indeed, this bias kept the delegates from deciding on a single executive until August 6.

For over 200 years the four-year term has rarely been seriously challenged. The first instance of a proposal for a single six-year term occurred in 1826. Since that time there have been 181 such amendments introduced in Congress, but few have been given serious consideration.

There was, during the late 1980's and early 1990's a call for modifying the Constitution to have a single six-year presidential term. These were mainly a reaction to the critics complaining

of the “permanent campaign” that seemed to consume politicians during the four-year term. It seemed that no sooner did a candidate win the election than they were visiting New Hampshire to prepare (or merely to become known or to raise funds) for the next presidential election (which began with the New Hampshire Primary). Jimmy Carter endorsed the single six-year term on the grounds that it would free up presidents from being accused of just “playing politics” (so as to get reelected).

Critics of the proposal for a single six-year term argued that it was undemocratic. First, it did not allow candidates (including successful and popular ones) to run for re-election. Second, it made the newly elected President “lame duck” on day one of their term. Perhaps the most succinct criticism was leveled by David C. Nice who argued it was “too long for failed Presidents, and too short for successful ones.”

EVALUATION: What is the BEST term?

The fact that since the ratification of the Constitution there have been so few major scandals in the individuals serving as President would seem to affirm the reasoning the Framers used in granting a four-year term for Presidents. Four years has proved to be long enough for Presidents to place their identity on the government, but not so long as to tempt them into sordid actions that would spoil their historical imprint. If really liked by the voters, they could be returned to office (until ratification of the 22nd Amendment). With the invention of the modern Presidency (by F.D.R.), there have been fourteen different individuals elected to the Presidency. Of those fourteen Presidents, seven were elected to a second term.

Furthermore, one should be reminded that there was no limit on the number of terms a President could serve. Although President Washington is usually assigned the credit for an informal two-term limit, that was not made official until ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment in 1951). The argument for why the Framers did not include a presidential term limit is the subject of the next *Federalist Paper*.

FEDERALIST PAPER NO. 72: Limiting Terms

Why did the Framers refuse to place any term limit on the President? The answer to that question is the subject of this essay. Publius gives five reasons why the Framers rejected the notion of term limits.

First, Publius asserts that term limits result in a decrease in inducements to good behavior. He argues that few men would act better knowing that at some point their term of office would automatically end than if their service was determined by merit. He based this argument on a fairly strong and reliable factor: human nature. He argues that not even the love of fame (a strong passion) would encourage a man to begin difficult tasks if one knew one must quit before the work is done (and perhaps even undone by his predecessor). In short, the most one could expect (with term limits) is a president trying to keep from doing harm (but no positive or innovative actions).

Second, term limits provide a strong temptation for corrupt acts. A avaricious man might “feel a propensity, not easily resisted by such a man, to make the best use of his opportunities while they lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory... .” Likewise, the same man (when no term limits exist) might seek to continue his honors by his good behavior or “his avarice might be a check on his avarice.”

Was Publius correct? In the first century of the Presidency, there was one major presidential scandal: Teapot Dome (involving President Grant whom historians believe to have been a failure as President).

The Twenty-second Amendment (limiting a President to being reelected once) was ratified in 1951. Since then there have been at least three major presidential scandals: Watergate, Iran-Contra, and the Monica Lewinsky scandal. All three took place during a second term, or, in the case of Watergate, as a President was seeking (it turned out successfully) a second term.

The third reason Publius gives for endorsing the Framers not placing any term limits on the President is that they would deprive the community of experienced politicians. Publius writes that, “Experience is the parent of wisdom.” What comes to mind reading this quote is the one instance in which a President was elected more than twice: the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt, who is considered by many scholars to be the creator of the modern presidency was elected four times. There would probably be no Twenty-second Amendment without this fact. When Republicans gained control of the Congress in 1946 they wasted little time in proposing that Amendment. Ironically, the first President to be subject to it was Dwight D. Eisenhower, a Republican and one of the most popular Presidents of the modern era.

The fourth reason Publius gives for why the Framers rejected term limits was that there might be peculiar circumstances (maybe emergencies) when the skills of a particular President were desperately needed. He refers to wars or a crisis when the change of an administration would be “detrimental” to the nation by substituting inexperience for experience.

The fifth and final reason Publius gives is that it might disrupt “stability in the administration.” That’s because Publius argues it would necessitate a change of men which would “necessitate a mutability of measures.” Relying, as he often does, on human nature Publius asserts “It is not generally to be expected that men will vary and measures remain uniform.” Indeed, he asserts, “the contrary is the usual course of things.”

There was a major legislative “term limit” movement in the U.S. during the 1980s. Oklahoma became the first state to amend its Constitution to place term limits on members of the legislative branch. The movement was ratcheted up, however, when Arkansas sought, by amending its state Constitution, to place term limits on its national Representatives and Senators. The amendment was approved by the voters. Still, the maneuver was challenged in court and ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the amendment to Arkansas’ Constitution was unconstitutional—that is, it violated the U.S. Constitution. On what grounds?

The Court pointed out that the U.S. Constitution listed three qualifications for being elected to the House or Senate. They were (1) an age qualification (25 in the House and 30 in the Senate); (2) being a citizen for seven years for the House or nine years for the Senate; and (3) being an inhabitant of the state in which they were elected. The Constitutional problem, from the Court’s reasoning, was that Arkansas was seeking to add a fourth requirement (not having served more than two terms already in Congress) without actually amending the U.S. Constitution. This, the Supreme Court reasons Arkansas (or any other State) could not do.

The fifth and final reason Publius gave for why it was wise for the Framers to not include term limits on the Presidency was that limiting a president to a number of terms would produce lack of stability in the administration. Here is how it describe the potential problem:

By necessitating a change of men, in the first office of the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures. It is not generally to be expected that men will vary and measures will remain uniform. The contrary is the usual course of things.

He concludes by continuing to display his savvy concerning political behavior. He notes that there is no need to worry about too much stability when change is possible and voters can place their confidence where they may.

In the final portion of the essay he address the question as to what the advantages of term limits would be. Given that he doesn't see any, he lists what others have argued. They are (1) a greater independence in the Executive and (2) greater security to the people. However, concerning the first, he notes that there may always be something to which he would sacrifice his independence. As to the second reason, he replies that a man of "irregular ambition" might excite the public to join in his disgust with not being allowed to run again, resulting in a greater threat to liberty!

FEDERALIST PAPER No. 73: The Qualified Negative

This *Federalist Paper* is devoted to two presidential topics. The first is "compensation" and the second is the veto. Only two paragraphs are devoted to the first with most of the essay devoted to the second.

Publius introduces the first topic as "adequate support for the executive" which is how he briefly discusses a President's pay. The Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 7) stipulates that the President shall receive a compensation which shall be neither increased nor decreased during his term of office. Publius argues that this provision will support "vigor" in the office of the Executive. Why? Because this guarantee means the President will have no monetary reason to become the mere "puppet" of the Congress.

Most of first part of *Federalist 73*, however, is devoted the President's qualified veto. Actually, the word "veto" is not used in the Constitution. The Constitution refers to congressional votes being "presented" to the President for his "approval". Continuing, it notes that the President may "sign" it or "return it with his objections" to Congress. The "return" is what is typically called a veto. How did Publius defend giving the President this power?

First, Publius notes that legislatures have a tendency to absorb power. In *Federalist Paper No.48* Publius describes Congress as "an impetuous vortex of power." Thus, without the veto Congress would eventually absorb the powers of the Executive, and even if this were not true, it is theoretically sound to assign this power to the President. This is so because Congress could strip him of his authorities, and gradually absorb his powers. Again, even were this not a real threat it is only reasonable to take such precautions.

Additionally, the veto serves as a shield against improper laws, by protecting citizens from "an impulse unfriendly to the public good" which might happen to influence a majority in Congress. It has been suggested that no "one" individual is wise enough to be allowed this power. But Publius responds that it is not a matter of wisdom in the Executive but of the possibility that members of Congress will not be infallible. That is the secondary reason for assigning the President the veto. The primary reason is the fact that Congress is not infallible. Granted the veto may be used to stop some good laws, but that is the price to pay for stopping many bad laws. Furthermore, it is assumed that the veto will not be used that frequently (even the Kind of England, Publius states, did not use it that much).

Indeed, some have used the argument that it won't be used that much to say therefore, why stipulate it as a presidential power. That is why the Framers relied on the "qualified" veto (to provide a rationale for more frequent use, since it can be overridden). After all, it is unlikely that 2/3's of the House will typically be united in opposing a presidential initiative. But the real power of the device is in "threatening" to use it.

The use of the veto has varied greatly by presidents. Washington, who served two full terms, vetoed two bills (neither of which was overridden by Congress). Grant, the first President to veto a stand-out number of bills vetoed 93! Here are the rates for some other Presidents who seemed use make exertional use of the veto:

Cleveland (1 st term) -----	414
Cleveland (2 nd term) -----	170
T. Roosevelt -----	82
F. Roosevelt -----	633
Truman -----	250
Eisenhower -----	181
Kennedy -----	21
Johnson -----	30
Nixon -----	43
Ford -----	66
Carter -----	31
Reagan -----	78
Bush -----	44
Obama -----	12
Trump -----	6

In spite of the above list of abnormal use of the veto, most presidential scholars argue that the real “power” of the veto is the “threat” of issuing a veto. The “threat” is often successful by resulting in Congress changing the legislation such that it becomes palatable to the President. It should be pointed out that although Congress passed a line item veto bill in 1997, the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional in 1998.

Finally, as stipulated in the Constitution, if Congress adjourns during the 10-day period during which a President has the opportunity to veto a bill, the bill is automatically negated by what is called a “pocket veto”. In an early “pocket veto” case the Supreme Court ruled that any adjournment that prevented the President from signing a bill (for ten days or more) constituted a “pocket veto” (even if it was not a final adjournment). About a decade later, however, the Supreme Court ruled that during a short recess of Congress, the President could not use the pocket veto.

President Wilson described the veto as a president’s most formidable prerogative.” However, some have argued that “presidential signing statements” have become an alternative to the veto. These statements, issued by the President when signing a bill, stipulate the President’s interpretation concerning controversial provisions of the bill. President George W. Bush made great use of these statements as did President Obama although not as extensively, and so did President Trump. Presidential scholars disagree as to how threatening these signing statements are.

FEDERALIST PAPER NO. 74: The Pardon Power

This *Federalist Paper* is the shortest of the Executive essays, even though Publius touches on three subjects: the Commander-in-Chief role, the Heads of the Departments, and the pardon.

Publius briefly commented on the Commander-in-Chief role in *Federalist* No. 69. While “brief” it was important in that he was down-playing the role by stating *it would amount to nothing more than supreme command . . . of the military*” (emphasis added). Of course, even as early as President Polk, and certainly in the modern (nuclear era) this assessment of the role is demonstrably incorrect.

Concerning the pardon power, Publius asserts a principle: because it is a “kind” power it should have few restrictions. Additionally, the fewer people involved in deciding to pardon, the greater the sense of responsibility; thus, the Framers were wise in assigning the power to pardon to one individual. Publius also address an objection that has been raised to allowing a President to pardon cases of treason without the involvement of Congress. To this objection Publius makes two points. First, he argues that in times of rebellion, a timely pardon to the parties involved could ease the tension (else happen too late to ward off such an act). Second, even were there be a rationale for involving Congress, it would generally act so slowly as to be unable to thwart the event. Finally, Publius engages in a kind of political psychology by arguing that Congress might “harden” a President to resist a pardon and thus lean toward “guilt” to publicly appear strong.

Prior to the recent pardons issued by President Trump, the most relatable historically memorable example of Publius’ argument concerning the pardon power was President Ford’s pardon of President Nixon. Ford, in what has become a famous statement in the order in which he pardoned Nixon, in order to end our Nation’s long nightmare (i.e. Watergate). As for President Trump’s pardon of those who attacked the Capitol in January of 2021, it would appear that the pardons were more for the President’s sake than those receiving the pardon. Time will tell.

Finally, Publius merely touches on the “cabinet” by noting that the Constitution stipulates that the President may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officers of the executive departments on any subject related to their duties. He describes this as a “mere redundancy” since this requirement would be understood by the mere creation of the departments.

FEDERALIST PAPER No. 75: Treaties

This essay is devoted to making treaties. The Constitution stipulates, “[The President] shall have power, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. . . .” Treaty-making involves a three-step process: (1) the President negotiates a treaty; (2) the Senate may consent to the treaty with a two-thirds vote; and (3) the President (with that consent) may ratify the treaty. One criticism made of this provision was that treaties should be made by either the President alone or the Senate acting alone—but not both. Others, think treating-making should have been assigned to the House of Representatives.

Publius attacks these criticisms by pointing out the uniqueness of treaties. They are unlike laws in that they do not regulate society. They are also not similar to the execution of the laws. Rather, “its object is CONTRACTS with foreign nations that have he force of law but based on “good faith.” As such they are “agreements between sovereign and sovereign.” And in a moment of complete candor Publius admits that “an avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth.” Hence the need to add the Senate to the treaty-making authority.

Why, then, not assign treaty-making to the Senate alone? This, Publius asserts, “would have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotiations.” While the Senate, were it solely assigned the power, could have turned to the President for his input, the would have had the option of not doing so! Furthermore, the Senator or Senators assigned to negotiate the treaty would not have the same “weight or efficacy” as the President. And having two parties involved in treaty-making would be safer for society as a whole.

Finally, Publius explains why the Framers relied on the approval of treaties by 2/3’s of the membership of the Senate instead of 2/3’s of those present and voting? An absolute 2/3’s would discourage attendance, while requiring 2/3/s of those present would encourage attendance.

TREATIES V. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

One modern development that has impacted the Constitution's treaty power is the "executive agreement." Although the office of the Presidency is routinely described as the most powerful office on the planet, the actual powers specified in the Constitution would not seem to lead to that conclusion. Once one gets past the Constitutional and historical role of Presidents as "Commander-in-Chief, and the power to appoint, one is left with such things as the power to pardon and to adjourn Congress if the two houses cannot agree on a time to adjourn.

In the first sentence of Article II there is a reference to "executive power." It is here that the Supreme Court has found the power to "remove" and "executive privilege", "executive immunity," "executive orders", and "executive agreements." Indeed, while Article II begins with "The executive power shall be vested in a President," Article I begins with "All legislative powers herein granted" The Supreme Court has taken notice of this difference. The Legislative branch powers are "included" in the Constitution and the word "all" is used in referencing them. On the other hand, concerning the Executive, there is just the rather vague reference to "executive powers" and no modifier indicating that one can know them by reading the rest of the Article.

Thus, when President Franklin Roosevelt swapped 50 overage U.S. destroyers to Great Britain in return for that country granting the U.S. 99-year leases to British bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda (and six additional sites from the Bahamas to British Guiana), he did so by announcing it in a message to Congress. In what was clearly a swipe at the authority of President Roosevelt to make this deal, the New York Daily News wrote that the U.S. "has one foot in the war and the other on a banana peel." Of course, unlike treaties, executive agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution and thus there is no need for the President to obtain Senate approval of them. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of executive agreements in *United States v. Pink*.

It should be pointed out that Publius justifies the need for Senate consent to treaties with this reasoning in *Federalist* No. 73:

When men, engaged in in unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of opposition from doing what they would with eagerness rush into if no such external impediments were to be feared.

FEDERALIST PAPER NO. 76

The Constitution grants the appointment power to the President, which is the subject of this *Federalist Paper*. He must do this with the approval of the U.S. Senate. Much like treaty-making (just discussed) it involves a three-step process: (1) the President nominates someone; (2) the Senate exercises "advice and consent," and (3) the President appoints the individual. Why did the Framers grant this power to one individual? Here is Publius' explanation:

... one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.

While some objected that the President's nominee could be rejected, Publius points out that while true, the person ultimately selected will still be the choice of the President. Furthermore, Publius predicts that "it is not very probable that the President's nomination would often be overruled. Publius was right.

For the first 200 years of the Republic, only 15 cabinet nominations were rejected by the Senate. Likewise, during this same period only 27 Supreme Court nominees were rejected. So, it is safe to say that typically, the President “gets his man—or woman.” Two things would seem to be at work here. First, it appears a safe conclusion to say that historically Presidents have not nominated ideologues or extremists in making appointments to Departments and the Supreme Court. Second, the simple majority requirement for confirmation in the Senate has not been much of a deterrent in making these appointments. Finally, beginning with the Republican/Democrat Party system, the Senate has been controlled by the same political party as the President’s 81% of the time.

How well did Publius see this pattern developing? In the latter portions of *Federalist* No. 76, Publius makes this observation (really, a prediction): “It is also not very probable that [a President’s] nomination would be often overruled.” While rejections of a President’s nominee vary from one President to another and from one era to another, a presidential scholar writing about this described Senate rejections of Presidential nominees as “very unusual.” Furthermore, no president since Herbert Hoover has been forced to withdraw more than 1 percent of his nominations, and no president since FDR has had more than six nominations rejected by the Senate.

Publius accurately predicted that it was “not likely” that the Senate would often refuse to approve of the President’s nominee “where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal.” Should the Framers, then, have placed the appointment power in the President alone? Here is Publius’s answer: “The possibility of rejection would be a strong motive to care in proposing.”

***FEDERALIST* No. 77: Appointments and Stability**

This is the final essay in the series devoted to the Executive Branch. Publius begins with a concern for stability in that Branch. In doing so he touches on a question that has plagued constitutional scholars since its ratification.

As noted in the previous essay, except for constitutional language to the contrary, President must get the approval of the Senate before making an appointment. The Constitution, however, says nothing about having to obtain the approval of the Senate to remove one of his appointees. This raises some concerns about stability.

This may explain why Publius states the following in the opening to *Federalist* No. 77:

It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint.

Notice that in the second Publius asserts that just as Presidents are required to get Senate consent to make an appointment, likewise, they would have to get Senate approval to remove an official. Yet, in practice, that has not been the case.

Constitutional scholar Louis Fisher has noted, “From the start it was recognized that all three branches have access to a combination of enumerated and implied powers.” Fisher argues that the “power to remove” is one such implied presidential power. The Supreme Court would agree. In a number of cases they have so ruled.

The Supreme Court was involved in the question of presidential removal powers in a 1926 case (*Myers v. United States*). President Wilson appointed Myers as Postmaster—his appointment

was approved by the Senate. When years later his resignation was demanded he refused and was removed from office on the order of the President. Myers objected, arguing that as the Senate played a role in his appointment, it should have played a role in his removal.

In his opinion upholding President Wilson's removal of Myers, Chief Justice Taft made the following observations. First, he noted that when the first Congress was debating the law affecting all of this it had been pointed out (by Mr. Benson) that as worded it seemed to imply that the Senate approval would be needed by a President in removing an official. Benson wanted to reword it so that it did not imply this and who else but Mr. Madison agreed and it was removed. Madison's rationale for agreeing are instructive:

He wished everything like ambiguity expunged...
And therefore seconded the motion. Gentlemen
Have all along proceeded on the idea that *the
Constitution vests the power in the President ...*
(emphasis added)

Thus was the precedent established that Presidents did not need Senate approval when removing executive officials.

Following *Myers*, it is clear that the Congress, President Wilson, and the Supreme Court (as indicated in *Myers*) did not agree with Publius' assertion that just as the Senate would be needed to appoint, it would likewise be needed to remove. However, in *Humphrey's Executor v. United States*, the Supreme Court did require the President getting the Senate's approval before removing an official (see, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)). It turns out that Publius was correct, except that for his reasoning to apply, the position involved had to be an important one. The *Myers* case involved a President removing a Postmaster. In the *Humphreys* case, it involved a member of an independent regulatory commission (the Federal Trade Commission). The difference between these two cases would seem to lie in the word "independent."

Publius also impeached the system used in New York state: combining the Executive with a Council. To this idea, Publius gives four criticisms: (1) it would increase government expense; (2) it would multiply the evils associated with favoritism and intrigue; (3) decrease stability of the administration; and (4) lessen the security against undue executive influence.

As a final thought, Publius addresses the point some have made that the House of Representatives should have had a say in the making of appointments. First, he points out that the House would be too numerous (causing delays and embarrassments) and too fluctuating (due to turnover rates).

FEDERALIST 77: FINAL THOUGHTS

Hamilton must have thought eleven essays on the Executive were enough. So, at the end of the essay he merely refers to the President's remaining powers: (1) giving the State of the Union address; (2) convening Congress upon extraordinary occasions; (3) adjourning Congress when the House and Senate cannot agree on a time for adjournment; (4) receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; (5) faithfully executing the laws; and (6) commissioning all officers of the United States. These, he notes, have caused very little controversy.

In summary, Publius was correct in his predictions 75% of the time and incorrect 25%.

SUMMARY OF PUBLIUS' DESCRIPTION OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

Federalist No. 67 – Recess Appointment-----C

Federalist No. 68 – Electoral College-----C+

Federalist No. 69 – “Catch All” (C-in-C)-----I

Federalist No. 70 – Single v. Plural-----C*

Federalist No. 71 – Four-year term -----C

Federalist No. 72 – Indefinite Re-eligibility-----C

Federalist No. 73 – Pay / Qualified Negative -----C

Federalist No. 74 – Pardon-----C

Federalist No. 75 – Treaties -----C^

Federalist No. 76 – Appointment-----C

Federalist No. 77 – Removal-----I~

C = Correct

I = Incorrect

-----+ stands for beyond merely correct (in this instance how electors would be chosen)

-----* stands for a “qualified” C due to the modern era “swelling of the presidency”

-----^ stands for the fact that Publius did not anticipate the use of “executive agreements”

-----~ stands for the “removal power” not being specified in the Constitution

Endnotes

¹The Federalist Papers, Introduction and Notes by Charles R. Kesler (Signet Classics, 2003), p. ix.

²There has always been some dispute about the number of essays written by each of the contributors. These numbers are based on the Madison scholar, Irving Brant. Brant authored a six-volume biography of Madison.

³The case was

⁴It continues, “...in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”

⁵https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brownlow_Committee

⁶Joseph A Pika, John Anthony Maltese, and Andrew Rudalevige, *The Politics of the Presidency*, 10th Edition (Sage, 2021), p. 25.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 356.

⁸National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).

⁹GET QUOTE

¹⁰“...if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.” Of course, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment (1913) U.S. Senators were chosen by state legislature.

¹¹The quote is from the last paragraph of Federalist No 67.

¹²Neil Peirce and Lawrence Longley, *The People’s President: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct Vote Alternative* (Yale University Press, 1981), p. 32.

¹³See paragraph 6 of Federalist 69. Emphasis added.

¹⁴The major proposal was to have three executives: one representing the northern section, one the middle section, and one the southern section.

¹⁵This was a kind of play on words by sounding similar to an earlier book (by a different author) concerning the role of money in presidential politics. That book’s title was *The Selling of the Presidency*. The author of the “swelling” of the presidency was Tom Cronin.

¹⁶This is the characterization provided by Joseph Bessett in *How Democratic is the U.S. Constitution*

¹⁷See, Danny M. Adkison, “Madison’s Sphere,” in *Creative Breakthroughs in Leadership*, edited by William D. Pederson and Frank J. Williams (Pencraft International, 2007), Chapter 1.

¹⁸Of course, an alternative Plan (the New Jersey or Paterson Plan) was introduced as an alternative on June 15.

¹⁹See, Madison’s *Notes of the Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787* (W.W. Norton, 1966, pp. 356-363).

²⁰Thomas H. Neale, “Presidential Terms and Tenure: Perspectives and Proposals for Change,” CRS Report, 4/15/2019.

²¹It was not lost on candidates for the Presidency that no candidate had been elected without first winning the New Hampshire Primary.

²²David C. Nice, *Congress and the Presidency*, Vol. 13, 1986, p. 210.

²³Trump’s election in 2024 would make the number eight but there being another President between his two terms, it belongs in its own category.

²⁴See the two Schlesinger Polls which relied on about 100 scholars rating the past presidents. The possible ratings were: Great / Near Great / Average / Below Average and / Failure. Grant was rated a failure in both polls.

²⁵Given that Donald Trump is currently President he has been omitted from this list. It should be noted, however, that during his first term he was impeached by the House twice. The only other Presidents impeached were Andrew Johnson in 1867 (also acquitted, but by a mere one vote). President Clinton was also impeached but the Senate acquitted him.

²⁶Most states already had a two term limit on their Governor.

²⁷Get name of case.

²⁸The procedures for amending the U.S Constitution are spelled out in Article V. There are four different methods, of which only two have been used.

²⁹P. massive CQ book, p. 451

³⁰From Franklin Roosevelt to end, See, Robert E. DiClerico, *The American President* (Prentice-Hall, 1995), p. 90. For earlier Presidents listed, see

³¹Arthur S. Miller, *Presidential Power In A Nutshell*, (West Nutshell Series, 1977), p. 98.

³²*Clinton v. City of New York* (1998). The case can be found here: 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

³³The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929). See, Sue Davis, Corwin and Peltason's *Understanding the Constitution*, 17th Edition (Thomson, 2008), p. 107.

³⁴*Wright v. United States*, 302 U.S. 583 (1938). *Ibid.*

³⁵Joseph Pika, John Maltese, and Andrew Rudalevige, *The Politics of the Presidency*, 10th Ed. (Sage, 2021), pp. 275-276.

³⁶*Ibid.*, See, pages 278-279.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 279.

³⁸The courts have done this based, at least partially, on the fact that the Framers introduced the powers of Congress and the Presidency differently in their respective Articles in the Constitution.

³⁹This was the famous Destroyer-Base Deal of 1940. See, Thomas Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 10th Edition (Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 718-719; Also, Louis Fisher, *Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power* (University Press of Kansas, 2017), p. 86. The leases were for 99 years.

⁴⁰Bailey, p. 719.

⁴¹See, Michael Genovese and Robert Spitzer, *The Presidency and the Constitution* (Palgrave, 2005), p. 167.

⁴²The Senate gives its approval by a majority vote.

⁴³These calculations were made from, James P. Pfiffner, *The Modern President* (Thomson, 2005), p. 134. They cover the period from 1789-1990.

⁴⁴See, Appendix 7: Presidents and Congress in Living Democracy by Daniel Shea, Joanne Green, and Christopher Smith, Living Democracy, 2nd Ed. (Longman, 2011), pp. A39-A40.

⁴⁵Pfiffner, p. 134.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Federalist No. 76.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Louis Fisher, Supreme Court Expansion of Presidential Power (University Press of Kansas, 2017), p. 17.

⁵⁰272 U.S. 52 (1926).

⁵¹Michael Genovese and Robert Spitzer, The Presidency and the Constitution (Palgrave, 2005), p. 74.

Black Screven, Georgia in 1950:

A Research Note on the Black Population

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the 1950 census with special reference to the Black population of Screven, Georgia. It also examines the total population of Black people in Screven, Georgia in relation to others. In addition, this paper examines the Morgan-Frazier family clan in the 1950 census, including the structure of the family units

INTRODUCTION

On April 1, 2022, the U.S. Bureau of the Census released its 1950 census data in the United States of America (USA). Social scientists and genealogists eagerly awaited the 1950 census data for research purposes. People became able to see and analyze the 1950 census data in fruitful ways. That included people inside and outside of Georgia. The data for the 1950 census were collected in April 1950 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2022).

The purpose of this paper is to examine the 1950 census data with special reference to the Black population of Screven, Georgia. It will also examine the total population of Black people in Screven, Georgia in relation to others. In addition, this paper will examine the Morgan-Frazier family clan in the 1950 census, including the structure of the family units. The research methodology consists of a mixed-methods approach, which includes the case study method, secondary data method, participant observation, secondary data method (aka secondary data analysis), and a qualitative survey. The research techniques include content analysis of primary and secondary source documents, participant observation, and in-depth interviews.¹

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

There are several important primary source documents related to the 1950 census in the USA. One document comes from the Bureau of the Census (1950a) and is titled the *Seventeenth Census of the United States, 1950. Schedule No. 1.—Population. Georgia, Wayne, Militia District 1217, Screven, Supervisor's District Number Enumeration District 151-6*. It was published on the form titled “1950 Census of Population and Housing.” The information on this Bureau of the Census document covers the population in the town of Screven, Georgia inside the city limits. A second document comes from the Bureau of the Census (1950b) and is titled the *Seventeenth Census of the United States, 1950. Schedule No. 1.—Population. Georgia, Wayne, Militia District 1217, Screven, Supervisor's District Number Enumeration District 151-7*. As was the case with the first document, it was published on the form titled “1950 Census of Population and Housing.” The information on the second Bureau of the Census document covers the population in the town of Screven, Georgia outside the city limits.

A third document comes from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) and is titled *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1*. The 1975 document details that the classification of the population by race “reflects common usage

rather than an attempt to define biological stock” (p. 3). The 1975 report also indicated that, “Through 1960, the classification of the population by race was usually obtained by the enumerator’s observation” (p. 3). In addition, the 1975 report stated that, “In the 1960 census, data on race were collected by a combination of self-classification, direct interview, and observation by the enumerator; the classification rules were essentially the same as in 1950” (p. 3). Furthermore, the 1975 report said: “In the 1970 census, data on race were obtained primarily through self-classification” (p. 3).

A fourth document comes from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2022) and is titled *1950 Census: Official 1950 Census Website*. The 2022 document related that, “Taken every 10 years since 1790, the United States census provides a snapshot of the nation’s population. Because of a 72-year restriction on access to the records, the most recent census year currently available is 1950” (p. 1). It also informed us that, “On April 1, 2022, the 1950 Census was released, and users can access it for free through a dedicated website at . This population census is the 17th decennial census of the United States” (p. 1). In addition, the 2022 document revealed that, “The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has digitized and is providing free online access to the 1950 Census population schedules for U.S. states and territories, enumeration district maps, and enumeration district descriptions” (p. 1).

DEMOGRAPHICS AND SOCIAL LIFE IN SCREVEN, GEORGIA DURING 1950

In 1950, Screven, Georgia was one of the many towns and unincorporated areas in Wayne County within the state of Georgia. The total population of Georgia in 1950 was 3,445,000. Of that total, 1,083,000 people were Black, 2,381,000 were White, and 1 were others. The total population of Wayne County in 1950 was 14,248. Of that total, 2,808 people were non-White and 11,440 were White. The total population of Screven, Georgia in 1950 was 752 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975).²

During 1950, Screven, Georgia was very racially segregated with three primarily Black areas. One area was known as Clay Street. A second area was known as the Quarters. A third area was known as the “Hill.” Members of the Morgan-Frazier family clan lived in all three areas of Screven. They also lived in other spots of the town as well. In the case of the “Hill,” it provided a village environment for the young people wherein all the adults looked after them and were authority figures.³

Members of the Morgan-Frazier family clan dealt with their spiritual lives by attending three churches. One church was St. James African Methodist Episcopal (aka St. James AME Church). A second church was First African Baptist Church. The third church was Mose Chapel Baptist Church. Traditionally, on Easter Sunday, members of the Morgan-Frazier family clan would attend a service at all three.

Another big event in Screven’s social life was the annual May Day event held at the segregated Eastern Elementary School (formerly Rosenwald School). The May Day event featured a May Pole. The norm was for the school-age boys and girls to pair off with the opposite sex and skip through the loop around the May Pole. Both sexes would spend time practicing their steps for the May Pole ritual.⁴

Whereas the children had May Day, the adults enjoyed spending time at local semi-professional baseball games and dances at the local juke joints. The local semi-professional baseball games would feature the local Screven teams against teams from neighboring towns. At those games, people enjoyed eating boiled peanuts and snowballs. In the juke joints, adults would

play music on the juke box while they danced the night away. Just like the baseball games, people ate boiled peanuts and snowballs. A key local juke joint was known as C.T.'s and replaced an older one known as Ruthie Mae's. The owner of C.T.'s juke joint was C.T. Hillman. It was customary for customers to have access to regular drinking alcohol as well as moonshine.⁵

A big custom in Screven was the Friday night fish fry. Often on warm Friday nights, the Black areas of Screven would hold a fish fry. At these events, fried fish would be shared along with grits, toasted marsh mallows, hot dogs, and boiled peanuts. This was especially true of the Clay Street area. Another big custom was the making of syrup from sugar cane. In the case of the Morgan-Frazier family clan, Jordan Frazier, Sr. kept a physical building on the family property to process the sugar cane into syrup. He also grew a field of sugar cane on the family property.⁶

When people in Screven died, their bodies were usually prepared for burial by Royal Funeral Home in Jesup or Marshall Funeral Home in Blackshear. Both directors of those funeral homes were longtime friends of people in the Morgan-Frazier family clan. Following the funerals at one of the Black churches, the deceased family members were usually buried in the Carter Cemetery, which is also known as Screven Community Cemetery. That cemetery includes members of the Morgan-Frazier family clan who were once enslaved. It also includes the final resting place of family members born after slavery. A very important member of the family buried in the Carter Cemetery is Jordan Frazier, Sr. Before his death, Jordan Frazier, Sr. was a casket maker and blacksmith as well as a syrup maker. Jordan Frazier, Sr. would make wooden caskets in which family members would be buried. He also made irons to press clothes as well as made shoes for horses and mules. After the death of Jordan Frazier, Sr., his son Augustus Manson Frazier continued the tradition of raising cane and making syrup on family property.⁷

To prepare for church services or recreation life at the baseball games or juke joints, the men usually headed to Snoot's Barbershop on the Hill. The owner of Snoot's Barbershop was Wille Jones, a member of the Morgan-Frazier family clan, and the husband of Eddie Mae Dixon Jones. The barbershop got the name from his basket name or nickname. At Snoot's Barbershop, men and boys could get a fresh haircut or shave. They could also sit around listening to Black folklore or playing with checkers while eating boiled or parched peanuts. Through this activity, the men engaged in social interaction and maintained social relationships that helped to sustain Black culture with Black African and Gullah Geechee roots.⁸

UNITS OF THE MORGAN-FRAZIER FAMILY CLAN IN SCREVEN DURING 1950

When the enumerators conducted their survey in 1950, members of the Morgan-Frazier family clan lived in all three main Black areas of Screven and other spots in the town. Hence, they could be found in the Clay Street area, the Quarters area, and the Hill area. Nevertheless, many members of the Morgan-Frazier family clan lived in the Hill area. The original Morgan-Frazier family clan homestead is in the Hill area.

By the 1880s, Jordan Frazier and Matilda Morgan Frazier had united in marriage and begun to have children. Their first child was Minnie Frazier Dixon, a girl born in 1888. The second child was Emma Frazier, a girl born in 1891. The third child was Jordan Frazier, Jr., a son born in 1893. The fourth child was Sarah Frazier Gaffney, a girl born in 1895. The fifth child was Bennie Mae Frazier, a girl born in 1898. The sixth child was Sibbie Frazier, a girl born in 1901. Their seventh child was Augustus Manson Frazier, a boy born in 1903. The eighth child was Prunnie Frazier, a girl born in 1907. The ninth child was Mary Frazier McLean, a twin girl born in 1908. The 10th

child was Mary Frazier McLean, a twin girl born in 1908. The 11th child was Alzada Frazier, a girl born in 1912 (Cromartie, 2013).

Another key unit of the Morgan-Frazier family clan who lived in Screven, Georgia was the family of orientation of Matilda Morgan Frazier. It consisted of her parents Alexander Morgan (1825-1938) and Sarah Wells Morgan (1833-1926). The children of Alexander Morgan and Sarah Wells Morgan consisted of Noah Morgan, a boy born in 1860; Matilda Morgan Frazier, a daughter born in 1862; Julia Morgan, a daughter born in 1864; Jane Morgan, a daughter born in 1866; Martha Morgan, a daughter born in 1868; Susie Morgan, a daughter born in 1879; Haven Morgan, a son born in 1886; Corene Morgan, a daughter born in 1889; and Zilfey Morgan, a daughter born in 1891. Some of those family members are buried in the Carter Cemetery located in Screven, Georgia (Cromartie, 2013).

By 1950, many members of the Alexander Morgan and Sarah Wells Morgan family were deceased. In contrast, many members of the Jordan Frazier and Matilda Morgan Frazier family were still alive and living in or near Screven. The 1950 census includes approximately 10 units of the Morgan-Frazier family clan in Screven. One family unit was a nuclear family headed by Augustus Manson Frazier and Gladys Frazier (aka Gladys McKiver). It included their son L.C. Frazier (aka Lucious Clyde Frazier); son Thomas Frazier; son Charles Frazier; daughter Betty Frazier (Betty Frazier Graham); son Jordan Frazier (aka Jordan Austin Frazier); daughter Florence Frazier (aka Florence Frazier Monroe); and daughter Martha Frazier (aka Martha Frazier Fuller). They lived in the Hill area (Bureau of the Census, 1950b).

A second family unit was an extended family headed by Martha Frazier (aka Martha Fisher). It was composed of her sister Sibbie Frazier; her uncle Alexander Morgan, Jr.; her niece Julia M. Brown; her niece Eleanor Frazier; and her nephew Charles Frazier. A third family unit was headed by Minnie Dixon. It included her son Vernon H. Dixon. A fourth family unit was an alternative family headed by Sarah Gaffney. It included her son John Gaffney, Jr. and her son Marcus C. Gaffney. A fifth family unit was an extended family headed by Willie Jones and his wife Eddie Mae Jones (aka Eddie Mae Dixon). It consisted of their daughter Nina; their son Willie Jones, Jr.; their daughter Mary Frances Jones (aka Mary Frances Jones Thomas); and their grandson James W. Wright. Each of those families lived in the Hill area (Bureau of the Census, 1950b).

A sixth family unit was a nuclear headed by Jimmie Cromartie and Julia Cromartie (aka Julia Frazier Cromartie Boyd). It was composed of their daughter Delores Cromartie (aka Delores Cromartie Lockhart). They lived in the Clay Street area. A seventh family unit was an extended family headed by Edward Hopps and Bobbie Hopps. It consisted of their son Robert Hopps; Edward Hopps's mother Mattie Moore; Edward Hopps's sister Leslie McMillian; Leslie McMillian's daughter Julie McMillian; Leslie McMillian's daughter Luirina McMillian; Leslie McMillian's daughter Eva Ka McMillian; Leslie McMillian's daughter Estes McMillian; Leslie McMillian's son J.R. McMillian; Leslie McMillian's daughter Gloam McMillian (aka Gloria McMillian); Leslie McMillian's son Maca McMillian (aka Maceo McMillian); and Leslie McMillian's daughter Christine McMillian. They lived in the Quarters area (Bureau of the Census, 1950a, 1950b).⁹

An eighth family unit was headed by Willie G. Dixon and Ada Dixon. It was a nuclear family composed of their son Willie G. Dixon, Jr.; son Charles R. Dixon; son John Lee Dixon; son Laurence H. Dixon; son Benjamin Dixon; and son Gean Dixon. They lived in the Quarters area. A ninth family unit was a nuclear family headed June Cromartie and Julia Cromartie. It included their daughter Helen Cromartie. They lived in the Clay Street area (Bureau of the Census, 1950a).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the 1950 census with special reference to the Black population of Screven, Georgia. It has reported the total population of Black people in Screven, Georgia in relation to others. This paper also examined the Morgan-Frazier family clan in the 1950 census, including the structure of the family units. The analysis of the 1950 census revealed that those family units lived in the Hill area, Quarters area, and Clay Street area of Screven. In addition, the analysis revealed that some of them lived in other spots of the town.

As Theodorson and Theodorson (1969) pointed out, a family is a group of people related by blood, marriage, or adoption. The family has three types, namely nuclear, extended, and alternative. In the case of the Morgan-Frazier family clan, all three types existed in Screven. The Morgan-Frazier family clan was held together by strong ties that were reinforced each year in July during the family reunion. Between 1923 and 2023, the Morgan-Frazier family clan held a reunion every year. All Morgan-Frazier family clan reunions were held face-to-face in Screven except two. In 2020 and 2021, the Morgan-Frazier Family Reunion was held online in those years because of the COVID virus. However, in 2022 and 2023 the Morgan-Frazier Family Reunion returned as a face-to-face event. During 2023, the Morgan-Frazier family clan held its 100th family reunion in Screven.¹⁰

NOTES

1. See Babbie (2004) for more information about the research methods and techniques.
2. The racial breakdown for Screven, Georgia was not provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
3. Clay Street later became known as White Star Road. If one were to head directly south on that street for some two miles, he or she will see the remains of an old turpentine camp owned by Lindsay Grace, who was the richest White man in the area. Many Black men worked in his business as turpentine workers at one time or another, including my father Jimmie Lee Cromartie, my grandfather June Steven Cromartie, and my grandfather Augustus Manson Frazier. By the time I was an adolescent, Lindsay Grace had shut down his operation, but the area was very popular for having numerous plum trees and grape harbors. My relatives spent many days walking to the remains of the turpentine camp to pick plums and grapes.
4. Martha Frazier Fisher, a sister of my grandfather Augustus Manson Frazier and a twin of Mary Frazier McLean, taught at Rosenwald School and Eastern Elementary School for over 40 years. She also raised tobacco as a cash crop and used the labor of her many family members. My great-aunt Martha Frazier Fisher was well known in the family clan for serving Hopping John and sweet tea to feed hungry stomachs. I attended the school where she taught for my first grade and a part of the second grade. When I was in the second grade, my mother moved our family from Screven, Georgia to Waycross, Georgia where I attended Bailey Street Elementary School. It was located almost across the street from the Bailey Heights Housing Projects where my family lived for many years. By the time I started school, Eastern Elementary School went to the seventh grade. To continue their education beyond that before the 1969-1970 desegregation year, Black people had to travel by car or bus to Jesup, Georgia located 12 miles to the northeast of Screven, Georgia. There they could attend Wayne County Training School which later became known as Northside High School. For more information about the eating of Hopping John among people with a Gullah-Geechee cultural heritage, see Pollitzer (1999), Cross (2008), Campbell (2008), and Cromartie (2013).
5. For more information about the juke joints among people with a Gullah-Geechee cultural heritage, see Campbell (2008).

6. During my childhood, a great joy was to be present when the adults were making syrup. They would hitch a mule to pole wherein the animal walked around a structure generating power for the grinders. The cane juice would go into a container before getting transferred to a huge black boiling vat heated by wood. As the juice heated up, it would be transformed into syrup. My cousin Glenn Frazier and I thoroughly enjoyed drinking pure cane juice by placing cups in the shoot that went from the grinders to the container. My grandfather Augustus Manson Frazier was the primary maker of syrup for our family clan, and it would be shared with other branches of the family to be eaten with biscuits and pancakes. My mother Julia Frazier Cromartie Boyd and my grandmother Gladys McKiver Frazier both made delicious biscuits.
7. For more information about the Carter Cemetery, which is also known as Screven Community Cemetery, see Cromartie (2013).
8. The Black African and Gullah Geechee roots of the local Black community are covered in Cromartie (2013). Many people in Screven had basket names, which are also known as nicknames or pet names. For more information about basket names among people with Gullah Geechee roots, see Turner (1949). Turner has informed us that:

Most of the Gullah people use two kinds of given names. One is English, and they call it their real or true name and use it at school, in their correspondence, and in their dealings with strangers. The other is the nickname, known also as the pet name or basket name. In their homes and among their friends and acquaintances they use the nickname almost exclusively. (p. 40)

Thus, Willie “Snoot” Jones was one of the many people the Morgan-Frazier family clan who had basket names. In the case of Willie “Snoot” Jones, he lived from May 7, 1911, to September 16, 2011, which was 100 years. Because of the location of Screven, many of its Black residents, including members of our Morgan-Frazier family clan, belong to the Freshwater Geechee category instead of the Saltwater Geechee category. For more information about Freshwater Geechees and Saltwater Geechees, see Cromartie (2021a, 2021b).

9. Leslie McMillian had her four youngest children with my grandfather Augustus Manson Frazier. Those children include J.R. McMillian; Gloria McMillian; Maceo McMillian; and Christine McMillian. Thus, during the 1950 census, Augustus Manson Frazier had four children in one house in Screven and another nine children in a second house with my grandmother Gladys McKiver Frazier. It should be noted that Julia Frazier Cromartie Boyd, the daughter of Augustus Manson Frazier and Gladys McKiver Frazier, was married at that time of the 1950 census and lived in a separate home with her husband Jimmie Lee Cromartie and their daughter Delores Cromartie. I am the son of Julia Frazier Cromartie Boyd and Jimmie Lee Cromartie, but I was not yet born.

10. As was the case with the 2013 Morgan-Frazier Family Reunion, I delivered a keynote address which covered the history of the Morgan-Frazier family clan at the 2023 Morgan-Frazier Family Reunion. It was a very special event because it was our 100th family reunion. I also sold many copies of my book titled *Morgan-Frazier Family Clan: Chronicles of a Black Family with a Geechee and Gullah Heritage in Essays, Interviews, Research Reports, Documents, and Photographs*. It should be noted that the Morgan-Frazier family clan was created when Jordan Frazier, a Geechee with roots in Camden County, Georgia, married Matilda Morgan Frazier, a Gullah with roots in Telfair County, Georgia. See Cromartie (2013) for more information about those two people who were born in slavery and their Morgan-Frazier family clan.

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The Horn of Africa as a Theater of Global Hegemony and Power Positioning: Who are the Actors and Why?

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Introduction

The Horn of Africa is becoming increasingly the epicenter of multi-power competition for sphere of influence, involving both established world powers and even emerging global powers that are positioned closest to the region. In its current state, therefore, this geopolitical entanglement in the Horn of Africa can be linked to the strategic significance of the Red Sea, which is often viewed by many political observers as well as regional experts as a vital outlet for the world economy. Stretching from the Suez Canal that links it to the Mediterranean, to the straits of the Bab al Mandab that connect it to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea occupies the world's most vital shipping lane, interlocked between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Gurjar describes the importance of the Horn of Africa to global commerce in this account:

In the last decade, the region {Horn of Africa} lying between Suez Canal and the Seychelles has emerged as a new geopolitical hotspot with factors like impressive economic growth of regional countries, emergence of new security threats, and the ensuing major power rivalry driving the strategic trajectory of the region. The straits of Bab el -Mandeb, which lies at the heart of this region, connects the energy-rich Middle East to Europe and, along with the Suez Canal, is considered a jugular vein for global trade. Annually, goods worth about \$ 700 billion, 25,000 ships and nearly two billion barrels of oil pass through the strategic Bab el -Mandeb Strait (Gurjar, 2020, 1).

Indeed, Gurjar and others with expertise on the Horn of Africa have examined at great length the strategic significance of the region to the global economy and the rivalry that exists among the various great powers; however, what is missing in many of their investigations is the more urgent studying of the consequences emanating from the hegemonic power rivalry for the regional states that are often at the risk to external pressure and influence. Considering the foregoing, the questions that his paper aims to answer are which are the contending powers, and what are the underlying reasons for lurching their geopolitical ambition into the region? Stated alternatively, what precisely triggers the pursuits of their national interest in that sub-region of Africa? The paper addresses these questions and explores the many facets of hegemonic power aspirations in the region. Furthermore, the study posits that the Horn Africa region has become a troubled spot pitting some hegemonic powers against each other, as they vie for control of the vital waterways of the Red Sea. The study further postulates that unless checked, the after-effect of this alarming external pressure, to which the regional states are subjected, could eventually lead to hostilities between the hegemon and the subjugated states and even to a possible armed confrontation among the rival powers themselves, with grave consequences for the states in the region. At a minimum, hegemony may stifle in the end the regional states' effort to maintain their political stability, preserve their sovereignty, and realize their targeted aspirations of development and prosperity.

The significance of this study lies mostly in its promise to be an all-inclusive geopolitical analysis of the Horn of Africa, deciphering the extent of the external rivalry in the region among both global and regional powers. This is particularly worth mentioning because the

Horn of Africa has indeed become increasingly the hotbed of terrorist threats, piracy, fragile interstate relations, and intrastate social upheavals. In the broader context of international relations, therefore, these factors could lead to unexpected armed confrontations among external powers as well as the regional states. The importance of this research is further buttressed by the reality that the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, taken together, are key to international peace and security, and any disturbance caused by hostilities among the hegemonic powers in that part of Africa, some of which have been known to be historical foes for decades, could bring havoc in the region on an unparalleled scale that the international community has never seen before.

The methodology utilized in this study relies on qualitative data analysis, with a focus on the implications of hegemony for peace and security in that critical sub-continent of Africa. Using the case study method, the investigation aims to describe events, issues, and activities vital to the study of international relations. By choice and practical necessities, therefore, the paper depends on wide-ranging bibliographical sources, most of which are very current, to examine the topic holistically while identifying the salient factors that give both meaning and context to it. In doing so, the author takes the challenging task of selecting, processing, and analyzing information applied to understanding the questions raised in the introduction of the paper, thereby enabling the reader to evaluate the study's overall validity and reliability methodically. The methodology used in the study attempts to answer the two main questions often posed in any given social science research undertaking: how was the data collected or generated? And how was it analyzed? These two critical questions have been contextualized throughout the study.

Furthermore, an effort has been made to ensure the unfettered readability of the data analyzed in the research. Accordingly, the paper is organized into four sections. This introductory section is followed by a brief discussion of the geopolitical context of the region, offering an overview of its importance to global security and international commerce. The third section is where each of the hegemonic powers---global and emerging ones---is briefly examined to demonstrate the extent of its involvement in the region, while explaining the types of activities that each hegemon is involved in. As is customary, the concluding section of the paper offers a summary of the study.

The Geopolitical Setting of the Horn of Africa

An Overview

Any mention of the constituent states of the Horn of Africa may not necessarily be constant as many scholars and regional experts, using their own reasonable understanding of the geographical delineation of Africa, provide a contextualized definition of the region as they deem appropriate. One version of such a view regards Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and the *de facto* state of Somaliland, including the semi-autonomous territory of Puntland, both integral parts of Somalia in the past, as constituting what is known today as the Horn of Africa; it should also be noted here that the two breakaway self-governing territories of Somalia are unrecognized as independent states by the international community, for Somalia still claims both as parts of its sovereignty (Egal, 2021)). The other version expands the list of countries that make up the region to include Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. In this study, however, the author's focus will be on the first set of counties, although this should not preclude the latter states from remaining within the purview of this study; any time their relevance becomes known, they will be a part of the discussion.

In essence---especially from the geopolitical standpoint---the impact of the Horn of Africa can be partially or fully interconnected with these critical global sea routes: The Red Sea, the Strait of Babe al Mandab, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and even the Mediterranean Sea. Thus, the strategic location of the Horn, along with these various sea routes, makes the states in the region extremely vital to the security and safety of global commerce routed to Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world. It is therefore in this context that the national interest of the global and regional powers is directly tied to the Horn of Africa; hence, the rivalry among those hegemonies that are positioned to control and influence the commercial, military, and existential landscapes of the region.

To ensure their hegemonic presence in the Horn of Africa, various global and regional powers use their trade, investment, military, intelligence, and diplomatic capacities, and even in some cases the instrument of development aid, with the intention of placing undue pressure and influence on the regional states while attempting to thwart each other's rival from gaining a competitive edge and pursuing their national interest and geopolitical supremacies. Two sets of countries, which may be hailed as global and regional, are the known forces at work in the Horn. Global powers are those states that, through their great economic, political, and military strengths, can exert power and influence not only over their own region of the world, but beyond others. Such countries as the U.S., China, Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, India, and Japan, and to a lesser degree Italy, Turkey, and Spain, may fall into this category of states. On the other hand, enjoying the power attributes, as quoted in the following, and acting as regional powers *vis a vis* the Horn are Israel, Iran, Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. As a rule, therefore, regional power can be described as

...a state that projects influence in a specific region. If this power capability is unrivaled in its region, the state could rise to the level of a regional hegemon. The regional powers display comparatively high military, economic, political, and ideological capabilities enabling them to shape their regional security agenda. Overall, the terms "middle powers" and "regional powers" convey capacity, hierarchy, influence, and aspiration (Yilmaz, 2019, 1)

With this distinction made, we will shortly review the global and regional powers that have established their presence in the Horn while deciphering the rationale undergirding all facets of their presence in the region. In effect, therefore, this section of the paper simply exposes the motive of each power for displaying a show of force in the Horn of Africa in pursuit of gaining a strategic advantage over their rivals competing for control and influence. In each case study, the global or regional power's activities in the Horn of Africa are examined, using the economic, military, and geopolitical variables particular to each power.

It is also critically important to see beforehand in the larger scheme of things that there is an undisputable truth that global powers have been increasingly vying for influence in Africa for several decades and even more forcefully in recent years. As global apprehension deepens yet more due to the prevailing global hostilities caused by both the Russian-Ukraine war and an increasingly aggressive Chinese posture towards self-ruled Taiwan, Africa's strategic importance seems to have risen, while both uncertainty and the threats of instability around the globe have heightened simultaneously. Melvin, analyzing the geopolitical competition among the various world powers in the Horn of Africa, describes the situation along the same line as follows:

The Horn of Africa is undergoing far-reaching changes in its external security environment. A wide variety of international security actors—from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia—are currently operating in the region. As a result, the Horn of Africa has

experienced a proliferation of foreign military bases and a build-up of naval forces. The external militarization of the Horn poses major questions for the future security and stability of the region (Melvin, 2019)

The Hegemons in the Horn of Africa: Global and Regional Powers

While both economic and military capabilities provide valid measurements of global power rankings, however, military firepower has been the mainstay of ranking nations and their influence on the global stage. In this regard, the U.S., Russia, and China are known to occupy the three highest power rankings in the world in that order. In the following case studies, nevertheless, the discussion does not mean to follow such an order; it is an arbitrary listing of the countries by the author without regard to any military or economic rankings, or both. With that said, we will now turn to examining each of the global and regional power's vital interests in the region, as well as the extent to which they participate in using their power and influence to maintain their presence and power positioning there.

United States

Among the global powers, the U.S. presence in the Horn of Africa takes center stage, given the current fierce hegemonic competition there, pitting one power against another. Essentially, U.S. foreign policy priorities in this region can be threefold: containment of Russia and China from dominating the region; prevention of piracy in the Indian Ocean, along with the offshore shipping lanes near the coastal waters of Somalia; and thwarting the spread of Jihadist movements in the area, juxtaposed with its antiterrorism policy particularly aimed at Al Shabab in Somalia, an extremist Al-Qaida-like organization committed to global Jihad and a harsh interpretation of Sharia law. While these three specific priorities provide the impetus for the U.S. strategic presence in the Horn of Africa, containing Iranian aggression against U.S. allies in the Middle East is also the ultimate pursuit of U.S. foreign policy. U.S.-Iranian relations have been strained for decades over the issue of Iran's nuclear program and its aggressive foreign policy against U.S. allies--- Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among others (Negatu, 2022). This has been further exacerbated by the Yemeni civil war in which the U.S. is indirectly involved supporting the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi rebels, which are supported by Iran.

Using any one or a combination of the three foreign policy objectives as a justification, therefore, U.S. intervention in the Horn of Africa has been manifested for decades in the military, economic and diplomatic spheres. However, the main instrument of U.S. policy used to exert influence on African and other developing countries has always been humanitarian and development assistance, conducted through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Indeed, the Horn countries receive a good share of such assistance especially during the time of droughts and other human-caused and natural disasters. For example, in July 2022, USAID reported that the U.S. allocated \$1.3 Billion among Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, which was aimed at alleviating the unrepresented drought that was causing starvation in these Horn of Africa countries (U.S. agency for International Development, 2022). Nonetheless, such aid is also known for being strategically targeted and deliberately so for exerting influence on the economically vulnerable countries while deterring rivals from gaining a foothold in areas where geopolitical strategies shape interstate behaviors among global and regional powers.

Militarily, the U.S. projects its widely recognized visibility in the Horn of Africa by having established a permanent naval expeditionary base in the tiny Horn of Africa state--- Djibouti.

Located adjacent to the International Airport in Djibouti City at its official Camp Lemonnier Base, the U.S. Africa Command, working through the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, boasts on its website that the U. S. naval base in Djibouti “...works against malign actors to strengthen collective security forces and respond to crises to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability and prosperity” (United States Africa Command, 2023). Leasing the Camp Lemonnier Base from Djibouti at a rate of \$38 million a year, the U.S. uses the base first and foremost to ensure that Al Shabab and other Jihadist movements are militarily restrained from spreading extremist ideology throughout the region; and both American combat troops and drone strikes are employed at times against them in their hideouts throughout the various parts of Somalia.

This strategic base, the only permanent military post of the U.S in Africa where about four thousand American troops are stationed, additionally serves three strategic purposes: monitoring as well as ensuring the free flow of global commerce through the Red Sea, while serving as a deterrent to Iranian military adventure in the area, particularly against Iranian arms shipments to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, which is located strategically across from Djibouti and bordering the Strait of Bab el Mandab. The Yemeni crisis began in 2014 when Houthi insurgents took control of Yemen’s capital and largest city, Sana’a. A Saudi Arabian-led coalition, consisting of some Gulf States, has been fighting the rebels in support of the internationally recognized government based in the southern port city of Aden, and the U.S. provides logistical and intelligence assistance to the coalition (The Center for Preventive Action, 2023). Furthermore, the base serves as a deterrent to rival global powers’ geopolitical maneuvering in that vital region of Africa, especially involving the two U.S. current nemeses ---China and Russia. So, the U.S. foremost strategy is to become a counterbalance to all the rival powers that have established a presence there.

The U.S. also uses other forms of military aid to shore up its diplomatic ties with some of the regional states and maintain its influence versus its adversaries. Whether training Somalia’s anti-terrorist forces or supplying small arms to Djibouti, however, this is no match, by comparison, with what the U.S. provides in military-related aid to Israel, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Ukraine, which runs into billions of dollars. Because of the sheer number of military sales or aid to the Horn of Africa states, which are so small that no credible information is available to cite, the U.S. does not hold any significant ranking as those compared to China, Turkey, France, Great Britain, and Russia. We will look at each of these countries’ military involvement in the proper time and space in the ensuing discussion. Similarly, in the investment and trade arena, the U.S. has had a hardly visible record especially compared to those of China or Turkey or even to some of the Gulf States. Devermont and Harris, writing a commentary for *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*, seem to validate this very viewpoint, as the following statement conveys:

And yet U.S. trade and investment with sub-Saharan Africa remains unimpressively low. The United States did approximately \$32.6 billion worth of trade in goods with the region in 2020, down from \$36.8 billion in 2019. This means that in the past two years, U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa has represented less than 1 percent of all U.S. trade in goods. If there has been a six-decade consensus on U.S. opportunities in sub-Saharan Africa and multiple initiatives and programs to increase trade and investment, why have there been such disappointing results? (Devermont and Harris, 2021, 2).

There are of course several roadblocks that inhibit American investors from fully engaging in trade and investment ventures in Africa. While the challenges are many, the most common ones regrettably involve biases and fears long held by American businesses about the feasibility of making investments in Africa where historically political instability and corruption have been

widespread. This has been further fueled by a lack of U.S. government backing for American business firms in their efforts to find a favorable environment and unfettered pathways for investment opportunities in sub-Saharan African countries. “At the heart of the anemic trade and investment between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa is skepticism about market opportunities, made worse by U.S. media and ingrained stereotypes about corruption and investment challenges,” according to Devermont and Harris. (Ibid.).

However, during the most recent years under the Biden administration, U.S.-Africa trade and investment trends seem to have changed course, and the prospects for future substantial engagements have never been more promising. For example, citing Africa’s integration into the world markets and acknowledging the robust entrepreneurial spirit among the young section of the African population, the White House, in December 2022, announced that “the U.S. Government has helped close more than 800 two-way trade and investment deals across 47 African countries for a total estimated value of over \$18 billion, and the U.S. private sector has closed investment deals in Africa valued at \$8.6 billion” (The White House, 2022). Added to this new thinking is the highly touted African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed into law in 2000, that is at the core of U.S. trade policy with Africa aimed at providing qualifying African countries with duty-free access to the U.S. market. In general, AGOA is intended for improving U.S.-African relations and more importantly helping African countries with a preferential treatment of their trade deals with the U.S., so that they can sell their products unimpeded, with the goal being the uplifting of the African economies and the living standards of the people thereof (Young African Leaders Initiative, 2019).

Reinforcing the recent and positive development that has come to characterize U.S.-African trade relations, Clements observed that AGOA has enabled outcomes, including... duty-free exports for almost 7,000 products from Africa to the United States. It has created long-term, sustainable growth by stimulating the private sector and creating jobs in many African countries. It has also supported the growth of certain sectors in the region, such as garment manufacturing (Clements, 2021, 1).

Looking at it critically, U.S.’s revitalized trade and investment interest in Africa, however, stems primarily from a strategy designed to counter China’s strong activities throughout Africa in all facets of development. China has outperformed all other countries in Africa in more recent years by creating opportunities and infrastructure amenable to loans, investments, and development projects, including the construction of railways, highways, bridges, air- and seaports, and large-scale power facilities, among others. Particularly, the Horn of Africa has benefited the most from Chinese commitment to Africa’s development needs. We will return to this same subject later in its proper place. The discussion now proceeds with Russia.

Russia

The geopolitical strategy of Russia in the Horn of Africa, compared to that of the U.S., is driven by a separate set of goals. Characterizing Russian foreign policy in the region as “Engaged Opportunism,” Ramani notes that Moscow in recent years has taken a bold stance to reclaim its global power status and has done so without ever alienating any of the states in the region, engaging them instead constructively through diplomacy while shunning the appearance of taking any

.....sides in the region's most polarizing conflicts.... Russia's resurgence in the Horn of Africa has generally dovetailed with the People's Republic of China's regional aspirations but has placed it increasingly at odds with France and the United States. Looking ahead, Russia's ability to link its Horn of Africa strategy to its aspirations in the Middle East will shape the future trajectory of its involvement in the region (Ramani, 2020, 1).

Ramani further observes that Russia's "engaged opportunist" security strategy in the Horn of Africa is predicated on a desire to become a preferred arms dealer to African countries, offering regional powers as well as others an alternative to Western arms suppliers, particularly the U.S., France, Great Britain and Germany; however, geopolitical considerations have also elevated Russia's hegemonic aspirations in more recent years, compelling it to secure military presence in the Horn of Africa that would possibly be a counterbalance to Western strategic military positions in the Red Sea. The overriding aim is still to procure a military base to reassert Russia's global power once again and ensure a physical presence in that vital region of Africa; nevertheless, the Russian strategy is not exclusive of investment opportunities either. In fact, an increase in trade and investments with the Horn countries could help boost Russia's global standing in the military, diplomatic and economic spheres while equally furthering its competitive edge against its geopolitical rivals in the region.

Exporting arms to client states in Africa has already put Russia at the top of the list of global arms suppliers to African countries. "Along with natural resources, arms exports are a key component of Russia's economy. In the last two decades, Moscow has managed to deepen its connection with Africa and became the biggest arms supplier on the continent," Kondratenko reflects (2020, 2). The five African countries that import Russian arms---in order of ranking by the number of arms sales---are Algeria, Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Yet among the Horn of Africa countries, Sudan, Ethiopia and more recently Eritrea have been patrons of the Russian arms industry. Weapons, ranging from transport helicopters and antitank missiles to surface -to-air missiles and tanks, are sold to African countries by Russia. At the same time, Russian arms sales are often made to Africa without any consideration of the internal politics of its client states, unlike the U.S. and other West European states. Often, the U.S., France, Great Britain, and Germany, just to mention only the top suppliers, are most likely to be influenced by factors such as the human rights record of a country purchasing arms from them. "In comparison to other big players, arms deal with Russia do not demand political or human rights conditions. In some cases, Russia has managed to fill the gap where European or American suppliers stepped out," Kondratenko maintains (Ibid). More recently, Russian drones have also been used as an enticement for building strategic partnerships in the Horn of Africa; Eritrea is a case in point.

As Russia further pushes assertively for global supremacy, the Horn of Africa has become its major conduit to that eventuality. The most recent conclusion of an agreement that Russia made with Sudan on the acquisition of a naval base in Port Sudan, a port city on the Red Sea, is the clearest indication of Russian strategic calculations, which certainly would present a formidable challenge to the U.S. and its Western allies. The *Associate Press* reported in February 2023 that the agreement allows Russia to set up a naval base with up to three hundred Russian troops, and to simultaneously keep up to four navy ships, including nuclear-powered ones, in the strategic Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The base would ensure the Russian navy's presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean and spare its ships the need for long voyages to reach the area, according to Viktor Bondarev, the former Russian air force chief. In exchange, Russia is to provide Sudan with weapons and military equipment. The agreement is to last for 25 years, with automatic extensions for 10-year periods if neither side objects (Magdy, 2023, 1).

This action coincides with other rival powers that have long established their military posts in Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, and Somaliland, for example, a subject to which we will return to in the oncoming discussion.

Russia's military presence in the Sudanese Red Sea port is also expected to usher in a new Russian investment undertaking. *Middle East Eye*, an online newsletter that delivers coverage and analysis of the Middle East, North Africa and beyond, characterizes Russian economic motives in Sudan in these terms: "Russia has long eyed Sudan as a gateway to Africa's gold, as well as a stake in a global power play over a key strategic waterway "(Ibid). Worried by the Russian display of power dynamics in the region, the U.S. has since voiced its concern to Sudan, but the African country seemed content with having Russia as a strategic ally on its soil. In fact, "Washington' s warning about Russia comes amid revelations of a massive effort by the Kremlin to extract gold from the African country. US officials say this could prop up the Kremlin's war chest as it faces slumping oil prices and western sanctions," the report by the *Middle East Eye* further reveals (MEE, 2022).

Simultaneously, Russia's invigorated foreign policy strategy in the Horn of Africa has also yielded yet another successful diplomatic victory, as another Red Sea state, Eritrea, succumbed to the Kremlin's courtship of securing a naval base near Eritrea's port city of Massawa. In exchange, Asmara would host a dependable ally and even more importantly procure advanced weapons to shore up the military prowess of its armed forces. The *Eritrean Press Agency* reported in May 2022 that "Eritrea receives 8 Russian Zala KYB drones – in return for Russian military base. Russia gave the drones in the form of support to Eritrea which it considered its friend in need for Eritrea is a key for the region's peace and as an input for the military base which Russia is going to build in the future in Afabet, 40km away from Massawa" (The Eritrean Press Agency, 2022).

Therefore, having secured agreements with two key Red Sea states---Sudan and Eritrea--- to build military bases, respectively, Russia would be able to counterbalance the U.S.'s strategic advantage that the latter has enjoyed for several years because of its possession of the Camp Lemonnier Base in Djibouti. Retaining naval bases in such strategic areas of the Horn of Africa also could mean that Russia would be poised to protect its military and economic interests against foes and competitors alike and maintain the balance of power among the global and regional forces operating in the region. Furthermore, Russia's hegemonic presence in the Horn Africa would increase the prospects of extracting gold in Sudan and of mining vital mineral deposits in Eritrea in the immediate future. It would also be in the realm of possibilities for Moscow to explore investment ventures in the energy sector and embark on infrastructural development projects there, as well as in the nearby neighboring states. The fact that "Petroleum exports from Russia account for the largest share (24%) of Suez southbound petroleum traffic" (Baloi, 2023, 2) further amplifies the significance of Russia's naval presence in Eritrea's waters. Having a naval base to safeguard exports through the Red Sea and to protect future investments in the Horn of Africa, where such investments might exist in the future, could be vital to any great power as Russia is in the current global power ranking, contends Baloi (2023). A comparable analysis of China's intentions in the Horn of Africa now follows.

China

There is no doubt that a formidable competitor of the U.S. and its Western allies in the Horn of Africa nowadays is China, given that the hegemonic rivalry among several global and regional powers for control and influence over the region is alarmingly intense. However, with some exceptions, China's relations with African countries in general and with the Horn of Africa

states in particular are economically driven. Thus, China's priorities have pivoted toward agriculture, trade, and infrastructure development throughout the continent. *Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute*, headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, reported that,

In a matter of two decades, China has become Africa's biggest economic partner. Across trade, investment, infrastructure financing, and aid, there is no other country with such depth and breadth of engagement in Africa. The Chinese firms of all sizes and sectors— are bringing capital investment, management knowhow, and entrepreneurial energy to every corner of the continent— and in so doing, they are helping to accelerate the progress of Africa's economies (Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute, 2020, 1)

The report further reveals that China has already become a big source of finance for African development, and the development loans that the Horn of Africa countries receive from the Asian economic powerhouse have been on the rise consistently, sometime resulting in defaults on loan re- payments by some. Still, the countries who have benefited the most from Chinese loans and investments are Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, although Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan have been recipients, as well, but to a lesser degree. These loans and investments primarily are centered on the transport, power, communication, industry, water, and mining sectors of these countries' economies. Ibid. To amplify the extent of China's engagements in such sectors, *Xinhua News Agency* reported that "Since 2017, China's imports in services from Africa have been growing at an average annual rate of 20 percent, creating close to 400,000 jobs for the continent every year." (Xinhua, 2022). In a move that offsets U.S. recent efforts to increase its influence in Africa, China reportedly "...dropped 98 per cent of tariffs on exports from Burundi, Ethiopia and Niger," with the aim of expanding such benefits to other African countries in the future. Chinese business firms have made direct investments of \$43.39 billion in Africa as of 2020. China's tariff liberality on African exports followed an announcement by the U.S. that the latter closed "...more than eight hundred two-way trade and investment deals in 47 African countries as of last year, with an estimated value of more than US\$18 billion. The US private sector has also closed investment deals in Africa valued at \$8.6 billion" (Jennings and Nyabiage, 2023, 1).

While China's ongoing economic engagements with the Horn of Africa states came about out of necessity, yet this was not accomplished in isolation; the acquisition of a naval base in the tiny state of Djibouti, where China has had its first military facility overseas since 2017, has provided an added momentum for China's geopolitical scheme in the Horn of Africa. As is always the case with hegemonic powers, however, China's rationale to have the base in Djibouti was that "It will be used to resupply navy ships taking part in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia, in particular" (Blanchard, 2017). It is further claimed that the base serves as a logistics support facility, while providing these other services: anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations; protecting China's growing overseas assets; evacuation of Chinese citizens in crisis situations; conduct counterterrorism operations; and institutionalization of intelligence-gathering, among others (Melvin, 2019).

Nevertheless, the valid rationalization for China's strategy lies substantially in the fact that the Horn of Africa has become the battle ground for control and influence such that global powers as well as ranking middle - power states have been vying to establish presence to ensure that no one global power or a group of powers control the shipping routes of the Red Sea where international commerce is channeled in huge volumes. So, it is therefore the proximity of the Horn of Africa states to the Red Sea that has made them exceptionally vital to the security of international commerce, as ships and other carriers pass through the shores of some of the states in the region. This unfortunately subjects them at times to pressure as well as courtship by hegemonic

powers for influence and control. That is also why more than ten external powers have currently military posts just in Djibouti alone. When Somalia and Eritrea are added, even possibly Somaliland, to the mix, one can reasonably assume that it is the hegemonic rivalry that has obliged the Chinese to secure a military base in Djibouti, just as the U.S., France, India, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, and Saudi Arabia all have done so.

On the other hand, while China may still be regarded as a newcomer to Africa's arms and security technology market, compared to other global powers, it is now considered as a progressively growing player also. However, "China's market position is comparatively small and has not expanded recently. While it has emerged as the arms supplier of choice for a handful of regimes, these regimes are minor players in terms of total arms transfers," argues Hendrix (2020). In other words, China must catch up in its arms sales to African countries *vis a vis* Russia, the U.S., Germany, and France in that order. To date, although China has recently become the exporter of choice for several African countries, the total sales amount only to 2.5 percent of the total global African arms market recorded so far (Ibid).

What follows next in the discussion is India, a ranking global power in both the military and economic spheres. As the most populous state on earth, with an estimated population of 1.4 billion, India's national interest can be enormous. Thus, we will now briefly examine India's prevailing interest in the Horn of Africa.

India

India's strategic priorities in the Horn Africa are primarily steered more than anything else by economic imperatives. What should also be acknowledged here is that the rivalry that exists currently between India and China in both South Asia and the Indian Ocean has further expanded to the Horn of Africa in a typical hegemonic entanglement based on a show of force for strategic positioning, global supremacy, and international power recognition. While India has had years of experience in assisting Horn of Africa states with much-needed food assistance during times of drought and famine, however, it has gone beyond the humanitarian mission in recent years and come to realize that the Horn of Africa is critical for its national security from the geopolitical standpoint. As a result, Africa and the Indian Ocean Region are central to the foreign policy of India. In practical terms, though, India's strategic interest in the Horn of Africa can be attributed to four interrelated core reasons: to secure a military presence in the immediate future and ensure competitiveness as a ranking global power in such a strategic region of the world; to monitor if not to counteract against the perceived or actual hegemonic threat of its historic archenemy---China--- in the Indian Ocean and by extension the Red Sea; participate in the global anti-piracy campaign being conducted by several of the great powers operating off the coast of Somalia; and finally to find an economic outlet whereby Indian investors can reap the benefits of both the undeveloped African markets and the abundant landmass that is suitable for commercial farming throughout the continent.

Majumdar, reporting for Deutsche Welle (DW), a German public, state-owned international broadcaster, states that "India is trying to strengthen its long-standing ties to countries on the continent as New Delhi attempts to catch up with China, which has emerged as Africa's largest trading partner" (2022, 2). This economic rivalry between China and India over African markets is further reflected in the security realm where a military presence in the strategically vital region of Africa becomes a necessity. Thus, China's military base in Djibouti has naturally drawn India's ire; however, India has no known military base in the region at the time of this writing, although there were reports indicating that the country was seriously considering establishing one

in Djibouti, thereby joining its rivals in the military arena there, as well (Whitehead, 2021). Yet, India has not sat idle throughout the years either. In addition to maintaining economic and cultural diplomatic ties with several Eastern and Western African countries, it has had a history of having defense partnerships with them, and therefore defense exercises and training of African officers have been part of its defense diplomacy (Singh, 2021).

As stated earlier, India's impacting presence in the Horn of Africa however is heavily manifested in the economic arena. The Indian Embassy in Ethiopia, for example, reported in January 2023 that "Indian investors are the second-largest foreign employers in Ethiopia, providing employment to more than 75,000 persons. About 61.78% of Indian investment is in the manufacturing sector, followed by agriculture (13.1%)" (Chaudhury, 2021). Africa-India overall trade has also been growing over the last several years, and the trend will most likely continue, as India attempts to have its presence felt in the continent. According to Gakhar and Gokran, African exports to India were growing at a rate of 32 per cent annually, with Indian exports to Africa at a rate of 23 per cent. Much of this trade involved exports of minerals, such as gold and ore, as well as oil and gas. Gakhar and Gokran, for example, assert that "India currently faces an energy deficit and coupled with potential supply insecurity from other regions, Africa's role as a supplier of minerals and fuels may intensify in the short run" (2015, 3).

Having explored the roles of the four largest military powers in the Horn of Africa in the foregoing analysis, we now pivot to the discussion of the same focusing on all other emerging global and regional powers. This is to be accomplished by presenting a case-by-case account of their strategic interests, motives, and activities throughout the rest of the study.

France

France, along with Great Britain and Italy, has had the longest presence in the Horn of Africa starting as colonial powers in the latter part of the 19th century. The Somalian territory was then divided up among the three European powers, following the Berlin Conference of November 15, 1884 – February 26, 1885, that carved up Africa into colonial territorial possessions among such European powers as Belgium, Italy, France, United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, and Germany; Ethiopia, which was not a party to the conference, had its share of such a possession. Consequently, the French took the area known today as Djibouti; the Italians took the southern part of Somalia, including the current Somalia independent state; the British occupied the territory to the north, including the current *de facto* state of Somaliland, in order to safe guard their trade route through the Suez Canal that had been open in 1869; and Ethiopia incorporated what is known as the Ogaden, which is currently the eastern portion of that country. Even after Djibouti gained its independence in 1977, which was then known as *French Somaliland*, France's influence in Djibouti has been so deep-rooted to this day that critics of the former colonial power mock the latter to be a "protectorate" of the former. This depiction of Djibouti comes amid circumstances showing on the ground that the strategically located, tiny state relies too heavily on French protection and support to maintain its sovereignty, thus giving it the appearance of a neocolonialized state that has yet to secure "real independence" from its past.

To the extent that France's presence in its former African colonies today is one of "paternalism," some experts reason that the relationship can therefore be regarded in the context of neocolonialism. Egal, for example, states that, "(2021, 1). To protect and influence its interests in post-Independence Africa, France, opted to institutionalize its relationships with its former colonies by signing comprehensive bilateral economic, political, military, and cultural accords that binds effectively French control, domination, and presence of the former colonies." (Ibid).

Nonetheless, France's strategic interest in the Horn of Africa is still fully deep-rooted in its military base in Djibouti, where the hegemonic rivalry is the fiercest, as ten global and regional powers monitor each other's activities against the background of the Red Sea and its vital waterways through which the greater shipments of global commerce find their way. Among the global and regional powers that have bases in Djibouti are the U.S., France, Italy, Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia. While these six countries are primarily military base proprietors, they host others, as well. For example, France hosts German and Spanish military personnel; United States hosts British troops; and Japan has entered an accord to share its base(s) with India. In this regard, a total of ten countries is stationed in Djibouti alone.

France has had a long history of military interventions in Africa specifically in times of crises in those countries that were its former colonies, for example, Senegal, Chad, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali, among others. However, France is known to have its biggest military base on the continent stationed in Djibouti, counting some 1,500 troops. Djibouti, hosting France's biggest Foreign Legion deployment, is home to French warships, aircraft, and armored vehicles. Using the Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, the French Air Force runs, in cooperation with other allies, such diverse operations as anti-piracy campaigns in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea; humanitarian aid; peacekeeping; tactical and strategic military raids; naval and air force sorties; drone strikes; special combats; anti-terrorist threats in Yemen and the Horn of Africa; and intelligence and surveillance gatherings (De Faakto Intelligence Research Observatory, 2019). According to Hansen, France has been active in the economic arena, as well. French companies have long been involved in African business ventures so much that 5% of France's export trade is with African countries, mostly of those known as *Francophone* because of their colonial past under France. To complement this, a substantial size of French nationals, numbering up to 240,000, live throughout Africa doing business and being involved in other forms of occupation, including banking and education. The strong ties that France has had with its former colonies are best described in the excerpt below:

Though France has diversified its sources of raw materials, Africa remains an important supplier of oil and metals. French officials also stress the importance of encouraging regional stability and development, support of democratic governments. "The African continent is our neighbor, and when it's shaken by conflict, we're shaken as well," said André Dulait, a French parliamentarian during a debate on Africa (Hansen, 2008).

Japan

At a glance, Japan's foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa may seem to be driven by the desire to join other forces in the anti-piracy campaign that is being waged by many of the great powers operating in the Indian Ocean and more particularly off the coast of Somalia; however, the motive for its active involvement in the region is also powered by considerations of trade and investment, along with the geopolitical realities deep-down to the region itself. Furthermore, Japan's interest in the Horn of Africa, like its hegemonic counterparts, banks heavily on such considerations as security details, freedom of commerce, and upkeep of global power standing. Along this line, Hammond observes that "Pirates or no pirates, Japan remains committed to an international security operation off the Horn of Africa which is increasingly a cornerstone of its wider Africa policy" (2019, 1). In addition to securing a military base in Djibouti, Japan's mission in the region is to ensure that "...a rules-based international order while providing an essential service in preserving safe passage through maritime corridors critical to Japan's economy and energy security (Ibid). From this statement, one can see that Japan's strategic interest is truly

imbedded in its activist stance in Africa through the mechanisms of trade, investments, foreign aid, and the like. The military component of this activism is of course well reflected in the securing of a military base in Djibouti, thereby countering the perceived and real threat other rivals in the region may pose in the strategic and vital seaways of the Red Sea. At the same time, unlike Russia, China, the U.S. and even Turkey, Japan is not known as an arms exporter to Africa, and in that regard, there is really nothing worthy of scrutiny here.

For Japan, however, the main challenger in the Horn of Africa is none other than China, and so it is the threat of the Chinese expansion in Africa that gives chills to Japan. As archenemies for decades if not centuries, Japan and China never agree on many international issues particularly those involving southeast Asia; a regional rivalry, fueled by the disputed South China Sea, has been at the center of discord between the two Asian economic powerhouses. Consequently, in competition with China, Japan leased from Djibouti in 2011 a military site and stationed a contingent of 180 Japanese troops, which is next to the U.S. Camp Lemonnier military base located at the Horn of Africa country's international airport. "Japan will lease additional land next year to expand a military base in Djibouti, eastern Africa, as a counterweight to what it sees as growing Chinese influence in the region," recounts Kubo, adding that "Japan also pledged to increase its support to infrastructure, education and healthcare projects in Africa, committing an extra \$30 billion in public and private support" (2016, 3). This huge sum was intended of course to counter China's \$60 billion commitment to development projects throughout Africa, which also included debt cancellations for several counties and pledges of developing the agricultural sector to eliminate food deficits while boosting commercial farming for domestic consumption and recapturing the amount of foreign currency reserve to be gained from agricultural exports (Ibid).

While acknowledging Japan's keen interest in building strategic partnerships with the Horn of Africa counties, Askar contends that Japan seeks "...to maximize its vital interests and enhance its influence amid strong international competition. Japan is also keen to counter China's influence in the Horn of Africa, which has grown immensely in recent years" (2021, 1). In addition to offering humanitarian assistance at times of drought and famine to the regional states, Japan's underlying economic interest in the Horn of Africa has been for the most part investing in several of the dynamic sectors of the African economies, while exploiting the strategic location of the Horn of Africa states, with a special focus on the export of goods and services. As Japan is known for aiding countries that lack both skills and capital, Tokyo's priorities in Africa thus have been supporting economic development, given that it is essential to link the emerging economies of East Africa with those of the world in which Japan itself plays a major part. This has led naturally to the growing Japanese interest in the maritime corridors of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, especially the Red Sea and Strait of the Bab al-Mandab, which connect Africa and Asia through the seas of Asia and the Indian Ocean.

United Kingdom

As a former colonial power, Great Britain has had a long history of engagement in the Horn of Africa, particularly in the current *de fact* state of Somaliland, which used to be called then *British Somaliland*. Unlike France, though, the British presence has been extremely limited since Somalia's independence, and it is only very recently that the U.K.'s interest in the Horn of Africa seems to have heightened after China and other great powers have been competing for geopolitical dominance of the region. At the same time, it should be noted that the U.K. has had a long and mutually beneficial partnership with other *Anglophone* African countries under the auspices of the *Commonwealth*---a political association of 56-member states, the vast majority of which are

former territories of the British Empire. Some of these countries included African states, eighteen in total, whose postcolonial ties with Great Britain have been unbroken under the *Commonwealth*.

However, following *Brexit*---a nomenclature for the official withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Union (EU) in January 2020---the U.K. has shown a renewed interest in revitalizing its international image and consequently embarked on a foreign policy that is particularly focused on Africa as a whole, with an eye on the Horn of Africa as well as the security of the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Indian Ocean. This whole new thinking of the U.K. has come about against the backdrop of the global hotspots of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa today, which have drawn the attention of several global and regional powers, as each seeks geopolitical supremacy at a time of political uncertainty across the world. Added to this global uncertainty are the threats looming over the U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine war that is threatening to plunge the U.S. and EU into an armed conflict directly with Russia, even to the extent of engaging in a nuclear war that may culminate in World War III; all these are concerns of Great Britain as they are to the great powers, and to the rest of the of the world, as well.

As is true with all its rivals in the Horn of Africa, the U.K.'s interests are multi -faceted. Active diplomacy that advances the national security interest of each state at the international stage is often an essential tool especially for any global power to remain competitive, and this imperative therefore has driven the British to make inroads into Africa by engaging strategically located African countries diplomatically. With the intention of propping its international standing, the U.K. in effect has replicated the actions of its counterparts---both allies and adversaries---in the Horn of Africa. In affirmation of this view, Askar notes that “Recent tours and movements by British officials in some regional countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia reflect a noticeable interest to expand Britain’s regional political and diplomatic presence in light of the international and regional competition in this region” (2021, 2).

Looking at it holistically, however, the long-term foreign policy strategy of Great Britain seems geared primarily toward an improvement of its trade and investment activities and becoming a major player in Africa. There is no doubt that the U.K. is making a concerted effort to have an impacting influence in the Horn of Africa at a level that is commensurate with its national interest and global power ranking. In the end, this sub-region of Africa is where the security interests as well as the strategic priorities of great and emerging powers are colliding, given the backdrop of intense hegemonic competition that has permeated throughout the region during the most recent decades. Although the presence of dozens of British troops in Djibouti to maintain its security needs, using the U.S. military base in Camp Lemonnier as an official post, may not seem to project a stately physical presence demonstrative of the U.K.'s global reputation, it certainly is a strategy that serves it effectively at this time. Germany, and Spain, along with India, have similar arrangements with their respective allied global power stationed, with an established military base in Djibouti. Sure enough, like the other regional powers, the U.K. uses its troops to provide support to the global anti-piracy campaign in the Indian Ocean while protecting the security of the shipping waterways of the Red Sea and ensuring that global commerce remains unaffected by any threats that could stem from the Yemen civil war---spilling over to the red Sea---and the often-volatile Middle East politics.

On the other hand, unlike some other global and regional powers involved in arms transfers to the Horn of Africa states, the volume of sales that the U.K. is known to have made in the past and currently have been insignificant, although in the decades past Somalia and Eritrea, following its independence in 1993, have been the beneficiaries of such sales. At the same time, it should

also be noted that arms sales by the U.K. to other African countries as well as to allies in the rest of the world have been the mainstay of a British foreign policy instrument for decades (Fleshma, 2011). On a much larger scale, Great Britain has more recently embarked--in pursuit of its economic interests---on a renewed roadmap that is forward looking. This has come about against the backdrop of its singular action to leave the EU and enjoy the leeway that allows it to conduct i its own independent political, diplomatic, and economic policies unfettered by any collective decision making that the EU requires of its member states. Consequently, the U.K.'s economic policy has been on a new trajectory that is best described by Askar as follows:

Britain seeks to preserve its power on global economy's map by forging a network of economic alliances, building strong trade partnerships with African countries in various fields such as infrastructure, renewable energy and technology, opening new markets in the Horn of Africa's countries as substitutes for EU's markets, benefiting from the population density and natural resources enjoyed by these countries, exploring economic opportunities, boosting trade volumes and expanding investments in the Horn of Africa's countries, ensuring bilateral and collective trade agreements with these countries, and highlighting Britain's status as a new partner for African states. All of this is boosted by London's efforts to occupy a better rank as a foreign investor in Africa among G7 countries in the next few years (Ibid).

Although there were reports showing that Britain's trade with Africa has shrunk in absolute and relative terms, from 30% in 1960 to about 3% in 2022, after *Brexit*, however, trade between Africa and the U.K. in general has grown steadily. According to Nicholas Westcott (2022), more than 40 per cent of the UK's African trade was with South Africa and Nigeria. This obviously does not in any way suggest that the Horn of Africa has been the main beneficiary of the trade with the U.K. It only confirms the earlier assertion made that the U.K. has not as actively involved in the region as it has in other parts of the continent, particularly of those states in the western and southern regions of Africa. At the same time, in the investment sector, Great Britain has set a robust record in most recent years, as noted by Westcott in this excerpt:

In 2019 the country held the second-largest stock of foreign direct investment in Africa (after China) at \$66 billion – 83 per cent of it invested in oil, gas, mining, and financial suggest services. Annual investment grew rapidly after 2000, but plummeted after Brexit and recovered in 2018-2019, only to fall again during the covid-19 pandemic. African investment in the UK was around \$3 billion in 2014, but the UK has found a niche in encouraging expanding African companies to list on the London Stock Exchange. By 2019, more than 110 African companies with a combined market capitalization of \$175 billion were listed on the London Stock Exchange – more than on any other stock exchange outside Africa bid (Westcott, 2022, 1).

That was why in 2020, the U.K. hosted an Investment Summit with African countries in hopes of promoting and elevating business investments throughout the continent, with the belief that“...Africa is home to several of the fastest-growing economies in the world; financial technology and telecoms are booming on the continent; African minerals are increasingly in demand; and Africa has great potential to improve its agricultural output.”(Ibid). In sum, the U.K.'s engagements in the many facets of its international relations with the Horn of Africa countries have been on the rise of late, and they are expected to accelerate even more in the coming years, as will those of the other powers that are competing for influence and primacy in the region.

Italy

The colonial ties that Italy has had historically to the Horn of Africa touch a chord with three of the four countries in the region. Both Eritrea and Somalia were once colonized by Italy; however, Italy's attempt to subdue the Ethiopian Empire and subjugate it into a colonial status ended in fiasco, as the Italian army was defeated in 1896 at the Battle of Adwa by the Ethiopians in one of the greatest wars in the history of Africa. Of course, during the Second World War, Italy was able to occupy Ethiopia for 5 years while the fight to expel them from the country still raged on. Given this historical connection, therefore, Italy's presence in the region should not be unexpected, as France's presence there should not. Unlike France, though, Italy's commitment to shaping the geopolitical surroundings of the region has been low key for many decades. This, however, has changed course in most recent years, as Italy's geopolitical interest in the Horn of Africa becomes more deepened in competition with allies as well as adversaries.

In the last ten years, the objectives of Italy's foreign policy have been redefined to include the African continent as a priority," states Strangis, of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. The wider objective of Italian renewed interest in Africa was spelled out in a 2020 A Partnership with Africa declaration, which provided areas of cooperation with African countries with a focus on security, migration, and human rights. "Rome is strengthening ties with the countries of the Horn of Africa, a strategic region at the center of the Red Sea route, one of the busiest trade routes in the world," Strangis correctly notes (2022, 1).

Given this backdrop, Italy's foreign policy toward the Horn of Africa thus relies on the three similar pillars to those Germany pursues in the region: stemming migrations from other countries through the dangerous waters of the Mediterranean Sea; becoming an active player in the global security taskforces of the Red Sea, with the aim of ensuring the safe and secure passage of international commerce; and taking advantage of the trade and investment opportunities that the region provides for.

Of all the countries in southern Europe bordering the Mediterranean Sea, however, Italy has been the most affected by immigration issues over the years. In fact, 75 percent of the migrants arriving in Europe land in Italy at the point of entrance. Using Libya and Tunisia as a gateway to Europe, most of the immigrants wanting to migrate to the various European countries end up on the Italian shores because of the country's proximity to the Mediterranean Sea. These immigrants often take the high risks of volatility of the ocean's waves at the time of turbulence and the vagaries of human traffickers that guarantee them no safe passage except usurping exorbitant fees from them while conducting their criminal endeavor. For example, in 1922, "6,701 migrants arrived in Italy from the Mediterranean -- around half were rescued at sea and the other half landed on their own," according to a report published by *Info Migrants* (ANSA, 2022). D'emilio revealed, citing a remark made in March 2023 by a lawmaker from a right-wing party in Italy, that "nearly 700,000 migrants are in Libya awaiting an opportunity to set out by sea toward Italy" (2023, 3). According to *Statista*, a leading provider of market and consumer data, 59,700 immigrants from Tunisia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Guinea, Morocco, Eritrea, and Sudan arrived in Italy between January and November of 2021 (2021, 1). From this stark evidence, one cannot fail to fathom the enormity with which Italy may view the immigration crisis it has confronted. Indeed, this is a national security challenge for Rome.

Equally important to Italian foreign policy objectives is having to assume a global role at a vital and strategic region like the Horn of Africa. A loyal member of the Western alliance, Italy's global interest aligns with that of the U.S. as well all other member-states of NATO and EU. The

most prominent of such countries---the U.S., France, Great Britain, and Germany---use global security imperatives and freedom of commerce through the Red Sea as a *raison d'etre* for their presence in the Horn Africa, and the same goes for Italy in that regard. With this being the case, Italy maintains its own military base in Djibouti. The base is regarded as the “... first real operational logistic base of the Italian armed forces outside the national borders and considered by the Italian government a permanent outpost in an area of enormous strategic importance” (De Faakto Intelligence Research Observatory, 2019, 1). Among the reasons that experts often cite as a trigger for the global powers to have military facilities in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Djibouti, are: “fighting terrorism, close to Somalia and Yemen; surveillance of mercantile traffic; deploying instructors and parachutists in Mogadishu as part of the European training mission in favor of the Somali army; military engagement in anti-terrorist operations against Shabab Islamists or al-Qaeda exponents; and liberation of hostages, kidnap and ransom operations” if and when they occur (Ibid). Italy is actively engaged in some if not in most of these activities, thus complementing the roles that other Western allies play in the region.

The third and last pillar in Italy’s Horn of Africa strategy may be linked to a trend that is at a high pitch of global economic diplomacy in the Horn of Africa these days, where business interests have become the superseding crusade of external powers. More specifically, though, this pillar is centered on the opportunities that the region offers to Italian investors while getting the most out of trade relations between Italy and the Horn of Africa states; and, undeniably, development aid has been the mechanism Italy and others use to advance their relations with the developing nations of the Horn. The abundance of natural resources, including the potential for benefit extractions in the dynamic sectors of the economies of these states by Italian businesses, is the driving force for Italy to navigate a constructive engagement scheme beneficial to Italy, primarily, but also to the states whose resources are sought after. To the extent that enhancement of trade relations and investment ventures often require effective diplomacy, proving a genuine interest in assisting countries that lack the know-how and the necessary funds to launch projects on their own, Italy has put programs in place that offer basic services to the needy and the less privileged in some countries of the Horn. Strangis clearly puts this in context in the following citation:

Through the WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) program in Ethiopia and Kenya, Italy has become a leader in projects concerning water resources. Italy is allocating funding and know-how to initiatives to tackle drought and climate change in Ethiopia. Moreover, the Italian Development Cooperation Agency is participating in a UNICEF project on drought response in Ethiopia that would implement sustainable water supplies in affected areas. At the bilateral level, Italy is reinforcing its ties with Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea through aid and development programs. Between 2017 and 2018, an overall amount of 81 million US dollars was donated to these countries. A stronger relationship has been built with Ethiopia especially, for which Italy is the second-largest commercial partner in Europe (Strangis, 2022, 1)

An Italian entrepreneur, named Agostino Siccardi, in an interview conducted in 2019, reiterated this in a much more convincing disclosure, as the quotation below so unveils:

...today, if you want to be successful, you must sit at the table and negotiate on an equal footing with the African customer: the time of colonization is over: let us keep in mind that Africa is not just emigration, as we want to believe. He added that The Africa Horn has enormous potential in terms of business and has a very strategic position, being at the entrance of the Red

Sea, where all exports from Far East countries to European countries transit. For too long, for example, Somalian piracy has disturbed these trades. For the business not only, money is needed for investments, first there is need for stability so that they can proliferate (Fotogiornalista, 2019, 1).

Although the exact amount of Italian business investments in the Horn of Africa is difficult to pin down, a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) disclosed that Italy was the seventh among the ten top direct investors in Africa (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2019). In an exclusive interview with the Ethiopian News Agency on April 1, 2023, Agostino Palese, Italy's Ambassador to Ethiopia, affirmed that Ethiopia is regarded by his country as its strategic partner in the Horn of Africa, adding that “We believe that Ethiopia could play a role in the Horn of Africa” (Ethiopian News Agency, 2023, 1). Citing the importance of Ethiopia as an investment destination for Italian businesses, Ambassador Palese further stated that energy development in Africa is Italy’s expressed interest, with private investment playing a key role and efforts to improve the skills and training of Africans in many different sectors of the economy becoming as the core objective of his government. For example, the ambassador cited the banking sector in Ethiopia where such skills and training may be needed, adding that “We have to continue to work because if Ethiopia is to attract investment and to have more reform economic agenda, I understand it takes time, but the only way is to go forward and especially in the bank system and on custom” (Ibid.)

Germany

To put it in perspective, Germany’s foreign policy toward Africa in general has been one of indifference for years, in contrast to its Western allies that have been active throughout the continent for decades. Nonetheless, the European economic powerhouse, as Germany is often hailed by many observers, has not been entirely blasé, either. Based on the principles of respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, Germany has dealt with African countries every so often, but not of course as actively and vigorously as France, the U.S., or Great Britain, just to mention a few. What drives Germany’s strategy in Africa are the issues of migration, development, and security, according to Pelz (2021). In what seems consistent with this same viewpoint, Schadomsky affirms that “Despite their understandable commitment to Ukraine, Germans and Europeans should not ignore the Horn of Africa. They must consider both geopolitical factors and their own self-interest: Should war and hunger trigger a wave of refugees across the Mediterranean, it could lead to new social upheavals in Europe” (2022, 2).

Overall, however, three interrelated pillars provide the guiding tenets of Germany’s activities in the Horn of Africa. The first pillar is security. Like its Western allies, Germany’s presence in that part of Africa has been shaped by the global security undercurrents prevalent not only in the Horn of Africa but also the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, and even the Persian Gulf. As key EU member and a loyal partner of the Western alliance, led by the U.S., Germany’s national security interest is therefore intimately tied to that of its allies. Thus, the anti-terrorism and anti-piracy campaigns waged by the global powers in Somalia as well as in the Indian Ocean, respectively, has compelled Germany to join forces with them, as this is coordinated with its overall national interest and foreign policy priorities. So, Germany’s measured involvement in the Horn of Africa has given way to the stationing of a small contingent of German soldiers, numbering between 30 and 80 in Djibouti, under the sponsorship of France, which has had a well-

established military presence in its former colony for decades. For example, reporting for the *Philadelphia Trumpet*, Di Santo discloses the functions of Germany's military station, asserting that "Germany has a presence at a French naval airbase in Djibouti, from which it patrols strategic sea lanes around the Horn of Africa. It conducts air patrols in support of an EU-wide mission to fight piracy and, in the past, has deployed frigates and support ships in the area" (2019, 1). At the same time, research shows that Germany's arms transfer to the Horn of Africa is nonexistent. Although it is known in the global arms sales industry as the world's third-leading weapons exporter, often placed behind the U.S. and Russia, there is no recorded data crediting it as an arms seller to African countries.

A second pillar and a fundamental tenet of Germany's foreign policy strategy have been the containment of massive inflowing of foreign immigration, mostly involving unskilled African migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea and seeking refuge in EU countries. Germany has been a magnet for economic refugees in most recent years, but it has been equally welcoming of refugees for humanitarian reasons stemming from wars and other human-made disasters. For example, Germany was absorbing more than one million Syrian refugees at the height of the Syrian crisis in 2015. Also, it has been a country of choice for asylum seekers; in 2017, for instance, "Eritrea followed only Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan as a top country of origin of people seeking asylum in Germany" (Pelz, 2018) While unskilled foreign labor is regarded as a liability not only in Germany but also in France, on the contrary, skilled labor is welcomed by both European countries because, in the view of Tandian, "...It can help balance an ageing society and finance the pension system, as well as compensate for the current shortage of skilled workers" (2023, 2).

Given this reality, Germany's new undertaking by seeking skilled workers from selected African countries lately indeed has put German-African relations on a new trajectory of cooperation for the common good. However, as a footnote to this, it should be noted that the "brain drain" syndrome, pushing the African educated class out of Africa, is costing African countries profoundly while alleviating the skilled labor shortages of the advanced countries of the West, such as Germany. For example, Germany announced at the beginning of 2023 a policy that would establish skilled-worker recruitment centers in Ghana, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. According to Tandian, "The people sought are skilled workers with vocational training, skilled workers with academic training, researchers, scientists and managers" (Ibid).

In this connection, while Germany's new search for selective African immigrant talent is certainly a new indicator of closer cooperation, still yet mass immigration from Africa of the unskilled category is of major concern to Germany, as well as Italy, both of which have been affected the most by ongoing immigration issues; France, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, all bordering the Mediterranean Sea, are also impacted, but not as much. Given these circumstances, therefore, Germany's fear of being swamped by excessive immigration of unskilled workers from Africa and elsewhere simply seeking economic opportunities may not be unfounded. European countries have seen for decades migrants taking extreme and risky journeys through illegal human trafficking across the Mediterranean Sea relentlessly to reach their shores and become a liability for them, as the foreign immigrants strain the educational, healthcare, and social welfare systems that the European countries have created for their own citizens. Consequently, many, like Germany, have taken a stand to stem the problem at its root-cause; that is to say, tackling the immigration issue from the place of origin---Africa and elsewhere. Since the interrelated issues of political instability, economic crisis, coupled with ethnic strife and drought conditions, are the main culprits, global response to the needs of counties that are prone to these conditions are usually

used as a justification for external intervention. Thus, it is against this background that Germany's foreign policy toward Africa, and most importantly to the Horn Africa, should be weighed.

The third pillar that defines Germany's global standing is further underpinned in activities that aim development as key to political stability and national unity. Countries that have historically been wrecked by violence, stemming from any combination of ethnic conflict, famine caused by drought conditions, border disputes, and authoritarian governance, as some of the African states have, are likely to be on Germany's development radar, with priorities centered on humanitarian aid, trade, and investments. For example, in 2011, at the height of an alarming famine conditions in Africa, Germany's Federal Foreign Office donated 9.6 million euro in humanitarian aid for the Horn of Africa, which was increased to 33.5 million euro in the same year. This was in addition to EU's total humanitarian aid of 160 million euro, of which Germany contributed about thirty-two million euro (German Federal Foreign Office, 2011). Likewise, as some of its Western allies as well as other rivals have done of late, Germany has begun to engage Africa in activities that spur development. The aim is tapping trade and investment opportunities across the continent, incentivizing market forces domestically, and integrating African budding economies into the global capitalist system. To that end, other countries have held business summits with African states and have done so in the hopes of opening investment ventures in the growing African economic sector while aiming to meet the demands of domestic market forces within their own countries seeking investment potentials globally. Countries such as the U.S., China, Russia, Turkey, India, Japan, among others, have held business summits in most recent years with African states, with trade and investments talks dominating the agenda. Germany had its own version of such a summit in 2017 in Kenya---the *German African Business Summit*----where "around 400 business and political representatives were expected to attend with a view to getting to know new markets, finding business partners and discussing opportunities and risks" (Olly/Fotolia – Business, 2017).

Nonetheless, Germany's involvement to date in African trade and investment activities have mostly involved West Africa, Southern Africa, and to some degree East Africa. In contrast, German investment interest has been minimal to date relative to the Horn of Africa, although Ethiopia remains a good prospect for German investors in the future. Pelz, reporting for Deutsche Welle (DW), maintains that "Ethiopia is already included in Germany's G20 initiative "Compact with Africa" (2018, 3). The goal is to attract more private investment to selected African countries. Reform partners would benefit from additional German development aid. In exchange, these countries would be obliged to uphold democratic values, respect human rights, and fight corruption" (Ibid.)

Spain

Spain's past foreign policy agenda toward Africa was best described by Gilin 2010 in a policy brief that he wrote for FRIDE, a European think tank for global action:

Spain lacks historic links in the continent comparable to those of France or the United Kingdom; it is also a country which, in spite of having increased its volume of ODA {Official Development Aid} from 2 billion Euros in 2003 to almost 5 billion euros in 2010, does not have the requisite economic might to compete with the United States or China (2010, 2).

However, global realities often compel established and emerging global powers to adapt to contemporary trends and developments affecting the global system, as they compete for limited resources and seek to cooperate with, influence, and control others that are less powerful but whose

natural resources are untapped and need development. As such, Spain has made a change of course and embarked on a more far-sighted foreign policy agenda lately, with Africa playing a significant part in it. “We want to be a strategic partner in the continent,” pronounced Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez in 2021, stressing the importance of Africa to Spanish business investments. Launching a new African strategy, he promised that African countries would be his administration’s diplomatic priority, further asserting that his plan would include boosting “...financing schemes to support Spanish companies seeking to expand in Africa and also a commitment by Madrid to call for debt relief for African countries at G20 meetings.” (Gallardo, 2021).

Unlike other European colonial powers, however, Spain’s African colonial experience is inconsequential because it had only one colony--Equatorial Guinea. Thus, Spain’s African engagements have been most recent, and even those engagements are widespread throughout the continent instead of concentrating in a sub-region. In that regard, the Horn of Africa is not particularly a strategic priority for Spain, although the country’s membership in the EU and having a shared democratic tradition with the West overall still make an alliance with Western powers that are active in the Horn of Africa a strategic necessity. As part of the innovative approach, Spanish companies built highly touted projects in some selected African countries, such as Morocco, where a mega solar energy facility was inaugurated in 2016, and Kenya, where a wind power farm in Lake Turkana was built in 2017.

In the investment sector, Spain has made some headways, as well. For example, “Spain’s exports to Africa were worth €19 billion in 2019, or 19 percent of the country’s exports outside the EU. Spain’s imports from Africa were worth €27 billion that year,” according to Gallardo (Ibid). At the same time, there have been some drawbacks negatively impacting Spanish investments in Africa. As with their counterparts in the U.S., Spanish investors have been reluctant to commit fully to business ventures in Africa fearful that political instability and corruption would put such ventures at a high-risk. The storyline about African countries has been for a while that frequent regime changes and high-level corruption reported in several countries of Africa make business decision making on foreign investments most difficult. Yet, this negative caricature of African societies has lessened in recent years. As a result, foreign investors are now pouring in billions of dollars into Africa more than any other time in the past, although the exact figure is hard to quantify.

On the other hand, Spain is not known as a major exporter of arms to Africa. Even so, it ranked seventh among the world’s twenty-five largest exporters of major arms during the period between 2016 and 2020, according to a study done by Wezeman, in 2021. Still constituting only 3.2% of arms traded in the international market, Spain’s arms exports during that period went to Australia, Singapore, and Turkey, not to Africa (Wezeman et al, 2020). In this connection, it is also essential to note that Russia remains the single largest foreign arms provider to Africa, accounting for 49% of arms bought by the region. The US and China are neck -and-neck with sales to Africa being 14% and 13%, respectively. Regarding Spain’s physical presence in the Horn of Africa, one can only point to the EU’s *Operation Atalanta*, established initially as European Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia, which...is a current counter-piracy military operation at sea off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean that contributes to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. The operation is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach for a peaceful, stable, and democratic Somalia and contributes to stability in the Horn of Africa” (Council of the EU, 2021).

Stationed in the French facilities in Djibouti, Spain maintains fifty military personnel to support EU's mission and has continuously increased its activities in the Horn of Africa by deploying maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft as part of *Operation Atalanta*.

Turkey

While a member of the EU but geographically connected with the Middle East, Turkey's national interest in the Horn of Africa certainly has an overlapping implication for the latter as well as the former. As Turkey is bordered by Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the proximity of these countries to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea all make the EU - member state a regional power by proximity. Of course, proximity alone does not necessarily make a state a regional power, since power variables could be manifested in the size of population, human capital, military capacity, economic power, and technological prowess of a country. Beckley, describing the essentials of power, observes that...

Power is the most important variable in world politics, but scholars and policy analysts systematically mismeasure it. Most studies evaluate a country's power using broad indicators of economic and military resources, such as gross domestic products and military spending, which tally their wealth and military assets without deducting the costs they pay to police, protect, and serve their people. As a result, standard indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries, such as China and India (2018, 1).

Despite the lack of consensus in effectively measuring the essentials of national power, nonetheless, Turkey's global power ranking has been on the rise during the most recent decades. With a population of eighty- five million, a GDP rank of 20 in the world, and a military that is in the top ten of the world's one hundred most powerful armed forces, Turkey is a country to be reckoned with. In fact, Turkey maintains the second largest number of military personnel among NATO countries, only exceeded by the U. S. (Statista, 2022).

Given the forgoing, what is Turkey's role as a regional power in the Middle East and by extension in the Horn of Africa? As a Sunni Islamic state, Turkey's relations with the Middle East and North African Arab countries have gone through rough times lately. The Sunni-Shia religious schism has not been the cause of it, however. Turkey and Egypt, where Sunni Islam is the dominant religion in both states, have been at odds for decades over such issues as the Muslim Brotherhood, a Pan-Islamic, religious, and social movement founded in Egypt, which taught the illiterate, and set up hospitals and business enterprises and later advanced into the political arena. Egypt saw the Brotherhood as a threat while Turkey had sympathies for it. Furthermore, Turkey and Egypt became on the opposite sides of the Libyan crisis, following Muammar Gaddafi's removal from power in 2011. The struggle between two political factions in post-Gaddafi Libya over succession pitted Turkey against Egypt because of the support they provided to the opposing factions there. Similarly, Turkey's support to Qatar, which is at odds with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, has exacerbated regional tensions.

The Qatar-Saudi Arabia diplomatic row has been on the forefront since the beginning of the Arab Spring---a wave of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging some of the region's entrenched authoritarian regimes. The revolution was viewed as a threat by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to their kingdoms, as did Egypt, whereas Qatar supported it. As Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both of which are members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Qatar's warm relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia's key rival in the region, have fueled further tension

between the two Gulf states. On top of that, Qatar's popular broadcasting outlet, *Al Jazeera*, which focuses its coverage on international and regional topics, supported the Arab Spring all along while fanning anti-Saudi Arabia news accounts, which has made things worse. In this connection, as Turkey has been a key supporter of Qatar against the interests of Saudi Arabia and the UAE primarily, with Bahrain and Egypt also included the regional rivalry in the Gulf has thus spilled over to the Horn of Africa for influence and control. The efforts of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Iran to secure some presence in the Horn of Africa as well as influence the geopolitics of the region are therefore part of the hegemonic rivalry in the Horn of Africa--the underlying thrust of this study.

While Turkey has had a long history of diplomatic relations particularly with Ethiopia, its active presence in the region only became more pronounced in 2011 as Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Somalia and secured a military presence there, using humanitarian aid to the famine-stricken, politically unstable Horn country as an enticement. What followed then was the following:

Ankara surged aid funding, initiated development projects, opened schools, and assumed a leading role in shaping the state-building agenda, including opening a sizable military facility to train Somali government soldiers. Today, Turkish firms operate Mogadishu's air and seaports, its markets are flush with Turkish-manufactured goods, and Turkish Airways flies direct to the capital city—the first major international carrier to do so (Vertin, 2019, 1).

Looking at Turkey's engagements in the Horn of Africa critically, however, one is inclined to conclude that three overall objectives steer its foreign policy toward the region: securing a strategic position in the Horn of Africa as an emerging power; increasing its trade and investment capacities; and becoming a major arms supplier to the regional states and beyond. In 2017, Turkey followed its Somalia success by courting Sudan, following Erdogan's state visit there, to engage in bilateral relations. Erdogan agreed to help restore the Sudanese "Suakin Island—a historic and long-defunct Ottoman trading post on Sudan's Red Sea coast and a one-time launching point for African Muslims traveling to Mecca. Among the dozen cooperation agreements inked was a pledge from Erdogan to restore the island, revive its cultural significance and reestablish annual ferries to the holy sites" (Ibid). However, the two countries' relations have been in limbo since the Sudanese military toppled the pro-Turkey regime of former Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in 2019.

Nonetheless, it is in Somalia where Turkey has secured a foothold in the region, with the first military base of its kind outside Turkey. Established in the capital, Mogadishu, in 2017 at a cost of \$10 million, the base was expected to provide training for Somalia's soldiers. Ironically, Somalia also was hosting the United Arab Emirates simultaneously. The UAE ran a military facility in the capital but had also agreed to secure another base in the breakaway region of Somaliland. This action of the UAE obviously created a shaky situation for Somalia, leading eventually to the former's easing out of the deal. The UAE's presence in Somalia certainly would have pitted it against Turkey, and the fact that the UAE sought a military presence in Somaliland was tantamount to recognition of the latter's *de facto* independence, which was unacceptable to Somalia. That said, Turkish military presence in the Horn of Africa country was a strategic move that aims to challenge Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE primarily, as these regional powers vie for control and influence the affairs the various states in the region (Al Jazeera, 2017).

Because both Sudan and Somalia are fellow Muslim states, Ankara saw them initially as a convenient target for strategic alliance in the region; however, it has been Ethiopia since then in which Turkey has been well invested; both commercial investments in and arms sales to Ethiopia,

the second most populous African country after Nigeria, have taken prominence. In 2016, for example, Turkey and Ethiopia signed an agreement, with a 5 million square meter area leased to Ankara in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, for 99 years to build a trade center for Turkish companies. Ethiopia has since been Turkey's top investment market not only in the Horn but also throughout the continent. According to the Turkish Embassy, Ethiopia at the time was the biggest recipient of Turkish direct investment in Africa. The *Middle East Observer* reported that the Horn of Africa country had then \$2.5 billion of the total \$6 billion Turkish direct foreign investments in Africa (Rashed, 2016).

There is no question that Turkey and Africa have a mutual need for cooperation in the economic sector, with Africa offering the raw materials that Turkey's manufacturing industries acutely need, including gas and oil, and with Turkey providing the investment capital and technical know-how and leveraging the potential for infrastructural development and job creation in the dynamic sectors of the African economies (Kenyon, 2018).

A related but significant goal of Turkey's foreign policy has been to develop into a major global arms supplier by increasing its arms production capacity, as the country is increasingly becoming an emerging military power and projecting an image of a higher global ranking. In 2021, it was reported that Turkey's arms sales surpassed expectations reaching their highest level, and the increase registered was reflected in the arms sales to African countries. Kenez provided this insightful reflection concerning Ankara's growing military industry:

In the first 11 months of 2021, Turkey exported \$2.793 billion worth of defense products, an increase of 39.7 percent compared to the same period of the previous year. The Turkish defense industry, which set an export record of \$2.7 billion in 2019, is preparing to set a new record by closing this year with exports of more than \$3 billion (2021, 1).

With the biggest increase of Turkish arms sales credited to African countries, Kenez argues that the strategy of the Turkish government is to make Africa a new arms market for its industry. For example, Turkey increased its defense exports to Africa" by 700 percent, in the first 11 months of 2021, from \$41 million to \$328 million. Africa, thus, ranks fifth in Turkey's defense exports" (Ibid). In the most recent years, Turkey's transfer of combat drones to Ethiopia helped the Horn of Africa country turn the tide of the war against the Tigray rebel forces in the north of the country. Reinforcing the close relations between Turkey and Ethiopia was the defense agreement they signed in April 2023, which stipulates that the two countries will engage, among other things, in the following: ...joint participation in military exercises and non-combat operations such as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and counter-piracy operations. The agreement also allows the two countries to cooperate in the defense industry. According to Article IV (6) of the agreement, the parties also agree to share military intelligence. Moreover, the parties will provide mutual logistical support and exchange munitions, materials, and services in the form of grants or in return for payment (Kenez, 2023, 1).

Turkey has become one of the leading drone producers in the globe, and so the effectiveness of its drones in combat has also made it the envy of many other countries that lack drone technology. In addition, the Turkish military industry is well-known for exporting to other African countries and others around the world such light arms as military electronics, software and systems, ammunition, rifles, sub-machine guns, howitzers, explosives, and armored vehicles, among others. Aiming to illustrate the extent of growth in both Turkey's military industry and its arms sales to Ethiopia, Agence France-Presse reported in 2021 that "Turkish defense and aviation exports to Ethiopia rose to \$94.6 million between January and November from around \$235,000 in the same period last year" (2021, 1).

Egypt

The historical connection of Egypt with the Horn of Africa countries, juxtaposed with its geographical proximity to the region, makes the north African Arab state a natural actor in the geopolitics of the region. So, one can presume that Egypt's national security interest is interwoven with the political, economic, social, diplomatic, and military dynamics of the region. As the proprietor of the Suez Canal, it can be argued that the Red Sea as well as the Horn of Africa are the lifeblood of Egypt for existence. Without too much overstatement, Egypt's survival as a state depends on what goes on within the Horn of Africa. In the end, the Suez Canal generates for the north African Arab country annual proceeds of \$8 billion in transit fees. Linking the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, the Canal services 10 percent of the global maritime trade and most of the oil transported by sea. The Red Sea states ---Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, land-locked Ethiopia, and Somalia by extension---are all critical in the larger scheme of ensuring the freedom of global commerce through the Canal. Any disruption of shipments in the Red Sea while sailing through the Mediterranean Sea, whether stemming from wars or interstate conflicts within the Horn of Africa and nearby other countries, could be a tremendous loss to the Egyptian economy. Given this fact, Egypt's attempt to control and influence the domestic politics of the Horn of Africa states by covert or overt means has always been part of the Egyptian foreign policy strategy for decades, if not for centuries. Thus, the rivalry in the Horn with other regional Arab and/or non-Arab powers can be intense, given Egypt's national security needs *vis a vis* those of its adversaries.

Even more so, Egypt is absolutely at the mercy of the Nile River for survival, to which the water flows from the Blue Nile and the White Nile, with both rivers merging near Khartoum, Sudan, and thereby becoming Nile proper. The fact 95 percent of Egyptians live within a few kilometers of the Nile, and their reliance on it makes the Nile River unquestionably Egypt's utmost treasure. The water from the Nile is used by Egypt, among other things, to irrigate farms; provide water supplies to Egypt's third largest population in Africa; offer food sources such as fishing; and serve as a major transportation waterway for trade and commerce. The White Nile upstream countries from which the smaller share of the Nile flows are Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda. It contributes only about 15% to the flow of the combined Nile. On the other hand, the Blue Nile, rising in Ethiopia, contributes about 85% to the flow of the Nile River that passes through Egypt to the Mediterranean. The fact that the Blue Nile tributaries all originate from the highlands of Ethiopia makes the Horn of Africa state the target of Egypt's constant indignation. Egypt-Ethiopia relations have been acrimonious throughout history for this and other reasons.

In fact, a war between Egypt and Ethiopia occurred as far back as 1874-1876, when the Ethiopian Empire and the Khedivate of Egypt, a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, clashed over sovereign rights to territories in what is now Eritrea; Egypt was decisively beaten by Ethiopia in the Battle of Gura (Military Wiki, 2012). Since then, the relations of the two countries have been hot and cold through the decades. Egypt's major concern throughout history has been the use of the Blue Nile as an exclusive entity, based on colonial era accords achieved by Great Britain, representing Sudan while a colony, and Egypt, to which Ethiopia was not a party. Named the Nile Water Treaties, the accords effectively prevented upstream countries, such as Ethiopia, from using the Nile's water without the consent of those downstream countries. This resulted in a strong Egyptian position of dominance, and Egypt continues to try to enforce the treaties even today. For years, "Egypt justified its dominance over the river by citing a colonial-era water treaty and a 1959 agreement with Sudan. But Ethiopia does not recognize them, and when its former leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, proposed building a series of dams on the Nile in 1978, he met thinly veiled threats," assert Walsh and Sengupta, reporting on the Nile water politics (2020, 3). Indeed,

the hostility between Ethiopia, on one hand, and Egypt and Sudan, on the other hand, reached an apex proportion in more recent years with the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. The largest of its kind in Africa, Ethiopia's mega dam, which has been under construction since 2011 at an estimated cost of \$4.8 billion, is supported by funds raised through domestic bonds. While the primary goal of the mega dam is electricity production to relieve Ethiopia's acute energy shortage, it also aims to export energy to several neighboring African countries. According to experts, the GERD is expected to generate a hydroelectric capacity of 5.15 gigawatts, making it the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed, as well as among the twenty largest in the world. However, as Mbaku correctly depicts it in the following quotation, the acrimony between Ethiopia, and Egypt and Sudan working in unison against the former reveals the real story of the Nile water politics in that part of Africa:

The dispute over the GERD is part of a long-standing feud between Egypt and Sudan—the downstream states—on the one hand, and Ethiopia and the upstream riparian on the other over access to the Nile's waters, which are considered a lifeline for millions of people living in Egypt and Sudan. Despite the intense disagreements, though, Ethiopia continues to move forward with the dam, arguing that the hydroelectric project will significantly improve livelihoods in the region more broadly (2020, 1).

To this day, the tension triggered by GERD between Egypt and Ethiopia remains unabated. At the time of this writing, about 90 percent of the GERD construction was completed. Nevertheless, Egypt was regularly issuing threats against Ethiopia over the continued construction of the mega dam while Ethiopia condemned such threats, calling them unwarranted and diplomatically irresponsible.

It is therefore against this backdrop that Egypt's role in the Horn of Africa must be examined. While Egypt may not have yet secured an official military base in any of the regional states, that does not mean it has not tried to acquire one either. Egyptian flirtations with securing military facilities in those counties that share borders with Ethiopia have been a known fact for years. There have been instances when Egypt made such overtures to South Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, and even to the breakaway territory of Somaliland, but all to no avail. The exception, however, is that Sudan and Egypt have waged a united front against Ethiopia in connection with the GERD, even to the extent of holding joint military exercises regularly aimed at intimidating Ethiopia. More recently, the Egyptians have received positive signs from the newly installed Somali administration of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which came to power in 1922, about setting up a military post there. Even without establishing military bases in the Horn of Africa, Egypt still is a leading Red Sea power by virtue of its control of the Suez Canal. The following narrative best describes Egypt's power projection as part of its growing role in the Horn of Africa:

In recent years, Egypt has sought to increase its military spending, including to project military force into the Horn region. In January 2017, Egypt inaugurated a new headquarters in Safaga for its southern naval fleet command, covering the Red Sea and including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which is considered a strategic interest. The southern fleet has recently been strengthened with the acquisition of modern warships, notably an amphibious assault ship. As part of the Saudi Arabian-coalition, Egypt has also been supporting military actions in the conflict in Yemen. This has primarily involved the deployment of ships to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as part of the naval blockade of Yemeni ports, notably to counter Iranian vessels (Melvin, 2019, 1).

In sum, two interrelated foreign policy imperatives guide Egypt's posture toward the Horn of Africa --- ensuring the unfettered flow of global commerce through the Suez Canal and the prevention of water insecurity that could come from the reduced volume of Nile water flow to the nation's farmlands and drinking water reservoir. The long-term strategy of Egypt therefore is to thwart Ethiopia at any cost from building other similar hydroelectric projects in the future that will further reduce the flow of the Nile and threaten the livelihood of its people. Egypt meets all its drinking water and irrigation needs from the Nile River. Nonetheless, any conflict that could ensue between Egypt and Ethiopia, with the construction of more dams by the latter in the future, is difficult to predict now.

Saudi Arabia

As the largest oil exporter of the world, Saudi Arabia's national interest in the Horn of Africa is commingled with the security of the shipping routes navigating the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Bebel Mandab, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, while carrying commercial products to the rest of the world. Given the proximity of the Horn of Africa to these sea routes, it is critical for Saudi Arabia, as well as for many other nations, to ensure that oil is shipped with the utmost security and freedom of movement to the global market. Thus, these routes and the Horn of Africa together make the Kingdom's growing role in the region to be a core foreign policy pursuit. While unfettered global commercial activities through these water ways are central to Saudi Arabia's foreign policy priority, two other vital national security quests ----containment of adversaries, namely Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, in the strategically vital part of Africa from expanding their influence in the region as well as creating business investment opportunities within the regional states---are also an embodiment of the Kingdom's growing attraction to the region.

Saudi Arabia's prominent role among the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), coupled with its global ranking as the largest exporter of oil, has placed the Kingdom at the forefront of the regional power hierarchy. Thus, the securing of a military base in Djibouti in 2016 was only a manifestation of the significant role that the Kingdom has come to play in the Horn of Africa in tandem with its growing aspiration of maintaining its rising status on the world stage. Indeed, the securing of a higher regional power ranking in the face of stiff competition from allies as well as adversaries, such as Iran, Egypt, United Emirates, Turkey, Israel, and Qatar, seems to be an eternal temptation of the Kingdom. There is no denial that Saudi Arabia has increased its military presence in the region because of the Yemeni civil war. The Kingdom concluded a security agreement with Djibouti to use the base as a monitoring station of the war in Yemen and of any other adversary activities.

The conflict in Yemen, which has led to foreign interventions on both sides of the armed factions, has further compelled the Kingdom to expand its sphere of military influence by maintaining a significant naval presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as well. The civil war in Yemen, which started in 2014 when Houthi rebels — Shiite insurgents with links to Iran and a history of revolting against the Sunni government—took control of Yemen's capital, Sana'a. Saudi Arabia has led a coalition of Gulf states since then supporting the internationally recognized central government located in Aden, the temporary capital of Yemen, near the Red Sea. The crisis has pitted Iran against the Saudi-led coalition, each sending weapons and providing logistical support to their respective patrons. Feuerstein, in a policy paper he wrote for the *Middle East Institute*, makes this insightful observation about the regional power rivalry of Middle East countries and the affected Horn of Africa states targeted for control and influence:

The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries old and complex. While the world's attention is focused on the "great power competition" in the region, primarily between the U.S. and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, principally Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa (020, 1).

Yet another significant element of the Saudis' national interest in the Horn of Africa is the interstate rivalry among the regional powers themselves and the quest for containment of any domination of the region by a single power. Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, have had an embittered relationship for several decades over issues, ranging from the crisis in Yemen to Saudi Arabia's close ties with the U.S., which Iran has always viewed with intense contempt. The rivalry was further heightened by each country's view of leadership in their respective religious sect. Hubbard and Bengali, reporting for *The New York Times*, maintain that "...Saudi Arabia and Iran are global leaders of the two largest sects of Islam, with Saudi Arabia considering itself the guardian of Sunnis and Iran assuming a similar role for Shiites" (2023, 2). However, the two long-time foes have recently patched up their differences---obviously to the disillusionment of the U.S.--and agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations, as reported by Hubbard and Bengali and cited as follows:

The new diplomatic engagement could scramble geopolitics in the Middle East and beyond by bringing together Saudi Arabia, a close partner of the United States, with Iran, a longtime foe that Washington and its allies consider a security threat and a source of global instability. Saudi Arabia and Iran have competed for influence for decades, each seeing itself not just as a regional power, but also as a lodestar for the world's 1.9 billion Muslims. Tensions between the two nations grew into an all-out rift in 2016 when protesters in Iran stormed Saudi diplomatic missions after the kingdom's execution of a dissident Shiite cleric (Ibid).

While this new development may have ebbed the tension between the two regional powers, however, their past relations were replete with bitter competition, which, to some degree, was manifested within the Horn of Africa, as each attempted to outdo the other by cajoling and pressuring the regional states for support and even for the acquirement of military facilities. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has succeeded in that effort to date by having a base in Djibouti, but not Iran.

Although a new era of rapprochement seems to be taking shape at this time, with Saudi Arabia's recent moves toward diplomatic appeasement of its former nemeses, including its willingness to cease its rows with Qatar and Turkey, their rivalry in the Horn of Africa will increase rather than decrease. For the record, both Qatar and Turkey have been historically supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood's grass-roots political indoctrination against authoritarian rule in the Arab world, which Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the rest of the Gulf states---with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain included---abhor. This issue alone has been a source of discord amongst them for quite a while. As things have changed in recent years, however, the regional reconciliation that the kingdom seems to be pursuing with its former adversaries may be viewed as Saudi Arabia's genuine attempt to carry out its *Vision 2030 Plan*, which "...calls for diversifying the oil-dependent economy by attracting tourism and foreign investment, drawing millions of expatriates to the kingdom, and turning it into a global hub for business and culture. Calming

regional tensions is central to that vision, but it is also driven by {the} desire to turn Saudi Arabia into a global power and make it less dependent on the United States” (*Ibid*).

While both the security of global commerce through the Red Sea and the rivalry with other regional powers over influencing the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa have been Saudi Arabia’s fixation for decades, the quest for trade and investments in Africa has been equally central to the Kingdom’s growing desire to become a major regional player. As such, Lon compellingly conveys the importance of the Horn of Africa to investment-seeking businesses in the oil-rich Gulf states in this narrative:

Over the past decade, Gulf countries have been continually active and invested significantly in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region. Booming consumer markets, natural resources, but also a strategic location along one of the world’s busiest maritime routes, make the region appear ripe for investment. More importantly, the Red Sea has recently re-emerged as a geostrategic space in which competing global and regional players have sought to project influence (Lon, 2021, 1). In further accentuating the rivalry among these regional powers, Lon also notes that, “Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Qatar and Turkey on the other, have intensely competed to counter each other’s influence, projecting their rivalries on to the politics of the Horn” (*Ibid*).

Saudi Arabia’s investment ventures in the Horn of Africa, along with other Gulf states, is now a matter of how much, not why and how; it is simply an economic necessity that has become a pragmatic way of addressing food security. Yousif, reporting for *Asharq Al-Awsat*, dubbed the world’s premier pan-Arab daily newspaper, makes this viewpoint clear, as documented in the following narration: A recent study pointed to the growth of Gulf investments in the countries of the Horn of Africa, especially in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. Africa has become an increasingly vital partner for the Gulf states. Investment flows from the Arab Gulf to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to about \$3.9 billion between 2005 and 2015, according to recent statistics based on completed projects. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis highlighted the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa region in terms of its strategic location overlooking the oceans, global trade routes and straits heading from the Gulf states to Europe and the United States (2022, 1).

Saudi investments in Ethiopia are the largest in the Horn of Africa. The sectors in which Saudi investors are interested include agriculture, livestock, and energy. With the aim of becoming among the world’s top investor states, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a strategy that would make it less reliant on its oil-based economy. For this, Africa, and particularly the Horn with its strategic location, has become a conduit to Saudi investment ventures. Regarding Ethiopia’s choice by the Saudis as an investment outlet, Mousa accurately provides this insight: “...the country {Saudi Arabia} is eyeing Ethiopia as one of its top investment destinations. Ethiopia has a huge animal wealth that is estimated at 44 million cows and 32 million heads of sheep and 29 million goats, this wealth that ranked Ethiopia the first in Africa owning livestock, and tenth in the world”(2017, 1).It is a proven fact that investments in agriculture and energy take the huge share of the total amount invested in Ethiopia by Saudi Arabia, contributing \$200 million a year, with coffee capturing the largest investment dollars. During the 2015 -2016 period, for example, Saudi investors reported that there were more than four hundred business firms invested in the various sectors of the Ethiopian economy. The volume of trade as well as investments has continued to grow since then. Mousa further pointed out that Ethiopia is an attractive investment destination because the country presents a demography of youth population prone to high level of

consumerism; a population of more 120 million, second in Africa, that provides huge markets for goods and services; rich natural resources that are ripe for exploitation or development; and favorable tax incentives that appeal substantially to foreign investment (I bid).

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates' foreign policy strategy toward Africa as a whole and the Horn of Africa particularly is like that of Saudi Arabia. As such, the UAE's policy toward the Horn of Africa is driven by two fundamental imperatives. First is ensuring the security of the Red Sea shipping channel and the Arabian Peninsula while advancing the role of being a regional player by establishing military presence in competition with allies as well as adversaries. Secondly, the UAE strategy is further buttressed by advancing economic cooperation with resource-rich Horn of Africa countries that often need foreign investments and technical knowledge for development. While these two motives are very likely to propel the UAE's engagements in the Horn of Africa, for a better grasping of the larger scope of UAE's active role in that vital region of Africa, one must glance through the narrative cited below from a published report by the *International Crisis Group*, a think tank that serves both policymakers and academics, performing research and analysis on global crises:

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged in recent months as an important protagonist in the Horn of Africa. Through political alliances, aid, investment, military base agreements and port contracts, it is expanding its influence in the region. Turmoil in the Middle East, Iran's growing regional influence, piracy emanating from Somalia and, from 2015, the war in Yemen combined to turn the corridor's stability into a core strategic interest. The 2017 Gulf crisis, which saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt cut ties with Qatar, pushed leaders on both sides of the divide to double down on their alliances, including in the Horn. Since then, the UAE has nailed down diplomatic relationships and extended its reach, particularly along the Red Sea (2018, 1).

Looking at it in retrospect, seeking a military presence in the Horn of Africa seems to have been a continual fixation of the UAE. In 2015, the UAE concluded a lease agreement with Djibouti at the height of the Yemen's war, joined by Saudi Arabia, to establish a military post in the latter's territory; however, this did not last even a year, as Djibouti abrogated the agreement due to the overbearing interference of the Gulf state in its internal affairs. One reason for the strained relations had to do with the UAE company, called Dubai Ports (DP) World, which was to manage and operate Djibouti's Doraleh Container Terminal and its failure to live up to the expectations of Djibouti officials. Following that flop, the UAE secured a base in Eritrea in a 30-year lease agreement in 2015 that allowed the building of a port and expansion of an airstrip in Eritrea's Red Sea port of Assab, all with the aim of ferrying heavy weaponry and Sudanese troops into Yemen as the UAE fought then together with Saudi Arabia and other coalition members against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. This was followed by the UAE's announced withdrawal of its troops from the Yemen conflict in the summer of 2019, which led to the dismantling of the base in Eritrea altogether (Melvin, 2019).

Yet, the UAE's quest for military presence in the Horn of Africa ended neither in Djibouti nor in Eritrea. Starting in 2014, the UAE was actively engaged in training Somali troops at a base in Mogadishu as well as a contingent of anti-piracy military personnel in the Puntland state of Somalia; however, the relations between the two countries became strained in 2018 following the seizure by Somali police of three unmarked bags of money on a Royal Jet plane at the International

Airport in Mogadishu, which in essence ended UAE's military presence there. Nonetheless, with a new Somali government in place in 2023, the relations between Somalia and UAE began to improve once again to the extent of having signed "...an agreement to bolster military and security ties, along with cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts, as the two countries work to improve strained relations" (Middle East Monitor, 2023).

Ironically, this rapprochement happened even though the UAE had courted Somaliland in earlier years for permission to set up a military facility in the port city of Berbera. In fact, the UAE even started construction of the base in 2017, and the agreement signed between the two included a 30-year lease. Since the port of Berbera is only 195 miles south of the war-torn Yemen, it became necessary then for the UAE to have a base in the breakaway, *de facto* state for use by its troops in the war against the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels as part of the Saudi-backed coalition. The plan for completing the construction of that military base has since changed. "The United Arab Emirates no longer plans to establish a military airport in Somaliland and the facility currently being built will be turned into a civilian airport," Somaliland's president was reported as having said at that time. According to Reuters, "Somaliland UAE military base to be turned into civilian airport" (2019, 1). In sum, the four cases mentioned in the foregoing discussion regarding UAE's efforts to establish military facilities in the Horn of Africa clearly demonstrate the enormity of its regional ambition in the face of the rivalry among its allies as well as adversaries to gain a competitive edge in the region.

Equally vital to the UAE is the quest for economic relations with the Horn of Africa states. In relative terms, the realization of a long-term food security by leveraging the investment potential of Emirati businesses in the developing sectors of the Horn of Africa states has been at the pivot of UAE's foreign policy strategy toward the region for quite a while. While Gulf states enjoy a well-developed economy powered by the oil and gas industry, reliance on the importation of agricultural products remains their *weakness*. Since much of the food imported to the UAE comes currently from Europe, the potential to invest in Africa's agricultural sector and diversify its energy-based economy has been at the forefront of the UAE's latest economic blueprint. In hopes of reducing food imports, the Emirates are also embarking on the use of modern technologies to produce more food domestically. "Increasing self-production within the local region and reducing the reliability on imports is what we are focusing on," reported one of the investment management companies known for finding farming solutions through innovative technologies (Desoukie, 2021).

With respect to the Horn of Africa itself, the UAE's investment parameters traverse across the region. In general, throughout Africa, the UAE was reported to have invested "...an estimated \$11 billion in capital in Africa in 2016, overtaking Saudi Arabia to become the largest GCC investor and the second largest in the world after China," according to Todman (2018, 2). More specifically to the Horn of Africa, agriculture-rich Sudan has always been a special attraction to the Gulf states due to that country's huge, and underused potential of the rich soil that borders the Nile River. Foreign direct investments for the period 2000–2017 in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Somaliland by the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, for example, showed massive amounts of dollars with impactful effects on the region's developing economies. Reporting on the extent of Gulf investments in the Horn of Africa, Clingendael, a Netherlands Institute of International Relations, disclosed, "The database contains 434 investments from 2000 to 2017 in 16 distinct sectors, worth approximately USD 13 billion" (2018, 1). The largest of these investments went to Ethiopia and Sudan. The report further stated that a UAE investment in Ethiopian sugar manufacturing alone totaled around \$3 billion in 2017.

During the 2000-2017 period, Ethiopia hosted 233 commercial investors from Saudi Arabia and 104 from UAE. In contrast, Sudan's figures showed sixteen investors from Saudi Arabia and nineteen from the UAE. The sectors in which the Gulf states invested are agriculture and manufacturing in Ethiopia, and in Sudan agriculture. Although the figures are exceedingly small for Djibouti, Somalia, South Sudan and Somaliland, the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, all have made investments in various sectors across the entire region (Ibid).

Qatar

Writing for the *United States Institute of Peace*, Mahmood observed that some Middle Eastern states are often derided by critics for using the power of petrodollars as an instrument to entice or pressure the Horn of Africa countries, extracting political and economic benefits from them where necessary while improperly interfering in their internal affairs. What happened in Sudan and Somalia, respectively, following regime changes there several years ago was cited as cases in point; that is, the destabilizing aspects of their interventions in the affected countries. While this may have been true, he further noted that "...Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey—the four most engaged countries—have all been involved in conflict resolution in various capacities, indicating a broader interest in the Horn beyond narrow commercial and military interests" (2020, 1). Given this backdrop, what exactly then drives the foreign policy of Qatar toward the Horn of Africa? We will explore this point briefly.

All global and regional powers have at least two overriding objectives that they share in their relations with each other or in conducting their foreign policy goals in the arena of international relations: sustaining their economic wellbeing and safeguarding their security interests at all costs. While these two doctrines are largely embedded in the national security interests of many global and regional players, Qatar particularly possesses an added diplomatic tool in its foreign policy practices that others do not uphold as dearly as it does: It might be the only regional actor that has come to be known prominently as playing the role of a peacemaker. Others like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and UAE have played the role of mediator in intrastate or interstate conflicts in the Horn of Africa in their past, however, they have always made military presence in the region as their core objective, which Qatar by contrast has not. Underscoring Qatar's uniqueness in the sphere of regional hegemonic competition relative to the Horn of Africa, the *Economist Intelligence Unit* reported that...

The aspiration of Qatar to become an internationally recognized peacemaker in the Horn of Africa could have important implications for peace and security across the region. Having mediated between the Sudanese government and Darfuri rebels in 2008 and arbitrated in the Eritrea-Djibouti border agreement of 2010, Qatar has emerged as a serious candidate to broker talks between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Economics Intelligence Unit, 2013, 1).

Other than hosting the largest US military base in the Mideast, Qatar is not known for having a military base of its own in the Horn of Africa, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The source of its recognition as a major player in the region, therefore, comes primarily from economic prosperity derived from the extraction and export of petroleum and natural gas. Ranked as the fourth highest GDP per capita income country in the world, Qatar, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, relies heavily on food imports. In fact, it is the most dependent of Gulf states on external food importation. For example, in 2015, Qatar imported about 80 percent of its food, primarily from the Middle East. Even without displaying a higher regional power ranking by way of establishing

military facilities like its rivals in the region, Qatar still stands to benefit from its mediatory role in the Horn of Africa conflicts and reap benefits from investments and trade relations with the developing states there. However, the current volume of investments in the Horn of Africa by Qatar, compared to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, is still insignificant. Nonetheless, Qatar's roles in Horn conflict resolution are still seen as its primary diplomatic asset. Observers link its mediation functions as a sign of projecting greater leadership, and this is indeed a sensible scheme to position itself as a regional player fitting its practices.

Categorically, the peacemaker role offers Qatar a competitive edge especially over its adversaries. Although an aura of reconciliation was underway at the time of this writing between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on one hand and Qatar on the other, the confrontation between them on some wider Middle East issues remains to be dealt with. Two key issues caused the rift between Qatar and its fellow Gulf states, along with Egypt: Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its cozy relations with Iran, which is regarded by the latter as a regional foe.

Iran

As Arab Gulf states push ahead more assertively in sub-Saharan Africa to capitalize on economic opportunities and protect their security interests, Iran, a non-Arab Middle East country, has not remained idle either. Yet, the Iranian role, in contrast with its Middle East rivals, is limited in the Horn of Africa, although the country has a much more impacting role in the Middle East itself, with its prevalent influence in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and the Palestinian territories being the surest of its manifestations. Iran's status as a ranking regional player cannot be underestimated. Iran's geopolitical calculations are fundamentally based on some key interrelated foreign policy objectives. Being a part of the "axis of resistance," Iran sees itself as a force advancing a strategy aimed at resisting the U.S. and the "geopolitical structure of international relations," which the latter dominates. Calling the U.S. an "existential threat to the Islamic Republic," Iran's regional assertiveness stems from a reaction to the decades-old economic sanctions imposed on it by the U.S. and its allies over Iranian nuclear program and over its alleged threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East. As a champion of the Palestinian cause and one seeking the destruction of Israel as a state, Iran's regional security interests are often in collision with those of many U.S. allies in the Middle East and even in the Horn of Africa.

Iran's regional power ranking is supported by its oil wealth and by building an arms industry capable of producing missiles, rockets, drones, and other high-tech weapons systems, including a nuclear program, that the U.S. and Israel, both seen by Iran as archenemies of the Islamic Republic, have vowed to destroy before that it becomes a reality. Iran's perception of the threat that the U.S. and its Western allies pose to it has forced the Islamic Republic to forge stronger ties with both China and Russia, as well as to the countries of the Global South that are non-aligned and developing, of which African countries make up the largest number.

Iran's anti-U.S. posture is rooted in its resistance to Western cultural, military, and geopolitical domination of the Middle East in which it has long been a major player. This is further fueled by Iran's self-anointed guardianship of the faith, including its determination to raise the level of Shia Islam's heightened sense of awareness on the world stage, a worldview that evolved under the Islamic Republic, promoting the belief that "Shia have collectively suffered throughout

history,’ and that the Islamic Republic, as the ‘government of resistance,’ must provide deterrence against the ‘dominant powers’” (Naeni, 2021). So, given the circumstances, both national security concerns and economic interests dictate Iran’s overall foreign policy priorities in the Middle East as well as in the Horn of Africa---regions whose geopolitical ramifications could become an existential threat to or shield for its sovereignty.

While the foregoing previews the essence of Iran’s foreign policy parameters, a more focused look at its current playing fields in Africa and more pointedly in the Horn becomes necessary. Iranian interest in Africa seems to have been driven first by “the resistance” strategy it has adopted against the U.S. Iranian expansion of its influence in Africa therefore was deliberately conceived on the subterfuge of “South-South cooperation,” using oil as a bargaining chip, along with such enticements as “building infrastructure like hospitals, setting up companies, and providing loans” for African countries (Ibid). Although the impact was minimal, Iran also invested in a few sub-Saharan African countries, including Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. Iranian efforts to secure allies in Africa were clearly intended to thwart the Western destabilizing pressure it has faced for decades while heightening its resistance strategy by expanding its influence beyond the Middle East. It was also meant to curb the influence and advantage that its regional adversaries, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, enjoy in the current situation in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere (Ibid).

However, In the Horn of Africa particularly, Iranian activities have always been viewed with contempt by its regional foes, as well as by its Western cynics. Yet, “The United States and some Arab Gulf states raise alarm over Iran’s conduct in the Horn of Africa. Although Tehran does play a role in this volatile region, Iran’s actual influence in the region is frequently overstated and exaggerated,” argues Cafiero and Cok, reporting for *Gulf State Analytics*, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk consultancy (2020, 2). The authors further observed that, “Although there are major limitations to Iran’s presence in this part of Africa, the Iranians have been able to use the region for growing networks that provide alternative corridors for the delivery of military, financial, and material assistance to Tehran’s allies, proxies, and partners throughout the Arab region” (Ibid). The most acknowledged of Iranian impacting actions in the region was when it gained access in 2015 to the Eritrean Red Sea port of Assab and used it as launch pad to ferry arms to the Houthi insurrectionary in Yemen. The Eritrea-Iran axis began to emerge then as both countries faced U.S. sanctions---Eritrea because of humanitarian abuses and Iran for its nuclear program and stance on Israel. However, the Iranian presence in Eritrea lasted only about a year, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE lured Asmara with development aid and a financial package that was so attractive that Eritrea booted out Tehran from the latter’s navy base in Assab. Often seen as a destabilizing force by states as diverse as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the U.S., Israel, and European countries allied to the U.S., the Iranian presence in Eritrea was immediately dubbed a threat to peace and security in the Red Sea, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa. Iran’s support for Somalia’s radical clerics and Sharia law advocates---Somalia’s Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC)--in the 1990s was another example of Iranian outreach to the Horn of Africa based on ideological affinities with fringe groups that gave pro-West regimes in the area as well as their Western benefactors a jolt, as they grapple with maintaining political stability in the most volatile region of Africa. In sum, looking at the entire picture of Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa, it appears that the Islamic Republic has not been as successful as Saudi Arabia, the UAE or Turkey; it simply has not been able to secure a lasting traction in the region as it had hoped for.

Israel

The political history of Israel indeed has been rife with conflicts and hostilities surrounding Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, and Israel. On a larger scale, hostilities between the Jewish state and most of the Middle East Arab countries, which until recently had rejected Israel's existence as a sovereign state while advancing the Palestinian cause, have been the hallmark of Israeli existence since its founding in 1948. The core of the conflict revolves around the Palestinians, who have sought statehood on territories that they believe were theirs, but Israel took them by force. Since 1948, several wars have been fought between Israel and Arabs involving Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Middle East states; however, the two prominent wars---the *Six-Day War* (June 5-10, 1967), and the *Yom Kippur War* (October 6 -26, 1974)---both ended with a victory by Israel, and territories that belonged to Syria, Egypt and Jordan were taken and most have remained in Israeli hands since then. Israel defeated the Arab armies and captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan. The Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt in 1982 under the terms of the peace treaty concluded between Israel and Egypt in 1979, following the 1978 Camp David Accords, while the Gaza Strip is still divided between Israel and Egypt. Without getting into depth on the genesis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which would be beyond the scope of this study, the aim here is rather to examine the role of Israel in the larger context of hegemonic rivalry in the Horn of Africa against the backdrop of the Middle East and the competition among the hegemonies over that strategic part of Africa.

Much of Israel's interest in Africa can be traced to the earlier years of Israeli nationhood. When African countries earned their independence mostly in the early 1960s, Israeli officials saw the newly independent states in their own image and wanted to assist them in areas that needed nation building. Nonetheless the relationship between the Jewish state and several of the sub-Saharan African countries throughout the following decades has been lukewarm at best and unwelcoming at worst. In 1973, most African states had severed their diplomatic ties with Israel. However, over time, relations began to improve, and so currently the Jewish state has formal and informal ties with 46 African countries. The initial severance of ties came about in the aftermath of Arab-Israeli war of 1973, coupled with pressure placed on the African countries from those states of the OAU (Organization of African Unity), the predecessor to the current AU (African Union), that are Arab and active members of the Arab League, as they pleaded with other African member states to sever ties with the Jewish state; the Palestinian question and Israeli occupation of territories it captured during the war from Arab countries justified the demanded diplomatic breakup. Despite all of this, Israel maintained a well-guarded relationship with Ethiopia because of the country's strategic location in the Horn of Africa and due to their historic bonds spanning over several centuries (Bard, 2023).

The strategic importance of the Horn of Africa to Israel was best highlighted with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's first visit in 2016 of East Africa, and included in his journey were Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda. Reporting for *Fair Observer*, an independent media organization, Cok makes the following observation:

Narrowing down focus on the Horn of Africa, Israel has a long history of engagement in the region that dates to the 1960s. The Red Sea has always been a vital waterway for Tel Aviv as it connects the country to East Africa, Asia and Oceania through the tiny outlet of Eilat. This strategic imperative has always been confronted with the hostility of nearly all the states of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden basin. Only Ethiopia and Eritrea have maintained relations with the Jewish state in the past decades, though with some setbacks (2020, 1).

Following the *Abraham Accords*, a normalization of diplomatic engagements between Israel, on one hand, and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, on the other, effective since September 15, 2020, Israel has made great strides in mending its relations with other Middle Eastern and African countries. “The Horn of Africa mirrors the Middle East in many aspects, and the recognition of Israel might be yet another one,” according to Cok, which in effect means that, as Israel hones its relations with Arab countries, African states that had severed ties with the Jewish state would likely follow suit; and this has indeed happened since then (Ibid). A case in point was Sudan’s normalization of ties with Israel in 2020 under U.S. pressure and the promise of removing Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. administration. Sudan had been one of the most hostile Arab countries toward Israel, and a one-time residence and host of Osama bin Laden, the founder of the pan-Islamic militant organization Al-Qaeda, who was killed in a special operation by the U.S. on May 2, 2011, in Pakistan.

Israel has had an adversarial relationship with Sudan for a long time, and the hostility between them was so entrenched that they had a reciprocal counteraction against each other, as this quotation makes it clear: “The Jewish state has financed and trained South Sudanese guerrilla groups in the past, while the Arab country has long served as an operational base to ship weapons and aid to Hamas in Gaza” (Ibid).

Ethiopia-Israeli relations, however, has been the most cordial, starting with the earlier days of the government of Emperor Haile Selassie. Even during the Derg regime, which overthrew the Ethiopian monarchy in 1974, and when the Arab outcry over Israeli occupation of territories following the Yom Kippur War was at its peak, the two countries maintained a low-key relationship that has continued to this day. In fact, Israel used to train the special forces that protected the emperor and was treating the ancient country as an ally in a region that is dominated by hostile Islamic states. Similarly, Eritrea’s closer relations with Israel started during the former’s 30 - year struggle for independence from Ethiopia during which time the Jewish state was supplying it with arms against the Derg regime while maintaining its low-key relations with Ethiopia. Following Eritrea’s independence in 1991, “Asmara went beyond establishing diplomatic relations and reportedly offered Israel a concession to open a military base on the island of Daklah, strategically located in the Red Sea” (Ibid). As is always the case in international relations, however, Israeli-Eritrea ties began to crack after Iran made inroads into securing a naval base in the Eritrean port city of Assab from which it ferried arms to the Houthi rebels in Yemen. With the UAE being active with port building and leasing a base in Somaliland, experts conjecture that Israel would be in a better position to establish influence with the *de facto* state, with the assistance of the UAE, which is strategically located in the Horn but still striving to secure international recognition toward full independence.

Conclusion

This paper examined the ever-increasing militarization of the Horn of Africa, a modern-day hegemonic spectacle that has generated unprecedented interest, as it becomes a new nexus of geopolitical rivalry involving great powers across the world, among which are Russia, the United States, and China. At the same time, it has become clear that the competition for control and influence in the Horn among the regional powers is just as fierce as that of the global ones. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, Israel, and Egypt, for example, are all pursuing their interests in and exporting their conflicts to the Horn of Africa. Other powers that also have

impactful presence currently in the region are Japan, India, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Germany.

Some external states are regarded as allies and thus known to have similar strategic interests; however, they still may pursue their policies in divergence toward the Horn of Africa. A case in point is the contrast in their pursuits of foreign policy strategies that is apparent between Egypt and the UAE. The latter has been a staunch supporter of Ethiopia's overall military posture in the region; however, by contrast, the former's relentless undermining of Addis Ababa by supporting rebel forces in Ethiopia as well as attempting to hinder the construction of the Blue Nile mega dam is a clear testimony affirming the opposite paths that two regional allies could pursue to maximize their respective foreign policy interests. And while the global powers, namely, U.S., Russia, and China, remain in fierce competition--- Russia with its expected building of a military base in Eritrea, and the U.S. and China, with their respective current military base in Djibouti---when and where their rivalry will eventually spiral to a real confrontation still remains the unanswered question; it certainly does not seem to provide a sense of security for the region and even for the entire global community.

It has also become evident in this study that research on external competition in the Horn of Africa has generated valuable data, as shown in much of the scholarly literature pertaining to the subject; however, the missing critical part---the lack of discussion about the potential ramifications of it in the region---would require further investigation and thus be the subject of scholarly inquiry in which this author will take on soon. Overall, this study therefore has been a small but well-meaning attempt to analyze each external power's motive to establish presence in that strategic region of Africa on a more comprehensive approach while simultaneously filling critical missing parts in the extant literature concerning hegemonic rivalry there. Pointing out several consequential contexts that, in this regard, demand further scholarly investigation, has been a major goal of this study. In this connection, some significant cases bearing the direct effects of the external influence and control on the Horn may be suggested here, with an eye to a follow-up research endeavor on these effects. Such impacts may include, for example, retreat from the democratization process in the region; increase in violence and human rights violation; incidences of inter-state and intra-state conflicts; fears of armed confrontation among the external rival powers; exploitation of the region's resources at the expense of the powerless and the needy there; and finally the burgeoning debt crises and the burden under which the Horn of Africa states find themselves and to the extent to which loan defaults have increasingly become a recipe for economic disaster, among others.

Finally, this author closes with an affirmation that the adverse consequences must be part of the scholarly discourse among scholars and regional experts, so that the variety of current analyses available on hegemonic rivalry in the Horn of Africa can have the full extent of its empirical significance as a subject of scholarly inquiry.

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A Potpourri of Happy Endings: An Analysis of Subgenres of Romance Novels

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A potpourri is a mixture of flowers, herbs, or spices kept in a jar for scent. This chapter analyzes 32 different romances from eight very different subgenres offering the reader enticing choices. Romance writers take you to new places where you learn from the challenges faced by their characters. There are pleasant surprises and disappointments. Occasionally, challenging philosophical, moral, and ethical questions arise. Romances offer a chance to learn and grow, as well as, escape.

The analysts used the following taxonomy to categorize romance novels. The term ‘genre’ means an entire category of literature like romance novels. Within each subgenre there are further divisions called subcategories. For example, romance novels are a genre. A subgenre is fantasy and the subcategory is vampires. The subgenres analyzed in this chapter have varying degrees of specificity. With Gothic, Medical, and Fantasy subgenres the reader gets what they expect: unusual houses or castles, doctors and nurses, or wolves and vampires. Subgenres like Adult, Black, Sports, and LGBTQ+ need more key words because they are so broad. For instance, a contemporary adult Black romance leads the reader to a fairly defined class of novels. At times, the researchers will refer readers to other subgenres. However, they utilize the same methodology for analysis throughout this paper.

Medical Romances

Medical Romances focus on the lives of medical professionals and the romantic associations and dalliances that develop between them. These books feature physicians, nurses, and other healthcare workers. They explore the challenges they face in their personal and professional lives. On the surface, it is difficult to understand why anyone would want to read about romance in a hospital setting. For the average person, novels filled with medical technical jargon are off-putting. In their imagination, hospitals are often a place of pain, disease, and death. This misses the point. If you have experience working in a hospital you know there is drama and emotion beyond the “scrubs” among healthcare workers.

Health care workers feel the pain of their patients. They rejoice when they heal, and grieve when they die. It is not so much the institution, but the people who work in them. They literally work in a life and death situation and are always striving to bring hope and healing to their patients. There is a wide-range of medical romance novels from Christian to those that feature more intimate romantic interactions. What determines their excellence is their ability to portray the emotional challenges inherent in the medical profession.

Registered nurse Laura Scott, a Christian Romance writer, displays extensive knowledge of the inner workings of hospitals. Such personal experience helps her describe testing and treatment for debilitating autoimmune diseases like muscular dystrophy with authority. In *Broken Dreams* (2023), she reveals the challenges of a rehabilitation ward in a Veterans Administration

hospital and in *Crushed Promises* (2024); she portrays the high intensity nature of an ER in a general hospital.

Both novels employ the same trope. A physician, confronted with a debilitating medical condition, is forced to alter the trajectory of his medical career. The love interest must overcome problems related to family. Characters in both novels refer to God's plan for them. Sexual relationships are limited to hugs. Kisses range from warm to edgy as relationships move toward love and marriage. Strong males solve problems and protect their love interest. Both novels employ mid-plot twists that heighten the tension, physical abuse by a staff member in *Promises* and the shooting of a policeman in *Dreams*. The physician in *Dreams* is a male and a female in *Promises*. In addition, *Promises* features a real world mystery centered on the theft of narcotics from the hospital. Scott uses clear, straightforward, often-humorous style, to give real insight into the lives of healthcare providers.

Hopefully, the social movement and awareness campaign against sexual abuse and harassment has changed attitudes since Grace Devon wrote *Medical Romance: Her Trauma Doctor* (2016) and *Medical Romance: Her Hot Doctor* (2016). The problem with both novels, and with all doctor-nurse relationships, is the unequal power and status between the two parties. Even so, such novels enjoy tremendous popularity. A large number of erotic and pornographic sources adhere to this trope. *Goodreads* lists 505 similar works.

In *Trauma Doctor* (2016), the main character, registered nurse Lucy Lavigne, verbally challenges Doctor Knox Paten for his brusque uncaring attitude toward patients. In real life, this act would guarantee a note in her personnel file or dismissal. Interaction between the two improves when they both work on a project for healing the lives of veterans suffering from PTSD. She learns Dr. Palen's troubling disposition is a result of his experiences as an Army Doctor in combat. Her support and his action in averting the suicide of a veteran in their program, lead to wellness and romance.

Devon's *Medical Romance: Her Hot Doctor* (2016) is the most troubling of the medical romances read by the researchers. Zeb Morgan, a neurosurgeon falls in love with patient Cassidy Novotny. His prescription for brain surgery, at which he assists, is an erotic dance for the patient in her hospital room followed by sexual intercourse when she returns home. Such action breaks the sacred trust between physician and patient. It violates the AMA code of ethics forbidding physicians from putting their interests ahead of patients. Such behavior is a good way for a physician to lose his livelihood and medical license. In addition, both of Devon's novels contained so many typos and miss-spellings that it constituted a distraction for the reader.

Most writers learn that each profession has a fairly standard rubric of the necessary preparation regarding educational background, hands-on experience, and previous recommendations. Indeed, it is refreshing to the reader to note specific activities that indicate a thorough knowledge of a character's profession. Medicine is a complex milieu with many levels of employment and a plethora of professional requirements. Writers of romance novels featuring the medical profession vary in their knowledge. Those, who have a rich background and personal experience in this field, are well worth reading. Some, unfortunately, misrepresent activities and relationships.

Fantasy Romances

Magic and love collide in this captivating category. Seven per cent of romance novels are in the fantasy subgenre. The novels in this imaginative and challenging subgenre feature storylines that include vampires, werewolves, wolves, and other assorted magical creatures. These settings

are far removed from the easily identifiable masculine characters in English and Cowboy Romances. Nevertheless they are true romances using all the conventions of the genre, an emphasis on relationships, and a love story with a happy ending. The effect of magic on the main characters is often portrayed as both good and evil. The principle fantasy romance characters often bond in a struggle or ongoing battle against dark magic or evil creatures. These imaginative romances tend to emphasize either the romance or the fantasy. Excellent authors blend the two elements in a seamless whole.

Publishers distinguish between "romantic fantasy" where the romance is most important and "fantasy romance" where the fantasy elements are most important. It all depends on the author. The following two novels illustrate the point. Rose Wulf's *To Love a Sentry* (2023) is a fantasy romance that reads like a graphic novel. Rochelle uses her magic to defend her kingdom as a sentry. But an explosion destroys the wall that separates the two kingdoms and she finds herself the captive of a soldier, sentry, and teacher from another kingdom. They are soon involved in a sexual relationship. He helps her strengthen her magic. Working together they better both their worlds. In this case, the fantasy served as a backdrop for an erotic relationship.

L.B. Anne's *The Girl Who Looked Beyond the Star*, a young adult Christian fantasy, lies at the other extreme. The fantasy elements predominate to such an extent that it is a romance only in a limited sense. Sheena Meyers is a middle-school student growing up in a Black family in a small town in Michigan. Her special gift lies in seeing and conversing with Angels. The key to unraveling that gift lies with an elderly White man she meets in a hospital. He tells the nurses that she is his granddaughter. When they question his assertion, he refers to the brown bag test, a discriminatory practice within the African American community in the 20th century, in which an individual is denied privileges based on their skin tone as compared to the color of a brown paper bag. The old man dies, but not until after he teaches her how she can use her gifts to make the world a better place.

Wolves - Writers through history have used the terms "wolf" and "werewolf" to mean whatever their story demands. Romance writers use them in two different ways. First, think of primitive humans who don the skin of a wolf to give them power during a hunt or in battle. Shape-shifters have control over their transformation into real wolves. They remember what happens to them as wolves and humans. They enjoy the freedom and closeness to nature brought by this experience. Their human self and wolf self co-exist in the same body and can communicate with each other. In a shape shifter wolf, the metal silver slows down their healing process drastically.

Fantasy romance writers love to write stories about wolves because they are social animals, hunt in packs, and mate for life. In addition, they have a keen sense of smell, communicate subconsciously with the pack, have decreased healing time, and heightened attraction to their destined mate. Shape shifting runs in families. If a shape-shifter has a child with a human, the offspring is always a shape shifter. However, some stories say that it depends on recessive genes. In these cases, the children can be either human or wolf. A person cannot shift into a wolf until a certain age, usually 16, so the parents do not know until then whether or not their children are shifters.

The second way writers use werewolves, or loup-garou in French speaking areas, is as mythical beasts, often in opposition to vampires. Werewolves do not have agency over their transformation. Remember the agony J. K. Rowling's character Remus John Lupin in her *Harry Potter* series. He loathes and fears his involuntary transformation into a werewolf when the moon is full. Humans are not born werewolves; rather, circumstances beyond their control, like sorcerers using magic curses, turn them into werewolves. Sometimes the bite or scratch of an existing

werewolf transmits this condition. Werewolves are immortal. They are known for their aggressiveness, speed, strength, and the ability to land on their feet from high falls. Silver, especially in the form of a bullet, can kill a werewolf.

The first novel analyzed, Patricia Briggs' *Hunting Ground* (2009), was a messy jumble of an urban fantasy romance set in the rain-soaked night streets of Seattle. A werewolf pack mates Anna, a victim of abuse, to Charles, a dominant wolf and enforcer for a pack of North American wolves. His mission is to rehabilitate her, ease his penchant for killing, and find love. A summit meeting of wolves involves them in a battle for supremacy in the wolf world between the good American wolves that see recognition and acceptance for what they are and the bad European wolves that wish to keep their identities secret. Fairies, vampires, wolves, witches, and pack magic attack them on their quest to keep the peace between warring factions by solving the mystery of who killed the leader of the European wolves. There are few scenes of intimacy between the main characters and lots of information on pack structure.

The researchers found more to like in successive wolf novels. The call of the wild for a destined or fated mate resulted in hot crisp love stories. The joy found in the running and play of the wolf pack appealed to the researchers. The protectiveness of the Alpha wolf, pack, and mate provided a reassuring theme. Terry Spear's *You Had Me a Wolf* (2020) provided ample evidence of these three tropes. Private investigator Nicole meets Blake at a ski lodge he owns with his brother. She is on the track of a trio of insurance frauds. They are both wolves and the romance quickly heats up as Blake pursues his quarry. Nicole, a brilliant and focused she-wolf initiates intimacy. His family and the wolf pack support their mating and provide interesting subplots and opportunities for more novels in the series.

Perhaps, because they make good stocking stuffers, publishers make a practice of debuting Wolf romances at Christmas time. Julie Trettel's, *Christmas at Kaitilyn's Place* (2022), revisits all the treasured wolf tropes. Brock, a single parent wolf, shows up in the territory of Cadence's wolfpack during the holiday season. He yells at her and tells her to go away at their first meeting. However, Cadence, a wolf, a witch, and a healer immediately bonds with Hazel, Brock's 12-year-old daughter. She includes her and her grumpy father in the social events held by members of the local pack, like finding the tree, decorating it, a tea, and a Christmas ball. Most significantly, she realizes she and Brock are true mates and nothing can or should get in the way of their mating. Like many wolf romance novels, the other members of the pack provide characters for more novels in a series. Trettel's book has hallmarks of good writing, clean layout and easy to read font. It touched on universal themes like love, family, and, support.

Vampire novels are a popular subgenre in fantasy romance literature. Readers thrill to the intensity and complexity of the relationship between vampires and humans. These novels employ three main tropes. The first concerns love between species. The second is a love triangle involving rivalry between two love interests for the affections of a vampire. This often involves a human woman torn between her love for a vampire and a human. Charlene Hartnady's *Chosen By the Vampire Kings* (2015) flips this trope. Two handsome vampire kings vie for the hand of Tanya, a curvy human bookstore owner. This book employs a third trope where a world of vampires and other beings exists along side humans, except every 100 years when the vampires appear in search of a queen. This creates a dark enchanted world for the characters to navigate, and adds layer upon layer of danger and sexuality to the story.

Critics look to Anne Rice's, *The Vampire Lestat* (1985) as the starting point for this subgenre, noted for its darkness and eroticism. Lestat, the hero of her ground breaking novel, wakes up in a coffin in the Vieux Carre of New Orleans where evil is omnipresent and a necessity.

He joined a rock band called Satan's Night Out. Rice uses florid prose in her back-story to establish a history of vampires starting with Lestat's experiences as a hunter and wolf killer, who ponders the meaninglessness of the universe with his soulmate. Popular actors Brad Pitt and Tom Cruise starred in a film based on Rice's work *Interview with the Vampire* (1991).

The most popular current vampire romance is Stephanie Meyer's Young Adult *Twilight* series available to the public in novels, films, and television. The first novel, *Twilight* (2005) details the relationship of Bella, a human teenager, and Edward, a vampire that drinks animal blood rather than human. Meyer's prose tends toward the florid. Bella's infatuation with Edward seems most superficial. Her description of Edward's appearance is unlike any other fictional vampire.

The first 100 pages of the book describe high school life in the small town of Forks, Washington. Edward's, vampire pale pallor, inhuman good looks, muscular body, and golden eyes that become black when he is thirsty attract Bella. She describes him as "dazzling" (*Twilight*, p. 177, 224). In the sunlight his skin "sparkled, like thousands of tiny diamonds on the surface" (*Twilight*, 280). By the third 100 pages Bella discovers he is a vampire and falls in love with him. The first real action occurs in the last 400 pages of the book. James, a member of a vampire coven that does drink human blood, attacks Bella, and tracks her when she flees to Phoenix, Arizona to escape him. James almost kills her, but Edward and his siblings intervene, kill James, and get Bella to the safety of a hospital.

For those who want even more vampires, there are the spinoffs from the 1992 film, *Buffy the Vampire Slayer*, including a seven season TV series, novelization of those shows, and originals from a multitude of writers. The theme is the same for all these shows. Buffy is one in a long line of young women chosen specifically to seek out and destroy vampires, demons, and other forces of darkness. Buffy establishes a support group of friends who aid her in this mission. Their battles are frequent since the high school they attend sits on the gate to hell.

Vampire romance novels enjoy an enduring and popular niche in American popular culture. They captivate readers with their unique blend of darkness and desire. . Vampire characters represent a true escape from reality, allowing readers to indulge in the fantasy of eternal love and passion. The inherent tension between the mortal protagonist and immortal vampire creates a dynamic that keeps readers engaged until the final page. The themes of desire, power, and redemption explored in vampire romance novels resonate with readers on a deep emotional level, offering a cathartic experience that allows them to explore their own desires and fears in a safe environment. For these reasons, Vampire romance novels have effortlessly made the transition to highly profitable films and TV series.

Fantasy romance novels and science fiction romance novels, feature completely different settings, but have much in common. Both take readers out of the mundane world of everyday life by evoking imaginative worlds, extraordinary relationships, and exploration of complex human emotions. In fantasy romance, magic and mythical creatures play a significant role in creating a sense of escapism. In science fiction romances advanced technology, space exploration, and futuristic societies provide a backdrop that transcend time and space. Both subgenres use unique settings to enhance the emotional depth of the relationships portrayed and ensure the required resolution of the story.

Science Fiction Romances

Science fiction and romance constitute two distant galaxies, which rarely intersect. Balancing deep philosophical questions with authentic, heartfelt relationships can be arduous. The focus on technology and fantastical elements can overshadow the delicate nuances of love and intimacy. This invites exploration into why crafting romance within a science fiction setting poses a challenge to the writer. The futuristic and often dystopian backdrops of science fiction can overshadow the emotional depth required to develop a compelling romantic narrative. The portrayal of love in a science fiction context demands a departure from conventional norms and societal structures. Creating believable relationships amidst alien civilizations, time travel, or dystopian worlds necessitates a thoughtful analysis of human emotions.

The striking blue cyborg on the cover of Melisse Aires' adult science fiction novel, *Her Cyborg Awakes*, alerts readers that this story is hot. Sabralla is a consort to a warlord who has little time for her. She has a handsome cyborg servant, Qy. A computer program addled his brain and rendered him asexual. He attends to Sabralla's every need. When her warlord orders her to "entertain" his top officers, she and Qy escape in a luxury space ship. She pilots the ship, docks it, and performs an operation on Qy that saves his life. In the process, he remembers he is a fierce warrior, and recovers his sexuality. The sex signal occurs when he asks her what she wants. She responds with her body. The last half of the novel elaborates on that fact in detail.

Lois Bujold has a reputation as a writer with many well-turned phrases. Her sci-fi romance novel, *A Civil Campaign* (1999) details the attempt of Lord Miles Vorkosigan to woo and wed a beautiful widow, Ekaterin Vorsoisson. His plan is to be kind, nice to her nine year-old son, and let things develop slowly. Eventually, she responds. The other volumes in this series may have more excitement and adventure, but this novel moves at the unhurried pace of its plot. It features numerous characters with strange names and complex relationships that serve the purpose of furthering the plot.

Michelle Diener's *Dark Horse* (2015) has everything science fiction aficionados want: space ships, aliens, and wars between galaxies. Aliens from another world capture Rose McKenzie. They look on her as a subject for study. She falls in love with the captain of the alien ship, Dav Jallan, and discovers that the two species are sexually compatible. Perhaps, there was a common ancestor eons ago or parallel evolution. She proves her mettle defending the spaceship against its enemies and earns the trust of her captors. This involves building a caring relationship with an artificial intelligence hidden on the space ship and helping it escape to another compatible ship. Rose finds happiness with Dav, but her true romantic relationship is with the AI she freed.

Alechia Dow's *The Sound of Stars* (2020) fits into a number of different categories: young adult, romance, science fiction, Black, or LGBTQ+. The story involves a Black girl who loves books. She is imprisoned in an apartment building in New York by aliens. She believes gender makes no difference when it comes to love and has a relationship with another girl. Soon, however, she falls in love with a male alien who loves pop music. She provides music recordings and teaches him about emotions. With his help, she escapes from confinement. They go on a wild road trip to save humanity, but are recaptured. They escape a second time, blast off in a space ship, journey to his home planet, and confer with his mother on how to save Earth. This novel sounds like a confusing jumble, and it is. As far as science fiction and romance, it is a difficult mix. However, if the main characters wear skintight space gear and are in space long enough, anything can happen.

Gothic Romances

Gothic romances have captivated readers for centuries due to their unique blend of mystery and passion. Often the settings, ancient castles, haunted mansions, or isolated landscapes, create a

sense of impending disaster and lurking danger that draws readers in. The element of the supernatural, with ghosts, vampires, and otherworldly beings, adds an exciting dimension, Gothic romances revolve around forbidden love, strong emotions, and complex characters dealing with secrets and hidden pasts. The tension between the light and especially dark aspect of human nature portrayed in these novels fascinates readers. These deep emotional themes resonate with audiences on a deep emotional level making them both captivating and relatable.

The publication of Horace Walpole's in 1764 established Gothic as a type of romance novel. A dark foreboding atmosphere characterized this work. Walpole described the subterranean regions of the castle, "Now and then some blasts of wind that shook the doors she had passed, and which, grating on the rusty hinges, were re-echoed through that long labyrinth of darkness" (p. 14). Gothic romances feature outlandish, even grotesque, characters and events. For example, a huge helmet crashes down and kills the son of the king. Walpole introduced the definitive tropes of the genre such as foreboding castles, cursed families, and a gloomy atmosphere.

Amanda Pagan, a Children's Librarian for the New York Public Library, noted female leads dominated gothic romance, especially after the publication of Charlotte Bronte's *Jane Eyre* in 1847. A young woman struggling to maintain her independence as she falls for a dark, brooding, handsome man became a genre-defining plot for Gothic romances. A renewed public interest in these stories came with the publication of Daphne Du Maurier's *Rebecca* (1938) upon its publication.

Dean Koontz, a popular and prolific modern writer, in *Writing for Popular Fiction* (1974), recalled that, when he could not convince a publisher to accept the science fiction he wrote, he turned to Gothic novels. He wrote one in two weeks, attached a female by-line, and upon submission to a publisher, received a healthy advance. He observed more than half the writers in this subgenre were men. He warned prospective writers that they must observe strict rules if they wished to publish in this genre. First, writers must start with a gloomy old house or castle. Second, the heroine must mature during the course of the story. Third, Gothic novels, like Christian romances, do not contain explicit or implied sexual scenes. Fourth, writers should maintain a leisurely pace letting the suspense build on its own. Last, and most important, the story must have a happy ending.

Jennifer Wilde is a pseudonym for Tom E. Huff (1938–1990), a native of Texas who gave up teaching High School English to become a full time novelist. Huff wrote several Gothic novels. The cover of *The Master of Phoenix Hall* (1968) depicts a couple about to embrace. This is about as steamy as this Victorian mystery and Gothic romance gets. The plot involves Angela, a London seamstress, who inherits a house in Cornwall. A robber holds up her coach on her way to her beautiful new house. She and her maid soon have it sparkling clean. The problem is the dank, dark, smelly cellar that contains jars of homemade poisons. Yet, she thinks, there is nothing to worry about. She settles down to peaceful country life and the attentions of the handsome local schoolteacher, Greg Ingram. The only negative is the arrogant master of the estate on which her house stands, Roderick Mellroy, wants to buy her house. Herein lies the mystery. Which of the two men, the gentle schoolteacher or the arrogant Lord is a cruel thief and which is her future love? The answer lies in something hidden in the creepy cellar. Angela grows from a timid seamstress to a member of gentility, with the courage to face down the villain when he tries to kill her.

Modern additions to the genre reflect both terror and romance, while also delivering updated or reimagined versions of familiar tropes. The cover of Violet Hawthorne's *Diary of Evil* (1972) depicts a forlorn looking woman in a blue dress. An ancient house shrouded by dark clouds

appears in the background. The story involves the adventures of Pauline Shepherd, a New York secretary, who takes a job on an isolated mist-shrouded island in Long Island Sound. Mr. Buchanan, the owner of the island, hired her to transcribe and edit documents relating to his family history.

Several unusual individuals: a handy man, a nephew of Mr. Buchanan, a private detective, and a business partner populate the island. The detective and the nephew are interested in Pauline as a woman, but there are no sexual encounters. As she delves into her work, she discovers there is a mystery concerning the deaths of Mr. Buchanan's wife and daughter. The secret lies in the wife's diary that Pauline discovers in an old trunk in the mansion's attic. Pauline demonstrates newfound strength in several dangerous situations, including confronting the killer. With the mystery solved and the villain disposed of in an explosion, Pauline emerges as a wiser and stronger woman for the experience.

In 1983, Gaywyck by Vincent Virga, reinvented the genre with a gay hero and a mysterious ancestral mansion on Long Island. Virga created a story about a mysterious and brooding master of the manor, and replaced the traditional damsel in distress with a handsome young man, Robert Whyte. In summary, Gothic romances fall in and out of favor, but when they do appear they follow the strict rules laid out originally by Walpole as later embellished by Koontz. If you pick a Gothic romance novel you will know two things for sure. First, there is a decrepit castle, mansion, or house. Second, like Christian romances, there are no explicit sex scenes.

Adult romance Novels

Adult or erotic romance novels entwine elements of love, passion, and sensuality. These romances include vivid and descriptive language that explores intimate relationships and sexual encounters between characters. They evoke emotional and physical responses from the reader, drawing them into a world of heightened sensuality and desire. Adult romance novels include approximately nine percent of all romances sold. They feature more sex scenes than other types of romance novels. E. L. James best-selling novel, *Fifty Shades of Grey* (2011), pushed the boundaries, or perhaps, overstepped them, for the types of sex portrayed in these romances.

Sally Thorne's *The Hating Game* (2016) is an adult contemporary romance novel. The trope of this book features enemies becoming lovers, or as the first page in the novel puts it, hate becoming love. Joshua Templeton and Lucy Hutton, the main characters, have adjacent desks in a publishing company. They both compete for a supervisory position. She hates him with a passion, but finds herself strongly attracted to him physically. She has sexual dreams about him and recounts them in an effort to titillate him. They share a passionate kiss in the elevator. The boss tasks them with developing a team building exercise so they are forced to work together and lower some of the barriers between them. They attend a wedding together at a distant city. When they arrive, the couple finds the hotel is overbooked, and they must share a room. Upon entering the room, Lucy declares that sex between the two of them was inevitable and announces, "Let's do this" (p. 256). They continue their relationship even after Joshua takes a job with another firm.

Christiana Lauren's *Josh and Hazel's Guide to Not Dating* (2018) is an adult contemporary novel set in Portland, OR. Hazel is outspoken and irrepressible. She meets Josh, a Korean-American, at a college party. She thinks he is so hot that she tells him she would be honored to have sex. Regardless, it does not work out until ten years later when they meet at another party. Josh is recovering from a difficult break-up. Hazel proposes they double blind date in an effort to find someone new for both of them. They run through several dates and sexual partners without success. Hazel proposes they become sexual partners with no serious commitment. He agrees and

they begin a sexual relationship. However, she becomes pregnant. She tells Josh she is pregnant only after she has problems bleeding. At which point, they declare their love for each other. The epilogue portrays them several years later happily married with several children.

Talia Hibbert, a Black author, chronicles the relationship between two unusual characters in *Get a Life Chloe Brown* (2019). This novel is listed as an Adult romance, instead of a Black romance, because the graphic scenes are more typical of adult romances. Chloe, a Black woman, is a computer geek and suffers from a chronic illness. Red, a White man, is an artist and the superintendent of the apartment building in which Chloe lives. Chloe decides her life is going nowhere, so she makes up a to-do list. On the list, is having meaningless, but thoroughly enjoyable sex. At first, she and Red do not like each other, but the physical attraction they feel for each other means Chloe is able to check one thing off her list. Then they have an argument, and break up. In the last few pages of the novel, they reunite and state their love for each other.

All three novelists employ humor and earthy language in detailing sex in the 21st century. All followed the enemies-to-lovers trope. The primary characters initially did not like each other, or were separated by circumstance. After working together on a project or a problem, they developed a sexual relationship. Romance came only after the intimacy. Perhaps, the intimacy was the romance. In any event, the couple's physical intimacy drives the relationship, the result of which is a happy ending. The women are open and direct in asking for what they want with no strings attached. The men are supportive, but somewhat clueless, about the needs and wants of the exceptional women with which they are involved.

Black Romances

Black writers have faced a long history of discrimination, prejudice, and segregation in their efforts to publish their creative works. Black slave narratives like Harriet Jacobs' *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*, published in 1861 shocked the sensibilities of Northerners and galvanized the abolitionist movement. It has as much impact today as when it was first written. Black writers continued to write stories of bondage, escape, and freedom after the Civil War. However, publishers often requested that they change the race of Black characters to White and some insisted Blacks could not write at all.

Elsie Washington (1942-2009) wrote the first Black romance novel, *Entwined Destinies* (1984). It featured two African-Americans living in London. Publishers specializing in works aimed at the Black community developed a market created when main-line publishers thought it not profitable. Arabesque Publishing sold to Black Entertainment Works which Harlequin purchased in 2005 under the brand name Kimani. They specialized in romances centered on Black sports heroes. Harlequin phased Kimani out in 2015 and now includes Black romances in its regular offerings. Black authors still find it difficult to find a publisher, and often use independent publishers and the internet to advertise their works.

Black authors have works of merit, but they are hard to categorize. The analysts believed Marcella Bell's *The Rodeo Queen* (2022) belonged in the Cowboy subgenre. This novel, about a Black cowboy and a Cuban Latina rodeo queen added much to cowboy history and belonged in the cowboy subgenre. Similarly, they thought three novels with Black characters belonged in different subgenres. They included L.B. Anne's, *The Girl Who Looked Beyond the Stars* (2019) in fantasy, Alechia Dow's *The Sound of Stars* (2020) in science fiction, and Joy Ohagwu's "Red" (2014) in contemporary Christian suspense.

The researchers created a subgenre for Black romance novels and in so doing gained new insights into how these novels challenge readers on issues of racism, identity, and body image.

Black romance novels showcase diverse narratives, characters, and settings. They cater to a wide range of readers. Their primary target audience is Black college educated women. Jessica Pryde, author of *Black Love Matters* (2022), cited a study by the Pew Research Center that showed this group contains the people most likely to read a book. She also noted that it is probable readers will read about Black women with White love interests, despite the fact that the 2020 Census indicated that Black men (24%) are twice as likely to marry outside their race as Black women (12%).

The researchers included the following four novels in the Black Romances subgenre. Simone Wu's *The Laws of Love* (2016), is a contemporary black adult romance focusing on relationships, love, and the everyday struggle faced by Black individuals. The key to the story is the book's cover that depicts an attractive up-scale African-American couple. His hair is in dreadlocks and he is dressed in a suit and tie. She wears a conservative black pantsuit with a white blouse. The image of a gavel appears in the foreground. This novel is one of the many billionaire romance novels with the same plot as *Shades of Grey* (2011). Stephanie Allen, a para-legal and John Pike, head of a multi-million dollar law firm, work late at night on a high profile entertainment case. In the process, they enjoy a torrid romance. She re-locates to another law firm to avoid rumors and innuendoes that she used sex to get ahead, but the couple continues to explore their relationship.

Black historical adult romances are set against the backdrop of key moments in Black history. These novels highlight themes of resilience, strength, and overcoming adversity. *An Extraordinary Union* (2017) about spies during the Civil War by Alyssa Cole is an excellent example of this type of novel. It chronicles an enemies-to-lovers romance between a White man and a Black woman. It features an unflinching examination of the causes of the Civil War, slavery, and systematic racism. Young people would benefit from reading this book, except that its explicit sex scenes earn it an over 18 rating. This novel received numerous national awards. The failure of the Romance Writers Association to include it in its nominating process for the 2017 Rita awards led to a bitter debate over racism in the romance novel industry.

Jasmine Guillory's adult contemporary Black romance, *The Wedding Date* (2018), features engaging characters, sizzling sex scenes, and complete honesty. Best of all, it surprises you with things you know happen, but, depending on your life experience, are unexpected. One of the main characters is Alexa Monroe, a Black woman who is a lawyer, and the chief of staff for the Mayor of San Francisco. The other is a White man named Drew Nichols, who is a pediatrician. Drew asks her to be his date at a wedding in a chance encounter in a stalled elevator in the posh Fairmont Hotel. On a whim, she accepts. She asked if she is going to be the only Black person at the reception. He replies that he never thought about that. She answers that is why I asked. "I just wanted to know what I was in for before I walked in" (p. 36). She handles her self well. After all, she is in politics. She has a good time and is attracted to Drew. Even so, the things she fears most happen. The group treats her as an exotic curio, a creepy usher uses racial slurs behind her back, and she feels ashamed of her body in a crowd of tall long-legged blond California girls. This book makes you cry, laugh, and think.

Author Sunny Hostin's contemporary romance, *Summer on the Bluffs* (2020), tells the story of three middle class women who grow up together, and enjoy a cottage in a Black community on the beaches of Martha's Vineyard. These three goddaughters of Anna, the owner of the cottage, have different backgrounds and sexual persuasions. Under her tutelage and financial support, they become successful professionals: a lawyer, a marine biologist, and a member of the New York

stock exchange. Each woman wants the cottage desperately as a place to slow down from the hectic pace of their lives. However, each has secrets which may hurt their chances.

It became evident upon aggregating Black romance novels that most center on accomplished heroines and upward mobility, two subjects of interest for Black women readers. In this brief analysis, authors portrayed black women as lawyers, para-legals, marine biologists, stockbrokers, and Chief-of-staff for the Mayor of San Francisco. They conquered evil, won the Civil War, and saved the world from aliens. They were open to love in all its forms, gay and straight. Their love interests included alpha male Doctors, lawyers, Pinkerton detectives, billionaires, and an Alien. No wonder the target audience becomes engrossed with these books. They hold significant interest for Black writers historically excluded from the romance genre because they question the underlying social and economic structures that facilitated that rejection.

Sports Romances

The following two sports romances represent the worst and the best of a subgenre not known for excellence in writing. The main characters in these novels are athletes, embodying determination, competitiveness, and physical ability. Their shared love for sports acts as a catalyst for their romance, creating a unique dynamic bond by mutual respect and admiration. The setting of sports romance novels is frequently centered on a professional sports league, or a college team. This serves as a backdrop for the plot, adds depth and authenticity to the characters, and attracts readers who love a particular sport.

These romances explore themes of overcoming obstacles and self-discovery. In Katy Archer's, adult sports romance, *The Game Changer* (2024), Casey is a star player on Nolan University's ice hockey team. After a one-night-stand with Carolyn, an avid hockey fan, he discovers that condoms are not 100% effective. He supports Carolyn in her pregnancy because the intercourse they enjoyed that night was the best he had ever had. He continues his support even when learning that there is someone else who could be the father. Then comes the gut-wrenching plot twist. Carolyn has a miscarriage. After her recovery, they declare their love for each other, move in together, and he presents her with a box tied with a bow. Wait a second romance fans, it is not a ring, it is a puppy.

This story is told in alternating chapters from both their viewpoints. It contains considerable graphic sex and very little hockey. She does mention college ice hockey does not tolerate fighting, as does professional hockey. In an author's note at the end of the text, she apologizes for the miscarriage plot twist and assures readers the main characters will have several healthy children in subsequent novels in the series. This book barely meets the requirements for a romance novel, but has received good reviews and high ratings. So, it apparently meets the expectations of a segment of the romance reading public.

Nicole Falls' *Shots Not Taken* (2019) is an adult, sports, Black romance novel. It is self-published and promoted by a podcast because of the difficulty Black authors find publishing and advancing their works. Alternating chapters tell the story of Nikolas, an NBA basketball player, and Jayde, a country western singer. Nikolas is the solid point guard on a championship team. He has played in Europe and overcome numerous physical injuries. True to the title of the book, he lives with the knowledge that you miss 100% of the shots you don't take. Jayde has overcome barriers to her musical career. Producers buy the songs she writes, but give them to White artists. They do not think that a country music audience will accept a Black artist singing her own songs on stage.

At first, Nikolas and Jayde are wary of each other, despite an obvious physical attraction. However, common goals bring them together. A virtual reality TV show picks him as a contestant. Jayde signs on as vocal coach for the contestants that live and perform in a large mansion under the ever-present eye of a TV camera. After a number of trials and tribulations, they emerge as a couple and support each other in their aspirations.

The romantic ending of the novel is one of the all-time best in the romance genre. Nickolas signs a lucrative free agent contract and Jayde gets a recording contract that allows her to perform at Ryman Auditorium, formerly known as the Grand Ole Opry. He arrives late at the venue, just in time to reassure her and present her with a performance poster. She wows the audience with a knock-out performance, at the end of which, she calls Nicholas on stage. They sing a duet together. He continues a solo announcing his love for her. When finished, he drops to one knee, presents her with a rose gold diamond ring, and asks her to marry him. She nods yes and the crowd erupts in cheers and laughter. A similar contrast of worst and the best romances occurred in the next subgenre analyzed by the researchers.

LGBTQIA+ Romances

Attitudes are changing in society about LGBTQIA+. Once publishers see that the public accepts this type of romance and finds them profitable more will emerge. These novels delve into the intricacies of sexual orientation and gender identity. They highlight diverse experiences and perspectives within the LGBTQIA+ community. Authors often relate their own personal experiences and present these narratives with authenticity and emotional depth. LGBTQIA+ romance novels celebrate love in all its forms, emphasizing the universality of connection, intimacy, and the pursuit of happiness regardless of sexual orientation. These novels frequently challenge societal norms and conventions, but, in the case of the following two novels, achieved widespread acclaim and acceptance by the mainstream media.

Cara Malone's sapphic medical romance novel, *Love Trauma* (2018), contains explicit sex scenes. The most significant thing for this analysis is that this novel goes beyond a love between two people to probe the emotional impact on healthcare providers when their work exposes them to danger and the emotional impact when a patient dies. Krys Stevens is a ruthlessly efficient trauma doctor. She devotes every second of her life to her patients. Her lover is Darcy Cosgrove, a former Army medic recovering from wounds incurred in the line of duty.

The two women meet in ER after Darcy performs a creative intubation with a ballpoint pen on a choking patient. Krys offers Darcy a volunteer position at a free clinic as a way of getting back to work. They start dating and Darcy always brings flowers and, according to convention, on the third date initiates sex. Their friends and families support their romance. Several jolting incidents force them to bond in a more meaningful way. They both undergo treatment after a young boy with tuberculosis sprays blood over them. To make matters worse, Malik, an eight-year-old boy with an indomitable spirit despite an advanced case of cystic fibrosis, takes a sudden turn and dies. This novel offers insight into the real dangers and emotional challenges inherent in the healthcare profession, as well as, the social connections between friends of different gender persuasions.

Casey McQuiston's *Red, White, & Royal Blue* (2019) is a contemporary LGBTQ+ romance novel based on the familiar trope of enemies-to-friends. Alex, the son of the President of the United States, and Henry, the Prince of Wales, have hated each other since a supposed snub by the Prince. Their feud reaches a climax at the Royal wedding of the Prince's sister in Buckingham Palace. The

two tussle and tip a huge multi-tier wedding cake over onto themselves. It is a hilarious scene in the 2023 Prime Video made-for-TV version of the book.

Handlers from the both countries insist the two young men participate in a well-publicized reconciliation during the course of which, they fall in love. Henry kisses Alex at a White House New Year's Eve party and they begin a secret relationship. Someone leaks photos and emails of the two together. Henry comes out as gay and Alex admits he is bisexual. Unfavorable publicity about their affair threatens Alex's mother's campaign for re-election. Alex flies to London to support Henry when he comes out to his parents. Alex's mother wins the election. Henry joins Alex onstage as an official couple at her inauguration. The author reveals in the bonus chapter of the collector's edition that Alex and Henry are happily living together. Alex pursues a law degree. Henry continues his work as a philanthropist after abdicating his place in the British lines of succession.

Publishers of romance novels are noted for their responsiveness to the demands of their readers. They have noticed an increase in demand for LGBTQIA+ novels in recent years and responded with new offerings. The speed at which these novels have found acceptance in the lucrative television and film markets has further incentivized their interest. The demand for these romances is expected to grow as societal attitudes continue to embrace diversity. Publishers recognize the need for catering to a more diverse readership. Authors are exploring a wide range of experiences within the LGBTQIA+ community, crafting stories that resonate with readers of all walks of life. These novels hold the potential to spark conversations about diversity and inclusiveness. If they can do this, and make a profit at the same time, so much the better.

Conclusion

Three years ago at the onset of the pandemic, the researchers noticed a news article stating the tremendous increase in the popularity of romance novels. It has taken them on an interesting journey...sometimes fun, sometimes frustrating, sometimes disappointing, but seldom dull. As the conclusion of their research, they discovered much about this venue. Why not simply select reading material much as members of the general public? They often select their choices by suggestion lists or perusing heaps of novels in a grocery store or pharmacy. The researchers chose a variety of subject matter within the romance genre. After many hours of determination and reading 164 romance novels, the authors of this paper submit this paper, the last installment of a book before publication.

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Gamification of History: AI-Powered Educational Games in Social Studies

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Efforts to strengthen student engagement in history education continue to evolve, and the combination of gamification and artificial intelligence has become one of the more promising developments in recent years. Many students still come to class with the sense that history is a sequence of disconnected facts to recall for a test, which has long frustrated teachers who know the field's interpretive richness (Fitchett & Heafner, 2017). Gamification attempts to interrupt that pattern by adding game-like structures that draw students into the material in a more active way. These elements can range from simple challenges to more sophisticated simulations that invite students to investigate how and why events unfolded. When these strategies are paired with AI systems capable of adapting instruction in real time, the potential for deeper engagement and more equitable learning grows.

Scholars who study digital games in history classrooms have noted that structured play gives students opportunities to test ideas and examine historical forces from different angles. McCall (2016) describes these spaces as “historical laboratories,” a phrase that captures how students can experiment with choices or conditions and watch the consequences unfold. Not all gamification is created equal, however. Research consistently shows that reward systems alone rarely lead to meaningful learning. The more effective approaches are those aligned closely with instructional goals and designed to prompt reflection or interpretation rather than simple point accumulation (Sailer & Homner, 2020). When used well, game elements can pull students more deeply into historical thinking by encouraging them to weigh evidence, anticipate alternative outcomes, and draw connections across events.

Artificial intelligence introduces another layer: the ability to adjust instruction moment by moment based on how students respond. Holmes et al. (2019) write that AI-driven systems can track patterns in student performance and respond with tailored supports, something particularly valuable in history courses where students often struggle with dense texts or abstract causal relationships. AI tools now appearing in social studies classrooms vary widely, but many share features such as branching scenarios, adaptive feedback, and options for differentiated tasks. Chen et al. (2020) note that these adaptive mechanisms can help maintain an appropriate level of challenge, keeping students from disengaging when material becomes too difficult or, just as importantly, too easy.

Existing tools already demonstrate what this combination of gamification and adaptivity can achieve. The iCivics platform, for instance, allows students to step into civic roles where their decisions shape unfolding storylines. Studies have found that iCivics contributes to improved civic knowledge and increased interest in public issues (Bers, 2010). The Mission US series offers another example, immersing learners in historical narratives where choices carry ethical, cultural, and political weight. These tools were not originally designed as full AI systems, but recent updates incorporate adaptive supports that respond to student decisions, signaling where the future of such platforms may be heading.

Although these developments are promising, they also reveal a set of practical and ethical concerns that educators must consider. The technological requirements for more advanced, AI-

informed games exceed what many schools currently have. Some districts struggle with unreliable connectivity, insufficient device access, or older hardware that cannot support sophisticated simulations (Brown et al., 2022). Beyond infrastructure, equity questions linger. Students without consistent access to technology at home may fall behind when assignments extend beyond the school day (García & Weiss, 2020). Ethical issues surrounding data privacy also deserve careful attention. Learning analytics can be powerful, but Prinsloo and Slade (2016) caution that data collected for instructional purposes must be governed with transparency, clear consent, and sensitivity to student vulnerability. Another consideration is historical accuracy. As Kapell and Elliott (2013) point out, game narratives can oversimplify or distort events if designers prioritize engagement over evidence, a risk that becomes even more delicate when AI begins generating or modifying content.

Taken together, these insights suggest that AI-powered gamification is not a replacement for traditional instruction but a meaningful supplement when thoughtfully integrated. Teachers play a central role in helping students analyze events, interrogate sources, and situate what they learn within broader historical contexts. When teachers guide these experiences, gamification can spark curiosity and motivation, while AI ensures that each learner receives the level of support or challenge they need. The future of these tools will depend not only on technological advancements but on educators' willingness to use them as part of a larger commitment to fostering inquiry, empathy, and historical understanding.

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Selecting Presidential Candidates: Staging a Mock Republican Convention on a Modest Budget

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Special Report, April 20, 2024, Republican National Convention, Loretto, Pennsylvania:

We have breaking news from the Republican Convention. The ballots have been cast and counted. The delegates have made their selection. The Republicans have selected their 2024 presidential nominee. It will be Donald J. Trump with 1,237 votes. Trump narrowly defeated Nikki Haley for the nomination. Haley finished with 1,192 votes. Wait. This just in -- the delegates have selected Trump's running mate. JD Vance! The Trump-Vance ticket should be a formidable one as the Republicans seek to recapture the presidency following four years of Democratic control. Will Donald Trump succeed in winning a second, non-consecutive term as president? And now we return you to your regularly scheduled programming.

Wait. The Republicans did nominate Donald Trump and they did pair him with JD Vance, but they met in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in July. However, the above “special report” accurately describes how things turned out months earlier in Loretto, PA at Saint Francis University’s Mock Republican Convention.

Introduction

Students started staging mock national conventions at Saint Francis University (SFU) in 1960. The events have become campus traditions, with mock conventions having been held every four years since. In presidential election years, SFU hosts mock conventions for the party that does not occupy the White House. In 2024, with President Biden in office, it was time for another Republican Convention. This paper describes some of our 2024 experiences in the hope that these comments will be helpful if you decide to stage a mock convention of your own.

Staging mock conventions is labor intensive. Is the effort worthwhile? Our students report that they enjoy and benefit from the experience. If you do not sponsor a mock convention on your own campus, consider accepting our invitation to join us at SFU for our next mock convention in 2028.

Organization

Our mock conventions are designed to resemble national party conventions as closely as possible. We have staged sixteen mock conventions thus far. In 2020, we were prepared to hold a mock Democratic convention. Speakers were scheduled, delegations were in place, the platform was finalized, decorating was about to begin, when COVID struck and campus was shut down. We were unable to hold a live mock convention that year, but we did conduct a mock Democratic primary election instead. Joe Biden won. In 2024, we were able to stage another live convention on campus. One major difference between our mock conventions and the actual party conventions is that ours last a few hours instead of several days. Another is that we run our mock conventions as “brokered” or “contested” conventions. All of our delegates are unpledged. They are free to vote their own preferences. They are not trying to predict how their states will vote at the summer

convention, nor are they trying to predict the Party's nominee. They arrive prepared to listen, cheer, bargain, negotiate, and vote.

Students and other members of the University community serve as campaign managers, state delegates, and state chairpersons. State chairs recruit delegates with whom they plot strategy and prepare posters, banners, and costumes. Campaign managers court delegates, distribute literature, and sometimes arrange appearances at the convention by their candidates or surrogates. Students serve on platform and other committees. They transform the student center into an authentic-looking convention hall. Much direction is provided by faculty but wide student involvement is critical to any successful convention.

Mock conventions are sponsored by the SFU Department of History and Political Science, the History Club, the Pre-Law Club, and the SFU Center for the Study of Government and Law (CSG&L). Students from various majors belong to the Clubs, but many are studying political science and/or History. Department faculty head the Planning Committee. Club officers also serve on this Committee. An officer serves as convention chair. Additional co-chairs are sometimes designated. Other club members choose committees that they will chair including the Correspondence Committee, the Platform Committee, the Credentials Committee, the Rules Committee, the Media and Community Relations Committee, and the Hall and Decorations Committee. Students also served as campaign managers for Donald Trump and Nikki Haley. Additional responsibilities were assumed by these individuals as needed. For example, one student served as recording officer and students and faculty served as convention floor managers. These specialized standing committees reported to the Planning Committee. The Planning Committee oversaw the entire convention -- its procedures, preparations, and committees.

Importance of Early Planning

About one year before the mock convention, we began publicizing coming events through meetings with key stakeholders including interested faculty, staff, and students. First steps were to determine the date of the primary election in our state, set the date for the mock convention, identify the appropriate campus location for the event, and reserve the venue. Book it well in advance. Budget estimates were prepared. Funding normally was supplied through the Student Government Association (parent organization of the History and Pre-Law Clubs), the History and Political Science Department, and the CSG&L. Additional support has been provided by the University president, the academic affairs office, and our dean. The State Republican Party has also contributed funds to help us defray expenses at some of our past conventions. This time, however, budgetary constraints were such that we did not have a dedicated budget line to fund operations. Instead, we drew money to cover basic expenses primarily from departmental and CSG&L accounts. In the past, we have said that it would be possible to stage a no-frills mock convention on a budget of a few hundred dollars, but a larger budget makes it possible to offer potential speakers a reasonable honorarium. In 2024, we put that claim to the test and found it to be true. More details about cost-cutting steps follow.

A special course, "The Road to the White House," was offered during the spring 2024 semester. Using relevant readings, (including Stephen Wayne's, *The Road to the White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections*), a directly relevant C-SPAN series, and related materials, the course studied presidential selection processes, in general, and the 2024 campaign in particular. Seminar students played key roles in the mock convention. These students also functioned as members of the Platform Committee and consulted on various plans. This course ensured that we had a core group of knowledgeable students for convention leadership roles. Student journal

entries also provided an indication of the academic benefits that mock convention participants derive.

We usually schedule our mock conventions for a weekend shortly before the Pennsylvania primaries so we can invite campaigning candidates or their surrogates to visit our campus. This time, our convention was held on April 20, just three days before Pennsylvania's April 23rd primary. Regardless of the date you choose, it is important to set the date far in advance so reservations and other facilities arrangements can be made.

Committees

During the fall semester prior to the spring convention, several committees were established to work on specific projects. Some committee chairs were selected at this time.

The Planning Committee held meetings to discuss possible speakers. Discussions took place with assorted campus officials regarding budgetary and other matters. The keynote speaker's honorarium is usually our biggest expense. In some of our earlier conventions, we were fortunate to have fairly substantial budgets and we were able to draw prominent keynoters from lists provided by speakers' bureaus. Funds were more limited in 2024 and we adapted. Former Chairman of the Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania, Robert A. "Rob" Gleason, Jr., is a friend on the University and a former SFU trustee. He offered his help and he agreed to serve as our keynote speaker. Mr. Gleason served in Pennsylvania Governor Dick Thornburgh, Bob Casey, and Tom Ridge's administrations. He also held appointments under Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump. He was a member of the Republican National Committee and attended numerous Republican National Conventions, chairing the Pennsylvania delegation three times.

We do not invite current elected officials to keynote. Their schedules are fluid and they can seldom provide the advance commitment we need to make firm plans. Such elected officials, however, can serve as additional featured speakers. Our list of 2024 speakers included Pennsylvania Representative Lou Schmitt, Jr. (R-79th). Lou was a 1984 SFU graduate, having earned his B.A. degree with a double major in History and political science. Additional speakers included former Pennsylvania State Senator John H. Eichelberger, Jr., Cambria County Commissioner Scott Hunt, and former Huntingdon County Commissioner William Hoover.

Representative Schmitt, Senator Eichelberger, and Commissioners Hunt and Hoover provided brief welcoming speeches, followed by Mr. Gleason's keynote address. Unlike past years, we decided to ask our speakers to be active participants throughout the mock convention. Each speaker chaired a state delegation and participated in the balloting. As a result, they interacted with student delegates from other states and with the students who were chairing the Trump and Haley campaigns. The speakers and the students enjoyed these interactions and we plan to continue this practice in future mock conventions.

Keynote speakers over the years have included Senator Richard Schweiker, Senator Eugene McCarthy, Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, President Reagan's former campaign manager, John Sears, U.S. Representative Bella Abzug, and Senator Paul Sarbanes. The 1992 keynoter was Senator George McGovern. Not only was he commemorating the twentieth anniversary of his nomination for the presidency by the Democratic Party; he was visiting SFU twenty years after his "mock" presidential nomination by a previous generation SFU delegates. The 1996 keynote speaker was former PA Governor and U.S. Attorney General, Richard Thornburgh. Our 2000 keynote speaker was Marlin Fitzwater, former press secretary for Presidents Reagan and Bush. In 2004, Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, Lieutenant Governor of Maryland and daughter of the late Robert Kennedy, keynoted. The keynoter in 2008 was former

U.S. Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN). In 2012, former U.S. Representative E.G. “Bud” Shuster (R-PA) keynoted. In 2016, PA Governor Tom Corbett and U.S. Representative Shuster served as keynoters. In 2020, Donald Trump was president and a Mock Democratic Convention was planned. Former U.S. Representative Mark Critz and former PA Senator, Lieutenant Governor, and Acting Governor Mark Singel were slated to keynote. As noted, however, COVID forced us to cancel the live mock convention and to offer a virtual mock primary election in its place.

A Correspondence Committee was also established. This Committee handled invitations and correspondence with speakers and invited guests.

The Platform Committee, naturally, drafted a mock party platform. The Committee included students enrolled in the Road to the White House course. One student served as Platform Committee chair. Students reviewed recent Republican Party platforms. The chair prepared a draft that was shared with members of the Committee. Campaign managers for Donald Trump and Nikki Haley had a chance to weigh in and shape the platform as well. Members provided feedback and the chair prepared a revised draft. The platform was discussed in class and it was approved. At the mock convention, the chair presented the platform and it was approved by a voice vote of the delegates.

The Credentials Committee was also established to assist and welcome non-SFU delegates to the convention. Students from 12 area high schools and some returning alumni participated. Students from other colleges and universities sometimes participate too. The Credentials Committee chair recognized these attendees, approved their credentials, and welcomed them to the mock convention.

A Rules Committee was also established. It was chaired by faculty members from the History and Political Science Department. The Rules Committee worked closely with the Planning Committee. Rules were printed in the program.

The Rules Committee report explained that the party platform was drafted by the Platform Committee, with input from the campaign managers, drafted the platform prior to the convention. The platform was approved at that time and no minority planks could be submitted afterwards. The platform would be submitted to the delegates for approval by voice vote at the mock convention.

The Rules Committee determined that only candidates who were still running on the eve of “Super Tuesday” (March 5, 2024) were eligible for the nomination on the first ballot. Eligible candidates included Nikki Haley and Donald Trump. State delegation chairperson would be able to nominate candidates. Customarily, the home state delegation of a candidate nominates him or her. After a candidate is nominated, his or her campaign manager accepts the nomination and offers some brief remarks, not to exceed two minutes in length.

In balloting, the vote of each state is announced by the chairperson of the state delegation. The number of votes needed to nominate was defined as one half of the total votes plus one (1,215 votes needed to nominate). If no candidate were to be nominated on the first ballot, a second ballot would follow, at which point any person who was constitutionally eligible to serve as President could be nominated.

Vice-presidential nominations were to be made from the floor. The presidential nominee’s campaign manager announces if a prospective running mate is acceptable. If time constraints preclude approval by roll-call balloting, the Vice-presidential nominee would be determined by voice vote at the discretion of the convention chairperson.

The Rules Committee worked with the Planning Committee in setting the convention agenda. The simulation is reasonably realistic, but we do take some liberties with the rules of actual national party conventions. For example, since we try to complete our business in just two or three hours, we use voice votes when we can. To reiterate, we conduct contested conventions. *All* SFU delegates are unpledged. We do not try to predict who the national party will, in fact, nominate in the summer. SFU delegates nominate the candidate they *prefer*. The 2024 vote was close. Donald Trump prevailed but it came down to the last few states.

Tickets emerging from these mock conventions have included Adlai Stevenson-John Kennedy, Nelson Rockefeller-Charles Percy, George McGovern-Shirley Chisolm, Jerry Brown-Morris Udall, Gerald Ford-John Anderson, Gary Hart-Jesse Jackson, Michael Dukakis-Jesse Jackson, Bill Clinton-Tom Harkin, Bob Dole-Colin Powell, John McCain-Elizabeth Dole, John Kerry-Al Sharpton, Barack Obama-Hillary Clinton, Mitt Romney-Rick Santorum, and, in 2016, John Kasich-Paul Ryan. Add Donald Trump and JD Vance to the list, as of 2024.

The Media and Community Relations Committee worked closely with the Planning Committee and the SFU Marketing Office in coordinating publicity. Releases were sent to newspapers, radio, and television stations. Articles were run in the campus newspaper and on electronic bulletin boards. Electronic and print invitations were prepared and mailed. Press kits including fact sheets about the event were developed and distributed.

In previous years, pre-convention luncheons for our speakers and invited guests (including our student leaders) were held. Press conferences were also held prior to the opening gavel. To cut costs, we dispensed with the luncheon and the formal press conference. Instead, we offered pastries and a coffee service for our speakers and other early-arriving guests. This provided the speakers and others a chance to talk casually and informally. Reporters were also encouraged to attend so they could speak with participants. We plan to continue in this practice in the future. In addition to saving money, conversations were more candid and animated than they were at formal luncheons.

The Hall and Decorations Committee normally secures art and construction supplies and transforms the student center into a convention hall. State delegation chairpersons bring delegates with them to a staging area at an assigned time before the convention to construct state and candidate posters. This time, we did not have a supplies budget available so we improvised. Upward Bound students prepared posters for each state and for the candidates, Donald Trump and Nikki Haley, at one of their Saturday follow-up sessions. The afternoon before the convention, a construction crew installed flags, prepared the stage and seating areas, tested podium and floor microphones, set up musical equipment, and made sure that the “convention hall” would be ready for the following day’s festivities. Large flags supplied by a former congressman are displayed prominently. We store these flags and retrieve them as needed. Each of these flags once flew above the U.S. Capitol. We also display several large Pennsylvania flags that were donated to us by our former Lieutenant Governor. Hundreds of small American flags were donated to us years ago. We place them outside lining roadways approaching the convention hall. In the past, shortly before the convention, students went to the hall to fill and place helium-filled balloons. We learned the hard way that helium-filled balloons sag noticeably if they are set up too early. In 2024, we had no “balloon budget” so we lived without them. The flags and posters more than made up for the absence of the balloons.

At past mock conventions, our campus radio station provided music. We no longer insist on traditional, patriotic music. Instead, we ask students to develop a playlist of contemporary, popular, upbeat, energetic music designed to keep the delegates bouncing and dancing throughout

the event. Music plays when the delegates are arriving and finding their places. It is turned off during the speeches. It is turned on during the balloting. When a state chair is announcing votes, the music is turned down but not off. When no one is speaking, we pump up the volume again. The importance of music to the overall atmosphere can't be overstated! Students seem to enjoy creating the playlists as much as they enjoy listening to the music.

Campaign Managers

Students volunteered to act as campaign managers for Nikki Haley and Donald Trump. They conducted research about their candidates and contacted candidates' campaign headquarters to obtain literature and other materials. They delivered brief nominating speeches for their candidates at the convention. They negotiated with the Platform Committee, tried to make deals with state delegation chairs, discussed the vice-presidency, and generally tried to win support for their candidates. Our guest speakers who were also serving as state delegation chairs were struck by the persistence and creativity exhibited by the campaign managers who were vying for their support. Some years, the campaign managers squared off in public debates prior to the convention. At such debates, questions are posed by a student moderator and by audience members. Students from residence halls, athletic teams, and student organizations have posed videotaped questions too. The inclusion of such interactive elements varies from convention to convention and depends largely on the inclinations of student organizers and campaign managers.

State Delegates and State Chairpersons

State delegation chairs are very important. During the months preceding the convention, they selected states on a master list posted outside departmental offices. They were briefed about their responsibilities and given informational handouts. Chairs recruited delegates for their states and submitted their delegate lists a few weeks before the convention. It is helpful to recruit residence hall assistants, fraternity and sorority officers, student government officers, and other campus leaders for these positions whenever possible. Chairs were in charge of their states' voting at the convention. During roll calls, they polled their delegates, tallied votes, and announced them. Some state chairs placed names in nomination at the convention. Some encouraged their delegates to dress in state-related costumes. Some offered some state-related "fun facts" before announcing their votes. For example, one said "Mr. Chairperson, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, home of the Liberty Bell, Independence Hall, and Yuengling's, the Nation's Oldest Brewery, wishes to cast its votes as follows. . . ." In short, chairs recruited delegates, led them, and encouraged creativity (within somewhat loose boundaries of good taste and decorum).

General Observations and Advice

One cannot anticipate everything that will require attention, but here are some general observations that might help if you decide to stage your own mock convention.

Start early! You will have to delegate many duties to students in leadership positions. Try to recruit your most responsible and conscientious students. The ability to work without direct supervision is important. Flexibility and a good sense of humor help. A thick skin is desirable too. These students should review files of past mock conventions in advance to get a sense of what's ahead. They should collect contact information from national party headquarters. They should research relevant web sites for candidate information, calendars, party rules, and the like. Such early "legwork" early is beneficial.

As any club advisor can attest, levels of enthusiasm, motivation, and competence of student members vary from year to year. The “Road to the White House” course has become a useful tool for organizing and motivating students. You will need the cooperation of assorted campus officials, staff members, and faculty colleagues. Ask your colleagues to participate and ask them to bring their students. You will need financial, logistical, and organizational help. When will you hold your convention? Where do you want to hold it? Anticipate your needs and discuss them with strategically situated individuals well before the convention. Stay in touch with them as the event draws near.

Decide on whether candidates who drop out before your mock convention will be included on your convention ballots anyway. If so, make sure that the campaign managers understand that their candidates will still be eligible for nomination and that they should still be doing their jobs! They can also try for the vice-presidential spot.

It is tempting to seek a current politician with national stature in selecting a keynote speaker. S/he will bring attention and will do so for a relatively low cost. Most cannot accept speaking fees beyond expenses. But as noted, it can be difficult to get a firm commitment from a current officeholder. Any commitment you receive will be, at best, tentative. They might have to cancel at the last minute and you will have to scramble to find a replacement. As such, we seek a keynoter whose schedule is more predictable, even if that means paying a higher fee. Budget constraints, however, necessitated some adjustments in 2024. As noted, Rob Gleason, a supporter of the University, served as keynoter and several elected and former elected officials filled additional speaking spots. Moving forward, I expect that we will proceed in similar fashion. We may imitate the recent practice of the national parties by eliminating the official position of “keynote speaker,” inviting several “featured speakers.” That way, if a speaker cancels, the “show” will still go on and we will save the speaker’s fee for a prominent keynoter.

It is also important to decide how many speakers you want to invite and how long each will have to speak. It is possible to have “too much of a good thing.” In 2016, for example, reports, remarks, and speeches were lengthy. While students reported that they appreciated the content and enthusiasm of the speakers’ remarks, it was evident that some were growing a bit restless by the time we began balloting for the presidential nomination.

Plan your use of technology carefully. Electronic scoreboards, e-mail messages, web sites, and recording will be featured. Off-site delegations, including alumni, can participate virtually. Selected speakers also can deliver their remarks virtually. Advantages include reduced travel costs and speaking fees. Disadvantages include the loss of personal contact. How much is it worth to your institution, your department, and your students to have a nationally prominent speaker visit your campus in person? Will a “virtual visit” suffice?

Record your convention. Television news coverage is also valuable. Current participants can see how well they have done. Students enjoy watching convention footage in class and seeing themselves and their friends in action. The videos elicit some laughs and good-natured teasing, along with a sense of pride, satisfaction, and accomplishment. The clips can be posted on relevant campus sites and later archived. Such materials are also useful for advertising future conventions and for showing future participants how the convention works.

Hold debriefing meetings with student participants after the convention. Survey participating students for their reactions. What worked and what didn’t? Make adjustments. Surveys reveal that students enjoy and remember the costumes worn by state delegations and fun facts mentioned by state chairs when they cast votes. Students overwhelmingly report that they are more likely to watch the actual party conventions after having participated in a mock convention.

These responses support the conclusion that we have achieved one of our convention goals: getting students more interested in and informed about the presidential race.

Recruiting students to participate may be your most challenging task. Some campaigns generate more enthusiasm than others. More than 200 students participated in the 2024 Mock Convention. We were successful in attracting students from area high schools. While the challenge of generating student interest is greater in some years than in others, it is precisely then that activities like mock conventions are most important because they help to generate student interest and focus attention on presidential campaigns.

Latest Lessons Learned

Budgetary constraints necessitated some adjustments to our usual practices. We streamlined and simplified some things, eliminated certain elements, and in the process, produced a tighter and more efficient event that was still beneficial and fun for our students. Some key “takeaway points” and things we learned include the following:

An official “keynote speaker” secured through a speakers’ bureau is not necessary. The national parties have moved away from having a designated “keynoter.” So can we. Instead, a number of prominent public officials from the area can be invited to speak. Doing so saves money and it provides flexibility in the event that one or more of these invited guests has to cancel his or her appearance.

The guest speakers should participate actively in the mock convention itself by chairing state delegations. They can cast votes during role call balloting, giving them a chance to interact directly with student campaign managers and student delegates.

Eliminate the formal pre-convention luncheon for guest speakers, administrators, and selected students. Replace it with an informal pastry and coffee service for guests who arrive early. In addition to saving money, speakers have a chance to talk among themselves and to speak informally with students who come over to talk.

Eliminate the formal pre-convention press conference. We will continue to prepare press kits including facts, figures, and basic background information about the mock convention, but reporters will be encouraged to talk with our guest speakers over coffee.

The student center can be transformed into an authentic-looking convention hall by displaying large American and Pennsylvania flags, along with posters produced by high school students in our Upward Bound Program. Greenery, helium-filled balloons, balloon arches and similar ornamentations are not really necessary.

Remember the music. It should be high energy, it should be contemporary, and it should be loud. We are staging a Mock *Party* Convention. The emphasis is on “party”! But we do not have to outsource or hire a DJ to provide the music. Students are capable of producing their own playlists and they enjoy doing so.

Why Stage a Mock Convention?

Experiential education allows students to see theories being put into practice. Through role playing, the abstract becomes concrete. Simulations, combined with meaningful reflection, can increase students’ interest in and knowledge of the subject matter. Mock conventions teach students about convention procedures, coalition building, and other aspects of presidential campaigns. The excitement and publicity surrounding mock conventions stimulate student awareness of and interest in presidential campaigns. Students on the Media and Community Relations Committee gain direct experience in dealing with local news media. Campaign managers

learn about the candidates and the issues. They learn about negotiating as they try to convince delegates to support their candidate. Delegates and state chairs inform themselves about the candidates. They experience the pressure applied by campaign managers. Comments from students returning in the fall demonstrate that they paid more attention to the actual party conventions during the summer -- and understood them better -- than they would have had they not themselves been involved in our mock convention. Post-convention surveys are distributed to participants. Journal entries are required in some classes. Discussion area questions about the convention are posted in course web sites. Such sources reveal that students find the experience worthwhile. Many say that the convention was fun, they learned about the campaign, and they plan to watch at least some of the upcoming national party conventions to compare them to their own experiences. Some students go on to attend the Republican and Democratic conventions in connection with academic internship programs. These students report that mock convention give them unique insights and prepare them to better appreciate activities at the actual party conventions.

For the above reasons, a conscious effort is made to involve students from various disciplines and majors. As explained, a varying but substantial proportion of our undergraduate student population participates in these mock conventions. Area high school students and students from other colleges and universities are invited to participate or observe. Press coverage is sometimes extensive, especially so if the speakers are well-known. Mock conventions have academic importance and they attract good publicity for the host institution.

A mock convention brings the campaign, the issues, and even some of the actors to campus. Bringing distinguished visitors to the campus and generating favorable publicity are certainly valuable outcomes. But the primary benefit should go to the students. A successful mock convention increases political interest and campaign awareness. A mock convention is a lot of work but it's also a rite of passage for our students, something they will be talking about for years to come. In short, a successful mock convention is memorable and fun!

Appendix

Some sample materials that were used at Saint Francis University's 2024 Mock Republican Convention are attached. Perhaps you can adapt them to fit your own needs. If you would prefer to participate in an existing mock convention program, we invite you to visit us with your students and participate in Saint Francis University's 2028 Mock Convention - - a Mock Democratic Convention next time.

APPENDIX 1

The 2024 Mock Republican Convention is coming to Saint Francis University on April 20, 2024!

WHAT IS A MOCK CONVENTION?

The Mock Convention is designed to resemble the National Republican Convention in every way, with students acting as campaign managers, state delegation chairmen, and state delegates. Participation is also needed in the areas of convention hall decorations, stage and sound crew, and security. Positions are available for hundreds of students in all these areas. Student political opinion will be reflected by the candidate nominated. The results may or may not be an indication of what to expect at the actual convention this summer.

WHAT IS A CAMPAIGN MANAGER?

The job of the campaign manager is to persuade the state delegates to vote for his/her candidate. The means with which to accomplish this are at the complete discretion of the campaign manager and his staff, in the best tradition of American “backroom politicking.” Bribes are permissible but do try to keep it legal.

WHAT IS A STATE CHAIRMAN?

The state chairman will recruit a delegation to represent a state of his/her choice. The more delegates you can bring to the convention, the more effective and exciting it will be. Come prepared for the occasion with such things as signs, banners, noisemakers, etc. Interested students should sign up as soon possible. The popular states will go fast! (The sign-up sheet will be posted on the bulletin board across from Scotus 314.)

WHAT IS A STATE DELEGATE?

A state delegate represents the state of his/her choice and will vote on each ballot until a majority of 50% plus one is reached. Your vote is important. YOUR vote will determine the outcome of the convention.

WHAT HAPPENS AT A CONVENTION?

Almost anything! Actual conventions tend to be rather chaotic; the Mock Conventions at Saint Francis University are no exception. Placards, posters, and political propaganda will be available with which to stage wild floor demonstrations. Improvisation is desired and encouraged. Between ballots, campaign managers will be busily caucusing the state delegations for votes. There is always the possibility of a deadlock—a few uncommitted voters could make all the difference.

WHAT IF I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT POLITICS OR CONVENTIONS?

Prior knowledge or experience is not needed. During the convention itself you will learn a great deal about the American political processes and you'll have some fun doing it! You will experience not only the external aspects of a convention, but also the wheeling and dealing that makes the system exciting. As a bonus, you will be more aware of the issues and the positions of the candidates, making you better prepared to vote in November.

HOW MUCH TIME IS INVOLVED?

Actually, very little. If you want to be more creative, however, the amount of preparation time is up to you. There will be periodic meetings before the convention in which details will be discussed.

WHEN IS THE CONVENTION?

The convention will be held on Saturday, April 20, 2024. Mock conventions can be a lot of fun; post-convention celebrating is a tradition.

APPENDIX 2

2024 MOCK REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

Saint Francis University

Loretto, Pennsylvania 15940

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SAINT FRANCIS UNIVERSITY MOCK CONVENTION

Students originated the idea of staging a Mock National Convention at Saint Francis University in 1960. The event has become a campus and community tradition, as a convention has been held every four years. It has been the tradition among the Saint Francis community to hold the convention of the party not holding the Office of the President.

The 1960 Democratic convention began amid parades and fanfare. The Honorable Philip Lepresti, a member of the State House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, delivered the keynote address. The event set standards for future years. The first mock convention ended with the nomination of Adlai Stevenson for president and John Kennedy for vice president. The event was deemed a tremendous success by all participants.

The convention continued to grow in 1964, when it was staged in Doyle Hall amid shouts and cheers. The purpose of the event began to become clear as a 1964 passage from the University newspaper *The Loretto* indicated: "This convention affords our students an opportunity to learn more about our political system and enjoy themselves at the same time."

By 1968, the campus event had begun to attract outside notice. Students weren't the only ones who watched Senator Richard Schweiker, who then represented the 13th Congressional District near Philadelphia, deliver the keynote address. Various states nominated their favorite candidates, later yielding these decisions to other delegations. In the fashion of a true political convention, floor demonstrations were conducted for each candidate following the nominating speeches. After six hours of balloting, caucusing, and vice-presidential nomination, the convention was adjourned with Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Senator Charles Percy as the students' choices for the Republican presidential and vice-presidential nominees.

The renowned Senator Eugene McCarthy was the featured speaker at the 1972 convention. Included in the nine-point plan he outlined was a suggestion that the Democratic National Platform include a firm commitment to end the war in Vietnam. Political maneuvering became an integral part of this event. Following the third ballot, Senator George McGovern was selected for president, and Shirley Chisolm was given the vice-presidential slot by the student body.

By 1976, the convention, held in the Maurice Stokes Field House for the first time, had developed a high degree of organization. Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, the keynote speaker for the bicentennial year, stated that "the convention at Saint Francis University mirrored national conventions I have seen." In that year, the tension ran high as Governor Jerry Brown edged Congressman Morris Udall for the presidential nomination. Udall supporters had to remain content with the vice-presidential spot awarded him. The atmosphere of the 1976 convention was often a lighthearted one, as reflected by these observations offered by one of the student participants: "As expected, the crazies were out in force. One delegate appeared costumed as the Wild Man from Borneo. Another fashioned bicentennial shorts with bright green sunglasses to match."

In 1980, a mock Republican convention was held. George Bush, then a Republican presidential candidate, was forced to cancel his engagement as keynote speaker. John Sears was a late replacement, and he filled in quite ably. Once again, enthusiasm was high and the convention nominated Gerald Ford to be the presidential nominee, and John Anderson as the vice-presidential nominee.

The 1984 Democratic meeting was one of the most controversial in the history of the convention. Bella Abzug delivered the keynote address amidst the picket lines and protests outside the Stokes Fieldhouse of Ms. Abzug's pro-choice stance. Despite the controversy, the convention was a large success and generated much enthusiasm. Gary Hart was chosen as the presidential nominee of the Democratic Party, and Jesse Jackson was the vice-presidential nominee.

The 1988 Democratic Convention was another rousing one. Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland was the keynoter and the delegates nominated Michael Dukakis for the presidency and Jesse Jackson (once again!) for the vice-presidency.

In 1992, the Democratic Convention was graced with the presence of Senator George McGovern as keynote speaker. Not only was Senator McGovern commemorating the twentieth anniversary of his nomination for the presidency by the Democratic Party; he was visiting Saint Francis University twenty years after his presidential nomination by a previous graduation of our mock convention delegates. Nominated for president was Governor (soon-to-be president) Bill Clinton, and for vice-president was Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, who was present at the convention representing the Clinton Campaign.

In 1996, another Mock Republican Convention was held. Former Pennsylvania Governor, U. S. Attorney General, and Under-Secretary General of the United Nations, Richard Thornburgh, was the keynote speaker. The delegates nominated Bob Dole for the presidency and Colin Powell for the vice-presidency.

In 2000, yet another Mock Republican Convention was held. Marlin Fitzwater, former press secretary for Presidents Reagan and Bush, delivered the keynote address. The delegates nominated John McCain for the presidency and Elizabeth Dole for the vice presidency.

The successful 2004 Mock Democratic Convention keynote speaker was Kathleen Kennedy Townsend. The 2004 participating delegates nominated John Kerry for president and Al Sharpton for vice president.

In 2008, with President Bush completing a second term, it was time for another Mock Democratic Convention. The keynote speaker was former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton (IN-9th). Other speakers included PA Auditor General Jack Wagner, PA State Senator John Wozniak, and several surrogates representing Hillary Clinton including, U. S. Representative Alysson Schwartz (PA-13th) and Jehmu Green, President of Rock the Vote Education Fund. The delegates nominated a 2008 ticket of Barack Obama for president and Hillary Clinton for vice president.

In 2012, Barack Obama was president so another Mock Republican Convention was held. U.S. Rep. Bud Shuster keynoted. Other featured speakers included PA Sen. John Eichelberger, PA Sen. Robert Jubelirer, PA Rep. Mike Fleck, and County Commissioner Douglas Lengenfelder. Mitt Romney won the nomination on the second ballot. Rick Santorum was selected as Romney's running mate.

President Obama was still in office in 2016 so we staged another Mock Republican Convention. Speakers included PA Gov. Tom Corbett, US Rep. Bud Shuster, PA Republican State Committee Chair Robert A. Gleason, PA Sen. John Eichelberger, PA Rep. Jerry Stern, and County Commissioners Bruce Erb, Terry Tomassetti, and Bill Hoover. Delegates nominated John Kasich for the presidency and Paul Ryan as his running mate.

In 2020, Donald Trump was president and another Mock Democratic Convention was planned. Former U.S. Rep. Mark Critz and former PA Sen., Lt. Gov, and Acting Gov. Mark Singel were scheduled to be featured speakers. All arrangements were in place when COVID hit and the campus went into a full lockdown. Unable to proceed with our live mock convention, we staged a virtual alternative Democratic primary election instead. Joe Biden won!

Excitement mounts every four years here at Saint Francis University as preparations for the mock convention are made. State delegation chairpersons promote state unity and enthusiasm. State costumes, signs, and flags are constructed. Campaign managers craftily secure the votes of as many state delegates as can be persuaded. They flood the campus with slogans, posters, and other paraphernalia in support of their favorite candidates. Construction crews work hard to create an authentic looking convention hall.

The 2024 convention scheduled for Saturday, April 20, promises to be no exception! Don't miss it!

APPENDIX 3

2024 MOCK REPUBLICAN CONVENTION

**Saturday, April 20, 2024, 12:00 noon
JFK Student Center, Saint Francis University Loretto, Pennsylvania 15940**

HOW WILL THINGS WORK AT THE MOCK CONVENTION

AND WHAT AM I SUPPOSED TO DO?

Agenda:

1. Call to Order: Chairperson
2. The Pledge of Allegiance
3. The National Anthem
4. Invocation: Fr. Malachi Van Tassell, T.O.R., Ph.D., President, Saint Francis University
5. Introductory Remarks: Chairperson
6. Welcoming Speeches
7. Featured Speakers: T.B.A.
8. Credentials Committee Report
9. Rules Committee Report
10. Platform Committee Report (followed by voice vote)
11. Nominations of Presidential Candidates; Campaign Manager Acceptances of Nomination
12. Balloting by Roll Call of States for Presidential Nominee
13. Announcement of Convention Presidential Nominee: Chairperson
14. Nomination of Vice-Presidential Candidates
15. Balloting by Roll Call of States for Vice-Presidential Nominee
16. Announcement of Convention Vice-Presidential Nominee: Chairperson
17. Adjournment

Rules of the Convention:

1. The Convention shall proceed in the order of business stated above.
2. The party platform will be drafted by the Platform Committee prior to the Convention. Campaign managers for eligible candidates may offer their recommendations. The platform will be submitted to the Convention delegates for approval by voice vote. A minority report or plank must be submitted in writing to the Planning Committee at least 72 hours prior to the Convention.

A minority plank will be submitted to the full Convention only if it has received the support of twenty-five percent (25%) of the membership of the Planning Committee.

3. To place a candidate's name in nomination, the state delegation chairperson should rise and wave the state's identification placard. Once recognized by the Convention Chairperson, proceed to the nearest floor microphone to make your nomination.

4. No campaign manager's nominating speech shall exceed two minutes in length.

5. In balloting, the vote of each state shall be announced by the chairperson of the state delegation.

6. The number of votes needed to nominate shall be defined as one half of the total votes plus one (1,215 votes needed to nominate).

7. Vice-presidential nomination will be by roll call. If we encounter time constraints, the Vice-presidential nominee will be determined by voice vote at the discretion of the chair.

General Instructions:

Before the Convention--

1. All state delegation chairpersons will receive a memo which explains some of your responsibilities. The memo also tells you how many votes your state will have and how you will cast them. If you have misplaced these materials, get new copies from Dr. Damico, Dr. Gentry, Gentry or Dr. Melusky.

2. All state delegations should have:

- a. state identification placard (this will be provided at the convention);
- b. additional state signs;
- c. candidate signs and banners;
- d. other distinguishing items (e.g., state costumes).

3. The state delegation chairperson should submit complete lists of state delegates to Dr. Gentry. This should be done **immediately** (if you have not already done so). **Be sure that none of your delegates have signed up to be members of some other state delegation.**

4. If possible, report to the JFK Student Center on **Friday, April 19, 2024 (the exact time will be announced)** with as many volunteers as you can round up to hang signs and banners and help with convention set up.

5. Assemble your delegation and have them seated in your state section on the Convention floor before 11:45 p.m. on April 20. **When you arrive, check in at the registration desk.**

6. All participants are encouraged to get into the "spirit" of the Convention and to have a good time but please remember that we are trying to project a positive image of Saint Francis University to the surrounding community. Remind your delegates that this is a simulation and they should at least **pretend** to have enthusiasm for the Republican Party, even if their actual personal preferences lie elsewhere.

7. Your state delegation is entitled to cast _____ votes. See the State Delegation Master List on the bulletin board across from Scotus 314. The apportionment of votes within the delegation is up to the delegation and its chairperson. For example, if your state is entitled to cast 50 votes and your delegation has five members, several things might happen. If all five delegates agree to vote for candidate X, the chairperson will cast all 50 votes for candidate X. But if four delegates vote for candidate X and one delegates vote for candidate Y, the chairperson will cast 40 votes for candidate X and 10 votes for candidate Y.

8. Each state delegation should caucus before the Convention to decide if it wishes to participate in candidate nominations. If you decide to nominate a candidate, the state delegation

chairperson will announce the nominee and that candidate's campaign manager will then make a **brief** acceptance speech.

9. During April, campaign managers can begin placing signs for the respective candidates around campus. In designing signs, all persons are asked to observe standards of "good taste." Following the Convention, you will be responsible for removing your own signs. Please do so immediately.

10. Campaign managers should caucus before the Convention to discuss the vice-presidency. Candidates who have withdrawn from the race might be considered for the second spot on the ticket. If candidate X wins the presidential nomination, his or her campaign manager will accept the nomination and will announce candidate X's preference(s) for a running mate. The campaign manager will be encouraged to **identify at least two acceptable running mates**. The Convention Chairperson will ask a state delegation chairperson to nominate this person (or these persons). Wave your state placard to be recognized. If more than one candidate is nominated for the vice-presidency, balloting by states will proceed in the same order as the presidential balloting. The number of votes to nominate will again be 50% plus one -- 1,215. If only one candidate is nominated for the vice-presidency, balloting will be by acclamation (voice vote).

At the Convention --

1. Presidential Nominations:

According to the rules of this Convention, only the Republican candidates still running on Super Tuesday, March 5, 2024, are eligible for nomination on the **first** ballot. Eligible candidates include *Nikki Haley and Donald Trump*. **If** we go to a **second** ballot, the field is wide open.

The Convention Chairperson will announce that the following candidates are eligible for the party's presidential nomination [See names listed above.] S/he will then ask if anyone wants to place a name in nomination. Suggestion: It is likely that the candidate's home state would place the candidate's name into nomination.

To place a candidate's name in nomination, the state delegation chairperson should rise and wave the state's identification placard or state sign. Once recognized by the Convention Chairperson, proceed to the nearest floor microphone to make your nomination.

If you are placing a name in nomination, say this: "Mister/Madam Chairperson, the state of _____ would like to nominate _____ as our party's presidential candidate." The Chair will ask for a second from another state. (Delegates will applaud wildly after the nomination is seconded.) Then the Chair will ask if the candidate's campaign manager is present and would like to offer brief remarks on his or her behalf. If not, the Chair will give **you** the opportunity to offer some remarks in behalf of the candidate you nominated. You can "respectfully decline" to do so.

The campaign manager will have two minutes to make a speech placing his/her candidate's name in nomination. A "spontaneous" demonstration of enthusiasm may follow.

2. Roll Call for Balloting for President:

Each state delegation chairperson will announce the votes from his/her state. The states will be called in alphabetical order. **PLEASE BE NEAR A FLOOR MICROPHONE SO THE ROLL CALL CAN PROCEED QUICKLY AND SMOOTHLY. ANTICIPATE YOUR STATE.** For example, the Convention Chair will call "Alabama." The Alabama state delegation chairperson will go to the microphone and will announce "Mister/Madam Chairperson, the state of Alabama (you can insert a few colorful, historically significant, or otherwise interesting

comments or “fun facts” about your state at this time) casts its votes as follows: ..." (Alabama will cast 50 votes. The Alabama delegation chairperson will calculate the apportionment of these 50 votes among the candidates. If all 50 votes are not being given to a single candidate, the Alabama delegation chairperson should save the largest count for last.) Subsequent state delegation chairpersons will follow the same procedure.

After all states have cast their votes, the Convention Chair will bang the gavel and call the balloting to a close. At this point, the Recording Officer will approach the podium and will announce the results. Remember, it takes a majority of the total available votes to win. That is, the nominee will require at least 1,215 votes.

If there is no winner on the first ballot, the Convention Chair will reopen the nominations. At this point, all nominations from the first round are “erased.” New candidates can be nominated or candidates who were nominated in the first round can be nominated again. Rise and wave your state placard to gain the Convention Chair's attention.

Any state delegation chairperson can now nominate a new candidate. At this point, **any** Republican who is constitutionally eligible for the presidency could be nominated. (“Eligibility” means the person is a U.S. citizen, at least 35 years old, has not engaged in an insurrection against the United States, and has not already served two terms as President of the U.S. (George W. Bush is not eligible for a third term). Next, a second round of balloting will take place following the same procedures used during the first round. Rounds of balloting will continue until a candidate is able to secure the nomination. (Note: bargains concerning the vice-presidency might be especially useful to break such deadlocks.) If we encounter time constraints a voice vote may be substituted for roll-call balloting at the discretion of the Rules Committee.

After the Recording Officer announces the winner of the presidential nomination, yet another "spontaneous" burst of enthusiasm may be called for.

3. Selection of the **Vice-Presidential Nominee:**

The Convention Chair will announce the start of vice-presidential nominations. The campaign manager for the winning presidential candidate will inform the Convention of his/her candidate's preference(s) for a running mate. As noted previously, the campaign manager will be encouraged to **identify at least two acceptable running mates**. The Convention Chair will then ask state delegate chairs for nominations. Only running mates identified as "acceptable" by the presidential nominee's campaign manager and who are constitutionally eligible for the vice-presidential spot on our Party's ticket can be nominated. Wave your state placard to be recognized. The Convention Chair will call for seconds. Anyone from the floor can shout out, "I second the nomination." After nominations have been closed, balloting by states will proceed as above. The number of votes needed to nominate will again be 50% plus one – 1,215. If we encounter severe time constraints a voice vote may be substituted for roll-call balloting at the discretion of the Rules Committee.

4. **Final Note:**

Try to hold your delegates on the floor for the entire convention. One helpful way of doing this is to caucus and poll them before each vote.

THIS IS NOT EXACTLY HOW REAL CONVENTIONS WORK, BUT IT IS A PRETTY CLOSE APPROXIMATION. WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO HAVE FUN, PAY ATTENTION TO THE 2024 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, AND TUNE IN TO THE NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS THIS SUMMER TO SEE HOW CLOSELY THESE SPECTACLES MATCH OUR OWN!

The Blues Man, the Blues Woman, and the West African Griot/-te Tradition

Evelyne Delgado-Norris

Chicago State University

In West African societies, griots and griottes are the musicians, storytellers, and historians of the community. Griots praise, educate, give hope and stir the soul, but they also use language to criticize and condemn. Blues men and women present many similarities with the griots of West Africa. This study will highlight some of their connections from a sociological perspective.

Who are the griots and what is their role? The griots are much more than simple entertainers. One does not apply to become a griot or a griotte, it is a specialized craft and caste. You are born within a griot family and the gifts of memory, recitation, and performance are taught from an early age and passed down from generation to generation. Historically, this class of individuals was and still is prevalent throughout West Africa, particularly in the Sahel in the Senegambian zone, Mali, and Guinea, stretching all the way through Niger, northern parts of Nigeria, and Chad. In societies and cultures that valued orality above written expression (most West African languages were not written languages), griots have held the specialized role as keepers of history, teachers, and vessels of wisdom. Traditionally, they were often attached to prominent families, kings and nobles, specific clans and communities to preserve the memory of main events, genealogies, alliances and wars. These memories were preserved in their epics, stories, and songs. In sort, they are the “living archives” of families, communities, and empires. The role of the griots and griottes is also to entertain. They learn at an early age to play drums and other traditional instruments such as the kora or the balafon. The griot class is strongly rooted in West African societies and dates thousands of years back. Their existence and role are stressed in important African epics such as the *Epic of Sundiata* from the 1200s (but griots existed long before and we find their origin in 7th century Malinké societies). One of the main griots in the epic is *Balla Fasséké*, the griot of the founder of the Empire of Mali, Sundiata Keita. He bears witness to history (in this case, the ascent of Sundiata), serves as the mouth piece of the King, advises, entertains and even inspires a whole army with his words that “filled their hearts”. The power of words and music to take possession of minds and souls also associates griots with magical abilities that are feared by many.

In addition to being attached historically to important families and nobles, griots are also independent artists and travel around to lease their services. Griots are hired for parties and celebrations, most often accompanied by dance and collective participation. They are present at marriages, birth, naming ceremonies, rites of passage, and death. But griots can also use their tongue to criticize and condemn individuals and society as a whole. In today’s African societies, you will even find griots at political rallies!

The Spirit of the Griot in America

The spirit of the griot survives in America. When Africans were brought to the New World, they brought with them millennia of culture and knowledge as well as their cultural practices and created something new in a different environment. Even though there was an effort to often diffuse ethnic groups and the uniting ties of language, religion, and cultural practices that would give strength to uprooted Africans (Alleyne, 1994), cohesive groups were also maintained in certain states because of valued specialized skills or certain dispositions noted by traders. The commonalities of the many African tongues, world beliefs, cultural expressions and practices (such

as the strong oral and musical traditions of the griots) still survived. The Africans brought to the shores of the Americas to be enslaved and exploited on the plantations of the south and elsewhere came with their cultural heritage and everyday practices and this includes without a doubt not only farmers, healers, carpenters, metalworkers who brought their craft, but also Africans from the griot caste. Slave ship records show that large groups of Africans arriving in the first waves to the American shores (Maryland and Virginia in the 17th century, for example) came from the Senegambian region and thus, would have included people of a variety of occupations and skills, including griots. Looking through slave voyages records from the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade database (available from slavevoyages.org), one can find British and Dutch ships originating from what is documented as “Gambia and Senegambia” transporting Africans stemming from ethnic groups where the griot and the oral tradition were strong.

Separated from their context and given new roles, these Africans refashioned their practices in a new oppressive environment. Edouard Glissant developed a useful framework for understanding the refashioning of culture in the Americas through the process of what he calls “creolization”. Glissant explains the process of cultural agency and identity reconstruction using the concept of “traces” in these terms: “[it recomposes through traces a language and arts available to all...he/she [the African] was able to create something unpredictable from the power of memory, from the traces left in his mind; from there he was able to create [creole] languages, but also new artistic forms for all] (Glissant, 2007). Traces of African cultural practices, languages, and worldviews are strongly present in the Blues.

When looking from a sociological perspective in terms of their role and the way they are perceived in society, blues men and blues women possess many similarities with the griots of West Africa. First, they are specialized musicians and wordsmiths. From the hollers in the fields, storytellers and entertainers at night to the evening porch fiddlers and the post-civil war traveling musicians with no fixed home or income, blues men and women have traditionally carried messages from the heart and the stories, not just about their personal experiences, but also carried the traces of the collective memory of Black folks. The stories of heroes and villains, typical archetypes that serve to teach and inspire, but also warn against bad choices make up the fabric of many blues songs. In the Black imagination, personages such as John Henry are immortalized in popular folklore and in Blues songs passed down and still sung today. John Henry’s story recounts the tragic battle and end of a “steel-driving man” on the railroad who challenges a steam-powered drill to a race. John Henry wins the challenge but pays with his life and dies from exertion. The story stages a strong Black man’s struggle against a new world where technology and machines would replace man’s honest work. One version of the song by Joe Brown and transcribed by the Heritage Discovery Center unravels in these words:

John Henry was a little baby

Sittin’ on his papa’s knee

He picked up a hammer & a little piece of steel

Said “Hammer’s gonna be the death of me, Lord, Lord!

Hammer’s gonna be the death of me.”

The captain said to John Henry

“Gonna bring that steam drill ’round

Gonna bring that steam drill out on the job

Gonna whop that steel on down, down, down!

Whop that steel on down.”

John Henry told his captain,

“A man ain’t nothin’ but a man

But before I let your steam drill beat me down

I’ll die with a hammer in my hand, Lord, Lord!

I’ll die with a hammer in my hand.”

(<https://www.heritagejohnstown.org>)

At the other end of the spectrum, you have figures such as *Stack’O Lee* who is immortalized in Blues tunes as a warning of the dark side of human nature and our propensity toward violence. The story is based on a real-life murder that occurred on Christmas night in St. Louis in 1895. As reported in the local newspapers at the time, an altercation occurred when Billy Lyon was shot for snatching the hat off a man named Sheldon. Billy was arrested, tried, and put to death. The story is a favorite among old time blues singers who use it as a cautionary tale to use self-control and not let anger take over your mind and sound judgment. Stories like John Henry and Stack O’ Lee (also titled Stagger Lee at times) offer an educational window to teach about the human condition and humans’ struggles that are timeless and universal.

Giving a Snapshot of the World Around Them

As Chicago blues man and educator Fernando Jones put it, the Blues continues to document the state of society at a particular time, it bears witness to a time and place. In his words, “some people document with a movie or a camcorder, the Blues song writer documents with words. He or she records information through the eyes and ears and they write about it”. He goes on to say: “Once something is documented, it can’t be disputed that it didn’t happen” (WGN news clip, 2020). Similarly to the griots who brought a “compass” to the kingdom by giving advice to kings and emperors (but also within the nucleus of the community and families), Blues men and women offer social and political commentary through their lyrics. The tradition of providing social commentary was and continues to be strong in West African societies and carried through in the Americas with Blues artists. *Bourgeois Blues* by Lead Belly is an example. It is a song written in 1937 recounting his experience in Washington D.C. where he came to record some songs for the archives for A. Lomax (a prominent researcher in American folk traditions). Needless to say, he

was not welcomed in that part of town in which was segregated at the time. The Blues man was denied a stay in the neighborhood near the Library of Congress.

Lord in a bourgeois town

It's a bourgeois town

I got the bourgeois blues

Gonna spread the news all around

.....

Home of the brave, land of the free

I don't wanna be mistreated by no bourgeoisie

.....

Well, me and my wife were standing upstairs

We heard the white man say "I don't want no niggers up there"

.....

I tell all the colored folks to listen to me

Don't try to find you no home in Washington, DC....

(<https://genius.com/Lead-belly-the-bourgeois-blues-1938-lyrics>)

There are innumerable Blues songs that address social issues and inequalities within society, particularly for African Americans. Blues artists talk about personal experiences, but also larger economic issues, civil unrest, war, and peace. Bus Ezell's *Obey the Ration Laws* urges people to comply with war time rationing, but also notes the non-committal attitude of wealthy Americans in this regard. Similarly to many Blues artists who encountered different conditions and a new urban environment during the Great Migration, griots under colonial rule and later in post-independence West Africa also underwent some changes. Newly independent West African

<p>Yone wi ! sorré na ! Té métti na Naniou ko waaadial</p> <p>Bo doul nopé khalate La niou défone Mameuuuu ya! Sa khol do toul nekh Té dotou khame lou doul féyane to !</p> <p>Souma sagnone Africa Béne niit mo koy djité ! Niou bolé Sounouy khalate Ak sounouy dolé Diokh ko !</p> <p>Naniou oubi frontiers yi! ratakhale yone yi Ba nieupeu guissé</p> <p>Changes your thinking! Work together! Keep and working!</p> <p>Cheikh Anta Diop! Kouamé Nkrumah! Steven Biko!</p> <p>All you people! Africa!!!!</p>	<p>But our past must not stop us from moving forward</p> <p>I dream to see Africans unified by a common vision Let's marshal our ideas, our energies Open the borders and come together</p> <p>Change your thinking Work together Keep on working</p> <p>Cheikh Anta Diop, Kwame Nkrumah, Steven Biko, Nelson Mandela</p> <p>All you people AFRICA!!</p>
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(<https://genius.com/Youssou-ndour-new-africa-lyrics>)

Even though African music is generally a collective practice, the personage of the griot can also stand alone and will accompany himself/herself to perform as the central figure, just like the bluesman. String instruments such as the Xalam and the Kora are king with the Wolof and the Mandinka and are said to be the African “memory” or “trace” for the American banjo. Early fiddles used by slaves resembled the Sahelian goge with its bow and the riti (Nyanyeru) of the Fulani. Beyond the stories, the virtuosity of the performer makes his fame. Their instruments, particularly the Kora and the Balafon are said to be imbued with magical powers, capable of invoking spirits, influencing events and the outcomes of battles, and even wielding power over natural elements. The gift of music itself and the skills of the musician place him or her in a mystical position. That is another similarity between the blues artist and the griot. In the collective imagination in both cultures, both the griot and the quintessential blues man have often been associated with some obscure force. We all know the story of Robert Johnson at the crossroads. His meeting with the devil is a seminal moment in blues folklore. The story goes that between US 61 and US 49 in Clarksdale, Mississippi, the devil offered the blues man extraordinary musical

talent in exchange for his soul. After that encounter, Johnson rose to fame. In West African folklore, the crossroads symbolize dilemmas, the making of decisions, and crossing mystical boundaries. In many West African stories, strong spirits linger around crossroads. Also, demanding something precious in exchange for a musical talent is a common trope with griots in West Africa. For example, griot Juldeh Camara, one of the leading Riti players (traditional African fiddle) from the Fulani ethnic group in the Gambia, tells how a spirit (or djinn) met his father in the forest and taught him to play the Riti. The price for this musical gift was his father's eyes. To soften the blow, the spirit let him know that despite his blindness, he would give him "the gift to see what others cannot see."

When it comes to women, West African female griottes (*jelimusow*) play a different but essential role in maintaining social cohesion and norms. Many make a living lending their services in family events and important junctures in a women's life: marriage, birth, baptism and naming of child, tattooing ceremonies (praising the courage of the women) but they also use their voices to address particular women's and societal issues. In African scholarship, the songs of the griottes have often been neglected. Scholars like Aissata Sidikou-Morton have been working to fill this gap and to show African women's perspectives and prism on history and everyday life in their own communities. In Sidikou and Hale's *Women's Songs from West Africa*, the songs presented highlight "alternative" versions of the grand epics (like Sundiata's), praise-songs, tattooing songs, lamentation, and even Wolof women's songs breaking the taboo of sex. Due to the predominance of Islam and patriarchal hierarchies, women's transgressive songs were mostly sung within women's private spaces. Wolof women from Senegal, for example, sing songs that educate about sex during ceremonies such as the *Laabaan*, which celebrates the bride's virginity, but also warns young women listeners against men's ways to tempt them into pre-marital sex and the consequences (dishonor to the family). Researcher Marame Guèye has studied the content of these songs and notes that "In Wolof culture, sex education occurs within these private women's spaces. *Laabaan* (the name of the ceremony and the type of song) is "reserved exclusively for women and conducted by them" (Sidikou & Hale, 1992). The songs are often raw and direct, mentioning sexual parts and full of humor. Today, the griotte's role and performance styles are changing, particularly with urban culture and global influences. Many step out of the private realm and have become national and international stars, speaking on behalf of their communities, but also for women and Africa's empowerment in general. Artists like Sona Jabarteh have brought the spotlight on the griot tradition in a modern local and global context. Sona stems from a griot family and is the first professional virtuoso on the Kora, an instrument traditionally reserved for men. Her practice and choice of the instrument is transgressive in itself. Her mission is to preserve her rich cultural heritage, but to also bring it into the 21st century, accessible to all and carry new messages of hope and social justice. Her mission points to the griotte stepping out of the private realm of women to burst out in the public spaces to also express national concerns. Jabarteh's *Gambia*, for example, calls her country to unity and a march forward very much in the style of Youssou N'Dour's *New Africa*. Sona Jabarteh assumes here the role of a modern griotte stepping out on the public stage as a mouthpiece for her people:

Translation from Mandinka lyrics]

[Intro]

Peace knows stability and progress welcomes it

[Verse 1]

Hospitality, happiness feel the faces of the country

The Gambia is a good country

Where ever you are, never let yourself forget

Your homeland Gambia

Truth is, if you forget your homeland

It means you forgot yourself

[Chorus 1]

We are proud, I am proud of my country...

We are proud...

[Interlude]

Let's come together and be united for

That's the way forward and benefit for all

[Chorus 2]

Where are the people of the world? This is a beautiful country

Where are the people of the world? This is a peaceful country

Where are the people of the Gambia? This is my country

Where are the people of the Gambia? This is hard to find!

(Sona Jobarteh – GAMBIA Lyrics | Genius Lyrics)

Sona Jobarteh remains rooted in the tradition of uplifting women, but takes a more progressive stance in terms of calling out women’s oppression and shaking up the norms and expectations for women in African patriarchal societies. Jobarteh’s song *Musolou (Women)* reminds us that all humanity is born from a woman and that the love of a mother is a special gift in this world. In the griot tradition of a praise song, the names of her heroines, these global women “ancestors” are called as homage and witnesses to women’s greatness: “I ask that societies give

back to women in return for their hard work and sacrifices. Women are controlled, silenced, oppressed, beaten and mutilated... I ask what type of people harm the very people that bring us into the world and raise us? I ask the people of this world to stand by women, to fight for them and their dignity” (Tigay, 2023). And further, she sings:

I pay homage to just a few iconic female role models of African descent,

Past and present, who have fought for social change:

Maya Angelou, Queen Nanny of the Maroons, Yaa Asantewaa,

Queen Nzinga of Ndongo and Matamba, Angela Davis,

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Harriet Tubman, Mbuya Nehanda,

Giséle Rabesahala, Miriam Makeba, Rose Chibambo,

Margaret Ekpo, Sojourner Truth, Andrea Lua, Women Warriors of Dahomey.

Women of the world, I thank you”

(Tigay, 2023)

Blues women are, in the same vein, our American griottes. They have highlighted alongside their fellow Blues men the personal, social, and economic conditions of African Americans from a Black woman’s perspective. Blasting to pieces the stereotypical image of the “Mamy” and domestic servant, blues women sang of independence, including sexual independence (which meant a lot in view of America’s long history of rape of Black women). Many of Spivey's songs are laced with expressions of sexual freedom, including *Good Cabbage*, *I'll Keep Sittin' On It if I Can't Sell It*, etc. Alberta Hunter’s *Yelpin' the Blues* is a direct reference to the determination and strength of women. You can also find political commentary in songs such as *Christmas Mornin' Blues* by Victoria Spivey in which she points to systemic racism, the condition of many Black men in prison, and the negative consequences this situation brings on women (emotionally and economically):

My man’s so deep in trouble the white folks couldn’t get him free

My man’s so deep in trouble the white folks couldn’t get him free

He stole a hog the charge was murder in the first degree

.....

Next Christmas I won't be here to get this bad bunch of news

I won't be here to get this bunch of bad news

Just mark on my tombstone, "Died with the Christmas Morning Blues".

(<https://www.musixmatch.com/lyrics/Victoria-Spivey/Christmas-Morning-Blues>)

Spivey's *Murder in the First Degree* laments about African American women not being able to improve their economic condition by occupying roles such as maids and domestic servants. Today, Blues women continue to "tell it like it is" and use their music to affect change. Grammy-nominated Blues woman Shamekia Copeland (who stems from a Blues family herself through her father) sings about love and harsh times, but also covers urgent social problems and women's challenges in America: *Done Gone Too Far* and *Blame it on Eve* are some of her latest releases. The titles say it all.

The blues is a musical genre that carries the unique and rich cultural imprint of Africans and their descendants in North America as it travelled from the deep south to the streets and clubs of Chicago and other big cities. This study aimed to look at the connections between the griot and griotte and the American Blues artist from a sociological perspective. Their role is important in carrying history and bearing witness to a time and place. These masters of the word constantly reinvent themselves and continue to create bridges between the past and the present, the living and the dead, and above all, between cultures who, even though separated by a grand ocean, continue to share visible and invisible ties.

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Foreign policy, Factionalism, and Chaos in New York, 1790-1815

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The Republican Party developed in New York during the first Washington administration around the core of George Clinton's anti-Federalists. During the Revolution they provided the leadership of the popular Whigs. Federalist foreign policies during Washington's second term enabled the Republican Party to establish a mass following. "British policy on the high seas and on the frontier, coupled with the Federalist response to them," historian Alfred Young concluded, "created the Republican movement in New York, enabling Republicans to catch full sail the fullest winds of nationalism to blow across the American political waters since the Revolution." The growth of the Republican Party in the 1790s depended on the successful use of public hostility to Great Britain.

In 1794, John Jay negotiated a treaty with the British providing for British evacuation of the frontier posts in the West in exchange for American acceptance of British restrictions on trade with the West Indies, and a promise not to impose discriminatory duties on British goods. While the treaty pleased Federalists because it produced an Anglo-American entente it angered Republicans because the British refused to recognize American maritime rights. "To Republicans the battle against Jay's Treaty, a betrayal of national interest, was a holy crusade; England, a den of iniquity; 'Tory,' the most odious epithet in their vocabulary." Initial public outrage at the treaty's abandonment of neutral rights aided the Republicans. However, Republican Anglophobia soon proved too strong for a majority of New Yorkers. Voters gave Republicans a majority of the state's Congressional delegation in 1794 during the crest of anti-British anger over Jay's Treaty. However, by the spring of 1795 New Yorkers found peace with the British more appealing. New Yorkers elected Federalist John Jay Governor and reelected Federalist majorities in the Assembly and State Senate.

New York Republicans took a more openly pro-French position than the national leadership of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. When the French requested bribes from American negotiators---XYZ Affair---Federalists capitalized on the public outrage in New York and portrayed the Republicans as seditious allies of the French. Federalists manipulated nationalism to their own advantage and seriously undermined the popularity of the Republicans. Adoption of the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 threatening basic civil liberties backfired against the Federalists and allowed the Republicans to regain the political offensive. Thomas Jefferson's successful attack on the foreign policy of President John Adams and the Alien and Sedition Acts aided the Republicans at the state and national level. Thomas Jefferson defeated Adams for the presidency in the 1800 presidential election. Between 1800 and 1801 New York's Republicans won control of the Assembly, State Senate, and the Congressional delegation. In 1801 Republican George Clinton defeated Federalist Stephen Van Rensselaer for governor. For the first time Republicans controlled all branches of New York government.

"A harsh and divisive dialogue pervaded the political atmosphere," historian Paul Goodman observed in Massachusetts, and "men argued not over means but over ultimate ends." In New York, as in Massachusetts, Republicans saw their opponents as aristocrats, British agents, and Tories. For the Federalists, Republicans were Jacobins, anarchists, democrats, and agents of France. Federalists believed Republican rule would lead to the destruction of "the foundations of society." Eventually, "you will see the virtuous brought to the block and decapitated, their property

plundered, and divided among the horde of wretches. They especially hated Jefferson and when his presidency ended, they thanked God for rescuing “us from the fangs of Jefferson.”

Federalism had been the dominant political force in New York since 1788 when forces in favor of the Constitution defeated the anti-Federalists led by George Clinton. Throughout the 1790s Federalists managed to contain the growth of the Republicans until they stumbled over aspects of the foreign policies of Washington and Adams. By 1801, Federalists lost control of all branches of state government and went into rapid decline into political insignificance. A change in the electoral laws in 1804 led to the loss of one of their last bastions of political power, the New York City Common Council. By 1806, the Federalists held no seats in the State Senate, 19 of 112 Assembly seats, and two of seventeen seats in Congress. In 1804 and 1807, Federalists did not even bother to nominate gubernatorial candidates, hoping they could regain some power by endorsing one of the Republican candidates. The strategy failed so badly that it led to the death of the state’s leading Federalist in 1804, Alexander Hamilton.

By 1801 the majority of New Yorkers, particularly in western New York, considered themselves Republicans. They identified with the principles of the Republican Party and with the state leadership of George Clinton. In the 1790s the Republican Party developed independent of the leadership of Jefferson and Madison, and “there would have been a Republican Party in New York without them.” New York Republicans did not follow the lead of Jefferson and Madison in the Hamilton finance questions of 1789-90, and in the foreign policy crises of 1794-96 they took a more extreme anti-British position than either Virginian. While Republicans backed Jefferson in 1796 and 1800, they did so primarily out of hostility to Federalists, rather than loyalty to Jefferson. According to Alfred Young, “New York Democratic Republicans cannot accurately be called New York Jeffersonians.”

Republicans dominated New York politics after 1800 because they identified their party as the party of the people. They projected an image of democracy, a faith in equalitarianism, As an example, when Daniel Tompkins ran for governor in 1807, he ran as the farmer’s boy, just one of the people he hoped to represent. While many Federalists expected the public to defer to men of superior merit, virtue, or wealth, Republicans emphasized that men of merit were “still only considered as equals.” Republicans cautioned voters against electing Federalists, “men whose aristocratic doctrine teaches that the rights and representative authority of the people are vested in a few proud nobles.” Many Federalists felt ill at ease campaigning. “Saving one’s country” proved “a nauseous piece of business” to Washington Irving, who in 1807 “talked handbill fashion with the demagogues and shook hands with the mob.” As late as 1815, William North complained of “suffering the worst of all evils...to one who hates the manners of the Vulgar, an evil sufficiently great, that of mixing and battling with the herd, all folly, filth, ignorance, and drink.” In spite of the efforts to convey the image of representing the best interests of the people and the state, Federalists could not overcome “the dread of federalism entertained by the great body of the people.” By combining equalitarianism, nationalism, and Anglophobia Republicans won the support of the majority of New Yorkers.

In the 1790s, the Federalists, as a party in power, discouraged mobilization of public opinion, rejected the use political organization, and frowned upon the expression of public opinion between the elections. Federalists denounced democratic clubs as the work of French Jacobins, as unruly revolutionary cells. The Federalist Party stood for a strong national government and a strong executive. Republicans glorified states’ rights in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and popular protests against Jay’s Treaty, Alien and Sedition Acts, and the undeclared Quasi War of 1798-1800 with France. After 1800 a partial reversal of roles turned New York’s Federalists into

states' rights advocates and into vigorous opponents of the nationalist policies of Jefferson and Madison. Federalists became champions of party organization, public protests, and of constant agitation against the policies of Jefferson and Madison. Embracing new methods of party organization Federalists founded Washington societies, and in the Capital District Trojan Whig societies to get the faithful to the polls and to engage in public opposition to the foreign policies of Republican administrations. Republicans rallied around nationalism and the policies of Jefferson and Madison administrations, but only if it appeared to give them an edge in New York politics. The various factions within the Republican Party used nationalism and states' rights as weapons against the Federalists and their political enemies within the Republican Party. While upholding the popularity and democratic nature of their political clubs, like Tammany, Republicans denounced Federalists political clubs as nest of Tories and treason. Ironically, both parties competed over which political organization represented the best expression of the Revolutionary tradition and the legitimate inheritors of the values of 1776.

In the 1790s, the struggle to oust the Federalists from state and national power provided the incentive that kept the faction-ridden Republicans united. With the elimination of the Federalist threat in 1801 Republicans waged a vigorous internecine war for control of the party. During the early 1790s, George Clinton, a popular governor aided by his nephew De Witt Clinton dominated the Republican Party. By the mid-1790s, the Livingstons led by Robert R. Livingston and Aaron Burr emerged to challenge Clinton. "While there was never any love between Clinton, Livingston and Burr" as long as the Federalists remained in power the three major Republican leaders cooperated against their common enemy.

Jefferson's election in 1800 provided an opportunity for the newly elected president to turn New York's feuding factions into Jeffersonians. By failing to use the power of federal patronage, he left New York's party leaders free to settle their own affairs and continue their internecine struggle. Rank and file Republicans identified with the national leadership of Thomas Jefferson and later James Madison. Local party leaders, especially the Clintons, ran the party independently and with little regard for the wishes of Jefferson. Party leaders identified themselves as Clintonians, Burrrites, Lewisite (Livingston-Morgan Lewis faction) or Martlingmen (Tammany), not Jeffersonians except when it became politically advantageous to do so.

After 1801 these factions fought for control of the Republican Party. In 1804, George Clinton accepted the Vice-Presidential post under Jefferson. Aaron Burr, former Vice-President of the United States, tried to succeed Clinton as Governor. The Clintonians, in cooperation with the Livingston faction, backed Morgan Lewis, Livingston's son-in-law. Lewis won and Burr blamed his defeat on Alexander Hamilton killing New York's most prominent Federalist in a duel. Burr's defeat and disgrace removed him from New York politics. His supporters tended to merge with the Martlingmen in New York City. George Clinton's assumption of the Vice-President's office left control of the Clintonians to De Witt Clinton. By 1806, Clinton and the Livingston-Lewisite faction split, and the 1806 and 1807 state elections turned into a contest for power between the factions. In 1807, Clinton challenged the reelection of Morgan Lewis by nominating Daniel Tompkins, the farmer's boy, as the challenger. The death of Hamilton further undermined the Federalists, and as in 1804 they were reduced to supporting one of the two Republican candidates. In 1804, most Federalists backed Burr, but switched to Lewis in 1807. Tompkins' victory left the Clintonians in total control of the Republican Party and New York State, but only temporarily.

The internecine political struggle within the Republican Party did not end with the triumph of the Clintonians in 1807 or the resurgence of Federalism in 1808. When Clintonians formed a coalition with part of the Burrrites in 1806, supporters of Morgan Lewis objected to the alliance

and the Livingston-Lewisite faction reached out to the Martlingmen who met at Abraham Martling's Tavern in New York City. Since Martling served as sachem of the Tammany Society, the Martlingmen soon became synonymous with Tammany. Ironically, Tammany's leaders included a number of former close associates of Aaron Burr, including Mathew L. Davis, Burr's closest political associate. Hatred of the Clintonians, especially De Witt Clinton united this strange coalition. By 1811 they successfully challenged Clinton's control of the Republican Party in New York City but failed to generate much support upstate. During the 1811 race for Lieutenant-Governor, Tammany backed Marinus Willett only polled five percent of the vote when he challenged De Witt Clinton and Federalist Nicholas Fish. Clinton easily defeated Fish and Willett. In 1812 members of Tammany moved into their new headquarters near Martling's Tavern, Tammany Hall, further cementing the identification of the Tammany name with the Martlingmen. Tammany added to the divisions and confusion in Republican ranks by expressing deep hostility to immigrants fresh from the bogs of Ireland. Leaders of the Tammany faction refused to nominate Irish Catholic candidates. The anti-Irish, anti-Catholic nativism lasted until the flood tide of Irish immigrants forced Tammany to relent in 1815. Members of Tammany belatedly realized they needed the votes of this growing immigrant population in New York City, especially since De Witt Clinton developed strong bonds to the Irish American community.

Trying to outflank the Clintonians, upstate Lewisite leaders Morgan Lewis, Robert Livingston and John Nicholas joined with Tammany's stalwarts portraying themselves as champions of Jefferson and his successor James Madison. They described themselves as Madisonian when George Clinton appeared to challenge Madison for the presidential nomination in 1808. Later, in 1812 they backed Madison against De Witt Clinton's bid for the presidency. By vigorously endorsing Jefferson and Madison and their major foreign policies---the embargo, non-intercourse, and war---Lewisites and Tammany hoped to win the endorsement of Presidents Jefferson and Madison in their efforts to destroy the political power of the Clintons.

Realizing the potential political danger the embargo posed, the Clintons initially criticized the embargo because of its negative impact on the economy of New York. However, De Witt Clinton's public attack on the law angered many Republican Party activists and provided an issue for anti-Clinton Republicans to use in their efforts to capture control of the party. De Witt Clinton's handpicked gubernatorial candidate, Daniel Tompkins, solidly supported the presidential measure. After realizing his opposition to the embargo jeopardized his control of the party, Clinton backtracked and endorsed the law. This prevented a rebellion of pro-embargo Clintonians but drove his close political associate and editor of the Republican leaning *New York American Citizen* James Cheetham into the political wilderness. He was no longer a spokesman for the Clintons and his past positions alienated him from the Lewisites and Tammany. Cheetham tried to form his own faction, consisting of Irish Americans, and he used his newspaper to harass both the Clintonians and Tammany in New York City.

In spite of the resurgence of Federalism produced by the embargo, Republicans continued to fight for control of the party. After the 1809 Federalist victory, warring factions in the Republican Party negotiated a compromise in the summer of 1809 and during the spring elections in 1810. Federalist success drove them together, but their deep hostility prevented a lasting reconciliation. Compromise did not come easily. Tammany's organizing chairman, Mathew L. Davis, expecting Clintonian opposition to Tammany's pick for Assembly candidates swore "an eternal war against every mother son of them." Caught between the Clintonians and the Federalists, Lewisites described themselves as a "poor set of true Republicans between Hawk and Buzzard." Warring Republicans managed to strike a deal. Clintonians in New York City backed the

Tammany slate for the Assembly. All Republicans supported the reelection of Daniel Tompkins for governor and the Clintonians endorsed Morgan Lewis for State Senator. For the first time since 1801 Republicans waged a political campaign united by their mutual hostility to the Federalists.

With the Republican comeback in 1810, open warfare broke out anew. The 1811 race for Lieutenant-Governor provided an opportunity for a test of strength. Clintonians easily defeated Tammany's Marinus Willett and Federalist Nicholas Fish by reelecting De Witt Clinton. However, when Clinton ran for the presidency in 1812, opposed he war and sought an alliance with the Federalists he split his followers. Prominent Clintonians, like Governor Tompkins and Martin Van Buren abandoned Clinton. Many of his Irish American supporters who hated the British favored the war and rejected Clinton. By 1813, his opponents within the Republican Party seized control as Madisonians, and Clinton's quixotic and foolish attempt to block Governor Tompkins' reelection in 1813 backfired destroying his credibility for the remainder of the war. President Madison got his revenge against Clinton by dismissing Clintonians from all federal offices in New York. Politically isolated, Clinton depended on the Federalists to retain the Mayor's office in New York City. Just as Burr in 1804 and Lewis in 1807, De Witt Clinton discovered that political alliances with Federalists alienated Republican voters.

While Republicans fought each other Federalists faced their own internal disputes. Between 1798-1800 Federalists split into pro-Adams and Hamiltonian factions. The defeat of Adams and death of Hamilton ended this division. Younger members of the party disagreed with their more deferential bound elders and proved quite willing to reach out to the masses and politic with the same vigor and democratic rhetoric of their rivals in the Republican Party. In Albany County a repeated conflict developed between the Dutch Americans who controlled nominations and the desire of more recent arrivals from New England for a share of political positions. Disagreements also surfaced over allocation of patronage appointments when Federalists won in 1809 and 1812-13. An especially bitter battle developed in 1810 because a nationalist faction emerged in New York City that endorsed the foreign policies of President Madison. Led by Oliver Wolcott, Jr and Peter Radcliff a faction within the Federalists wanted the party to adopt a more "American" stance and expel the Tories from the party. Other Federalists, like Robert Troup and Gouverneur Morris, strongly disagreed with endorsing foreign policies promoted by Madison, a man of "not only reprehensible but impeachable conduct." Historian Lee Benson's research into Jacksonian New York asked for other historians to look for the ethno-social conflict in political loyalties. Within the Federalist and Republican parties this appeared in the Yankee Dutch conflict among the Federalists in Albany County and Yorker Irish split in the New York City Republican Party. In 1814, a group of Federalists led by Oliver Wolcott and Gulian Verplanck broke with the Federalists in New York City and organized the pro-war American Federalist Party, nicknamed the Coodies.

As an example of the generation gap between younger Federalists and the older members of the party the Federalist Party pamphlet of 1808 in Schenectady County revealed the fundamental differences. Federalists in Schenectady articulated in greater detail the rights of the citizens to dissent from government policies and throw out of office men who betrayed the public trust. American government was formed "for the people, and not the people for the government." In the United States, "all power emanates from the people." Schenectady Federalists articulated a vision of people's role in government similar to the Republicans. While many of the older Federalists believed in a speaking elite and silent democracy---deferential politics, Schenectady Federalists expressed a commitment to the popular will and veneration of popular sovereignty. Older Federalists, like John Jay and Gouverneur Morris, complained of the Republicans courting popular

opinion and flattering the multitude. Schenectady's Federalists willingly courted public opinion. They encouraged the public to criticize the government and vote. By encouraging the public to participate in the political process, Federalists speeded the democratization of New York's political structure.

From 1801-1807 the Federalists remained confined to their areas of political strength, St. Lawrence County, and parts of the North Country; Southern Tier, Upper Hudson Valley, parts of the Mohawk Valley, especially Oneida County, and the lower three wards of New York City. By making deals with Aaron Burr in 1804 and Morgan Lewis in 1807 they tried unsuccessfully to play Republican factions off against one another. Their coalitions with the Burrties in 1804 and Lewisites in 1807 failed to win them political power. Between 1801 and 1808, the Federalists were a party in search of an issue. In 1807, Federalists turned to nativism. They hoped native New Yorkers' hostility toward Irish Catholics would provide the catalyst for a political resurrection. The Federalist campaign of 1807 combined nativism with criticism of the foreign policies of President Jefferson. For the Federalists, the Irish symbolized the worst evils of Republican rule. To the Federalists the Irish were anti-British and would embroil the United States in a second war with Great Britain. To stress their Americanism and opposition to immigration, Federalists became the American Party for 1807. Privately, Federalists expressed the same concerns about the Irish as they did publicly during the 1807 campaign. David Ogden, a lawyer, and son-in-law of Gouverneur Morris, feared the Federalists could not carry New York City, because "this city is completely ruled by Irishmen." During the 1807 campaign Irish Republicans and Federalists fought each other on the streets of the Seventh Ward. Street brawls were not unusual in the sometime chaos of politics in New York City. Ironically, the Lewisites joined on the anti-Irish bandwagon in 1807. Supporters of Governor Lewis accused the Irish of brawling, drunkenness, crime, and clannishness. Federalist William Van Ness optimistically reported that "the conduct of the Irish and French raised [the party] beyond all former example" Van Ness could not count. Federalists only picked up five seats in the Assembly from 1806, and the Clintonian Republicans won a decisive victory over the Lewisties and Federalists. Federalist William Wilson blamed the Federalist defeat on the "United Irishmen and French Jacobins."

President Thomas Jefferson's foreign policy decisions turned around the fortunes of New York's Federalists and gave the Federalists the first real chance in a decade to limit Republican domination of the state. The deterioration in Anglo-American relations after the *Chesapeake Affair* in June 1807 led the President to ask Congress to adopt the embargo on trade. Duplicating the tactics of the Jay's Treaty fight, Republicans campaigned on Anglophobia, American nationalism, and the legacy of the American Revolution. In 1806, during the *Leander Affair*, Republicans successfully manipulated American hostility toward the British, but the adoption of the embargo on trade in December 1807 proved a Republican foreign and domestic policy blunder. The economic hardship produced by the embargo was more important to New Yorkers than appeals to Anglophobia, the Revolution, or patriotism. Farmers in upstate New York engaged in widespread smuggling of produce and livestock to Canada for shipment via Montreal to Europe. Even in New York City and Long Island farmers and merchants managed to smuggle goods aboard British ships off New York Harbor or in Long Island Sound. Profit proved more persuasive than patriotism. In upstate, smuggling became so widespread that President Jefferson declared the Lake Champlain region of New York and Vermont in a state of insurrection on 19 April 1808 and authorized the use of the militia and federal troops to stop the smuggling. Jefferson also wanted to declare the Oswego region and neighboring communities on Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence

in a state of insurrection, but Governor Tompkins fearing the political consequences of a second proclamation of insurrection persuaded Jefferson to refrain from issuing the proclamation.

Fearing that the embargo would lead to an Anglo-American war Barent Gardenier urged fellow Federalists to create a public outcry against war in the state legislature “to catch the public ear.” Federalists introduced an amendment to the Assembly’s reply to the speech by Governor Tompkins assailing the embargo and the President’s handling of Franco-American relations. Then, on 28 March 1808, at the Albany meeting of the state’s Federalists, the party adopted an election address attacking the embargo and the foreign policies of President Jefferson. Their attack worked and Federalists doubled their seats in the Assembly, jumping from twenty-four to forty-seven, and increased their share of the Congressional delegation from two in 1806 to eight in 1808 (8 of 17). For the first time since 1800 Federalists elected a State Senator. Jefferson’s foreign policy and the impact of the embargo on the lives of New Yorkers brought back the Federalists from political oblivion. As one example, the embargo destroyed the prosperity of Hudson, “sounding the death knell to a booming economy.” As Martin Van Buren and other Republicans, like former governor Morgan Lewis admitted “the embargo and the idea of French influence produced a most extraordinary effect.”

Events during the 1808 election suggest the chaos of New York politics during the early national period. Political emotions ran high in Columbia County in April 1808. Federalist Elisha Williams challenged Martin Van Buren to a debate on the embargo. To insure a sympathetic audience Van Buren brought Republicans from Claverack and Hudson. When Van Buren arrived with his Republican legion Williams refused to debate him. Republicans took control of the meeting hall and held a pro-embargo meeting while Williams and the Federalists regrouped in another part of the building. Van Buren told De Witt Clinton that the “Federalists feared a debate.” During the first party system political opponents rarely debated and showed up at meetings to heckle or silence the political opposition.

A typical incident took place in New York City in late April when a donnybrook broke out at a meeting of pro-Federalist sailors. When Federalist Cadwallader Colden delivered an anti-embargo speech, a group of Republican sailors downed him out. In reaction to “the tumult and confusion,” pro-Federalist sailors left while the Republicans took over the hall adopting pro-embargo resolutions. In retaliation, a mob of Federalists marched into the heavily Republican Sixth Ward carrying an American flag, shouting “no Republicans, down with Jacobins.” Two days of post-election rioting by Republicans incensed the Federalists against the Irish. On 28 April 1808, a mob of 600 Irish Americans and Irish immigrants marched down the Sixth Ward shouting kill the Federalists. Rioting on the night of the 29th led to the deaths of two men. William Coleman, the Federalist editor of the *New York Evening Post*, blamed “the tribe fresh from the bogs of Ireland.”

Many Federalists did not understand the nature of their political resurrection. Most of their votes came from citizens rejecting the foreign policies of Thomas Jefferson and the embargo, not embracing the principles of Federalism. Optimistic about the future Federalist Henry Van Schaack predicted we “shall do much better than we have done now.” Jefferson’s reliance on the embargo in 1808-09 turned Van Schaack’s prediction into reality. Republican appeals revealed a siege mentality. Failure to support the embargo warned New York City Republicans, “*threatened the existence of our Republic.*” Republicans portrayed the embargo as a test between the free republican government in America and the tyrants of Europe. As David Gardiner argued, “we have asked for nothing but justice...which our independence and honor will never allow us to relinquish.” They blamed the failure of the embargo to successfully pressure the British into

respecting American neutral rights on the Federalist traitors in league with the British. Republicans demanded the expulsion of the Tories from the United States, and some advocated invading Canada and driving out the Tories who settled in British North America after the Revolution. Once again, Republicans wrapped themselves in the legacy of the Revolution and Anglophobia to motivate voters to ignore the economic consequences of the embargo and counter the upsurge in support for the Federalists. Tammany could not put aside its hostility toward the Irish and refused to nominate Irish Catholics which amused the Federalists. "A deadly animosity seems to have arisen," Federalist John Foote noted "between the imported and home-made Jacobins."

Public hostility to the embargo and Republican divisions encouraged Federalists to increase their organizational activity. Beginning in July 1808, Gulian Verplanck, Richard Varick, and Isaac Sebring established a chapter of the Washington Benevolent Society in New York City. In Stillwater in Saratoga County younger Federalists joined the United Brethren of Washington. Younger Federalists created the Whig Society in Troy, because younger Federalists wanted to preserve "everything dear and sacred" from corrupt Republican rule. In New York City, a split temporarily developed between younger Federalists led by Gulian Verplanck who wanted to exclude former Tories and adopt a more nationalistic expression for American neutral rights. Accepting the advice of William Coleman and Robert Troup Federalists buried their differences and united to defeat the Republicans. Federalist organizational activities brought voters out to condemn the embargo and the foreign policy of President Jefferson and later President James Madison. Federalist organized meeting throughout the state attacked the embargo and the new enforcement act as unconstitutional danger to American liberties. Using the discontent created by the embargo induced depression Federalists turned that state election into a referendum on Jeffersonian foreign policy. Their strategy worked winning five of the eight contested State Senate seats and 63 of the 112 Assembly seats. Federalists won a majority in the Assembly for the first time in ten years. In the 1809 state elections in New York a majority of voters repudiated the foreign policy of President Jefferson. Surviving evidence suggests that the embargo increased voter turnout. Political competition between Federalists and Republicans over the wisdom of the embargo brought voters to the polls. In 1809, the increase in voter participation benefited the Federalists because of their opposition to the embargo

New York's 1810 election showed the importance of foreign policy issues in local and state politics. President Madison's foreign policy dominated the Federalist controlled Assembly and Republican Governor Daniel Tompkins. Federalists and Republicans debated foreign policy over the summer of 1809 and in the November Common Council elections in New York City. Madison's foreign policy became the main issue for Federalists and Republicans in the spring 1810 elections for the state legislature, governor, and Congress. Republicans called the Federalists Tories, lackeys of the British, and claimed the Federalists wanted war with France. Their opponents viewed continued Republican rule as a disaster that would lead to more embargoes and war with Great Britain. The 1810 elections revealed the connections between foreign policy and local and state politics.

In November 1809 New York City voters went to the polls to elect the Common Council. Federalists and Republican ran their campaign not on local issues but on foreign policy. Editor Zachariah Lewis predicted that Federalists would have the support of "of all who deprecate a useless embargo and unnecessary war." Republicans described their political opponents as Tories and agents of Great Britain. Both parties claimed to inherit the Revolutionary legacy. Ninth Ward Federalists reminded voters "they remembered the plains of Lexington and the bloody field at Monmouth, where Federalists" led our patriots to victory. Republican divisions between Tammany

and Clintonians aided the Federalists who won fifteen of the twenty Council seats. Federalists interpreted their victory as evidence the people would reject men who are “advocates of embargoes, non-intercourse, and war.”

The 1810 campaign began with a direct confrontation between the Federalists in the Assembly and Governor Tompkins over supporting or condemning the foreign policy of President Madison. During the 1810 election campaign Republicans denounced former British Minister Francis Jackson for “his vile attempts...to evade...the just claims of our government.” To the Republicans, Federalists put the interests of Great Britain first, ahead of American neutral rights. Federalists argued that Republicans followed the orders of the Jacobin clubs of France. Republicans retook a majority in the Assembly and Federalist congressional seats dropped from eight to five. Federalists won 41 Assembly seats. Their only surprise gain was six of the eleven seats from New York City. Republicans blamed the eight hundred African American voters and made plans to restrict their right to vote. Governor Tompkins easily won reelection. Without the embargo the efforts of the Federalists to put the blame President Madison for the failure of Anglo-American relations failed. This time, attacking England proved more effective than censuring President Madison and Republican foreign policy.

An apparent improvement in Franco-American relation in September 1810 and the continued stalemate in Anglo-American relations troubled New York’s Federalists. After President Madison declared on 2 November 1810 that the French had repealed their decrees that negatively impacted American neutral rights Federalists worried about a further deterioration in Anglo-American relations. In the state elections of 1811, both parties attempted to use foreign policy against their opponents. Anglophobia worked better for the Republicans and the Federalist critique of Madison’s foreign policies with France and Great Britain failed to move the voters. Republicans retained control of the Assembly and De Witt Clinton won election as Lieutenant-Governor.

When Anglo-American relations continued to deteriorate President Madison opted for a new embargo and war in the spring of 1812. A new embargo allowed Federalists to take power winning a majority of seats once again in the 1812 spring state elections. Foreign policy dominated the campaign. In the spring of 1812, Congress approved a new ninety-day embargo. When news reached New York City on 3 April 1812, fifty ships rushed to leave port and as Jonathan Ogden noted “ a like confusion I have never seen.” The embargo and threat of war became the major issue in the election. Thanks to the foreign policy decisions of President Madison, the Federalists were back in power winning three Senate seats and a majority (60 seats) in the Assembly. Results of the election suggested a majority of New York voters rejected renewed commercial restrictions and war. Divisions about the war, and initially splits within Republican ranks became apparent when eleven of the fourteen Congressmen present during the war vote along with one of the state’s U,S, Senators voted against war. Clintonian Republicans initially opposed war. Four Federalists and seven Republican congressmen voted against war. Later, at the end of the year when New Yorkers went to the polls to elect members of Congress they selected 19 anti-war Federalists, one anti-war Republican, and seven pro-war Republicans. New York sent the largest anti-war delegation of any state to Congress suggesting that a majority of the electorate in New York rejected President Madison’s decision to go to war.

While Governor Tompkins won re-election in 1813 his vote totals were half of 1810 and the Federalists campaigning against the war retained their majority in the Assembly in the spring 1813 state elections. Public sentiment changed in the winter of 1813-14 because of British raids on the Niagara Frontier forcing thousands of New Yorkers to flee eastward to the comparative

safety of Batavia to avoid the British and their Native American allies. Reacting to the reality that New York had become a major battle ground of the war, voters elected twenty-one pro-war Republicans to Congress in the spring of 1814, and Republicans won two-thirds of the Assembly seats. However, the less than glorious outcome of the war allowed Federalists to make one more political comeback denouncing the war and the foreign policy of President Madison. Federalists picked up twenty seats and almost tied the Assembly at 64 Republicans to 62 Federalists. Republican 1814 majority of thirty-two seats dropped to two in 1815, hardly a ringing endorsement of the War of 1812. In looking at New York politics between 1790 and 1815 four themes dominate--impact of foreign policy on state and local politics, the factionalism of the two political parties, especially among Republicans, chaos in the election process and afterward, as the 1808 election demonstrated, and high voter turnout due to the increased competition between the Federalists and Republicans.